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RESUME
A conception of the Correspondence Principle which Bohr 
deployed implicitly in developing a new theory of atomic 
constitution in 1913, is made explicit through an extensive 
examination of his classic paper of that year. Arguments are 
considered which purport to show that the application of the 
principle must be restricted to few isolated cases. These 
arguments are either defused or rejected. In particular 
an extensive review of issues concerning the interpretation 
of Quantum Mechanics is made to counter the claims that an 
insurmountable conceptual gap exits between the tenets of 
this theory and those of Classical Mechanics which makes it 
logically impossible for the latter to be regarded as the 
'limiting case1 of the former. In the light of a particular 
interpretation adopted and defended, a proposal is made that 
suggests that the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of Classical 
Mechanics, as well as Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, can 
be viewed as 'limiting cases' of Quantum Mechanics. Having 
established a case for the global validity of the requirement 
imposed on physics by the Correspondence Principle, it is 
then argued that this requirement is indispensable if a 
particular brand of realism is adopted for the interpretation 
of theories in physics. Taking on board the assumption that 
an ultimate theory exists which mirrors the underlying 
physical constitution of the world, it is subsequently argued 
that the intertheory order established by the global 
imposition of the principle in physics, can be used to solve 
the problem of rational theory choice for this brand of 
realism.
CHAPTER 1 
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CONTENTS
1
CHAPTER 2
Bohr's Conception of the Correspondence Principle
1. General Features of Bohr's 1913 Theory 15
2. The Average Rule 19
3. The Informal Justification of the Average Rule 24
4. The Formal Justification of the Average Rule 28
5. Methodological Review of Bohr's Argument 33
CHAPTER 3
Generalized Correspondence Principle and Two-tier Realism
1. Conceptions of the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle 37
2. The Approximational Conception of the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle 45
3. Objections to the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle 55
4. The Charge of Inconsistency 63
5. The Two-tier Realist Conception of Theories 65
6. Some Concrete Examples 68
7. The 'Paradox' of the Two-tier Realist Assessment
of Success 78
8. Resolution of the 'Paradox' 84
CHAPTER 4
Verisimilitude and Rational Theory Choice in Physics
1. The Correspondence Relation 95
2. The Relative Proximity of a Theory to the Truth 102
3. The Ultimate Theory 113
4. The Truth-likeness Sequence 119
5. The Problem of Rational Theory Choice 122
6. Convergent Realism and Verisimilitude 126
CONTENTS / continued
CHAPTER 5
Is Quantum Mechanics Inconsistent With the Demands 
of the Generalized Correspondence Principle?
1. Introduction 131
2. Anomalous Results From Slit-Experiments 140
3. 'Wave-Particle Duality1 142
4. Some Critical Remarks 146
5. The Conception of State in Classical Mechanics 149
6. The Quantum Mechanical Situation 152
7. The Uncertainty Principle 153
8. Phase Space and the States of Physical Systems 155
9. Schrodinger's Scheme for the Description of States 157
10. The Conception of State in Quantum Mechanics 159
11. Credible Measurement Results 162
12. Dispersion of Measured Values and the State of
Q-Systems 166
13. Instantaneous State of a Single Q-Particle 169
14. Evolution of Quantum Mechanical States 172
15. The Reality of the State Function 174
16. Beam-Splitting Experiments 178
17. Delayed-Choice Experiment 181
18. The Amplitude Field 182
19. Back to the Beam-Splitting Experiments 187
20. Averages and Expectation Values 191
21. Operators, Their Eigenvalues and Eigenfunctions 194
22. Eigenvalue Equation and the Superposition Principle 197
23. 'Paradoxes' of the Orthodox Interpretation 200
24. The Problem of Measurement 202
25. Schrodinger's Cat and Wigner's Friend 207
26. Back to the Wave Function 211
27. Amplitude Field and Measurement 216
28. The Limiting Case Problem 219
CONCLUSION 230
REFERENCES 233
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The question of what counts as the right approach towards the 
solution of the problem of theory choice in science, depends 
very much on how this problem is formulated. If the problem 
is viewed as how best to select theories which are not suited 
to be believed (so far as rationality of choice is 
concerned), then Popper's falsificationist approach may be 
regarded as an adequate step in the right direction. But if 
the problem is considered to be how to select theories which 
are worth believing, this approach, on its own, can no longer 
serve as adequate. It must either be augmented with 
additional considerations or else replaced with an altogether 
different approach. Alternatives in both these categories 
already exist: Watkins [1984] offers an approach of the first 
kind, and the varieties of Baysianism may be considered as 
species of the second.
With perhaps the possible exception of the objective brand of 
Baysianism, these approaches share in keeping the notion of 
truth basically out of their prescription for theory choice. 
The main reason for this may be cited as difficulties, which 
following the failure of Popper's account of verisimilitude, 
were perceived by many authors to stand in the way of 
formally defining the notion of proximity of a false theory 
to the truth. Many people, however, feel that truth is too 
attractive a notion to be given up in accounting for rational 
theory choice in science. This feeling is particularly shared 
by those who adopt a strong realist outlook on scientific
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theories. If science is a genuine cognitive enterprise, and 
if scientific theories purport to describe the world as it 
really is, the feeling is that, in comparison to its rivals, 
the merit of a theory for being believed ought to reside in 
the greater similarity of what it says to the truth. In the 
absence of a knock out argument that shows this feeling to be 
based on a mere illusion, the search for an approach to the 
problem of rational theory choice which incorporates the 
notion of truth is, therefore not an unrewarding exercise.
The motivation for this thesis is the exploration of one 
possibility towards this end. The idea is the following: 
Suppose in a branch of science an ordering can be established 
between theories which somehow ranks each according to its 
explanatory, as well as predictive capability with sufficient 
clarity. Then the assumption that this ordering converges to 
a theory that surpasses all others in these respects, would 
help to set up a progression which may be exploited to 
indicate the relative place of a theory vis a vis the one 
which forms the ideal in that branch. With a strong realist 
gloss, this ideal may be taken to represent that theory which 
mirrors the underlying constitution of the world in the 
relevant field. Now, such a theory may be taken as a 
surrogate for the truth in the corresponding domain, and 
consequently the progression in question may be taken as 
representing a verisimilitude ordering in the given branch. 
In this way, a reasonably clear representation for the 
relative proximity of theories in a branch of science may be
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obtained while circumventing the difficulties associated with 
the formal definition of this notion.
In 1913 Niels Bohr suggested an original idea which he 
exploited ingeniously to develop a radically new theory about 
the constitution of atoms. The idea may be roughly stated as 
follows: Suppose in a branch of physics a theory exists which 
has proved spectacularly successful in accounting for and 
predicting a wide range of phenomena. Should, as a result of 
experimental research into the further depths of the field, 
circumstances arise which call for the emergence of a new 
theory, of all the theories that can possibly succeed where 
the old one had failed, only those should be considered as 
worthy of an established place within the branch which can at 
least reproduce its successes in the appropriate domain. This 
demand, which essentially amounts to a call for the 
preservation of continuity in a branch of physics, is known 
as the Correspondence Principle. Two questions immediately 
arise here: (1) Precisely what sort of inter-theory relation 
must be envisaged between successive successful theories in 
a branch of physics if this demand for continuity is to be 
realistically fulfilled? (2) Can this principle be 
generalized to hold in all branches of physics? Issues 
surrounding these questions are contentious and there is by 
no means a consensus among authors who have taken an interest 
in them.
The aim in this thesis is not to settle accounts on these 
issues. They are nevertheless raised and dealt with for the
purposes of exploring the potentials of the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle in establishing a progression 
between several major theories from various branches of 
physics, which can then be used (along with additional 
assumptions) to represent a quasi-verisimilitude ordering. 
Towards this end a conception of the Correspondence Principle 
is needed which can not only hold its ground in particular 
cases of interest, but also lend itself to generalization. To 
find this conception the strategy will be to go back to Bohr 
and start by examining his intuitions on the subject. The 
reason for this choice is not only that Bohr was the first 
physicist who introduced the Principle and exploited it in 
the practice of developing a series of theories which 
culminated in the birth of Quantum Mechanics, but also he 
envisaged it as holding generally in any case where a new 
theory is needed due to the failure of attempts to extend the 
resources of an otherwise successful theory to new domains.
The thesis gets under way in chapter 2 with an investigation 
of Bohr's deployment of the Correspondence Principle in his 
[1913]. The term 'Korrespondenzprinzip', according to van der 
Waerden [1967], p. 7, first appeared in the literature in a 
paper published by Bohr in 1920 (Z. Phys. 2, p. 423). The 
concept, however, was introduced and heuristically exploited 
by him seven years earlier in his classic 1913 paper. During 
the period when Quantum Mechanics was being developed, there 
are notable references to, and further articulations of, the 
Principle in several papers which Bohr published either by 
himself or jointly with other authors. Nevertheless,
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throughout this period not only did the concept remain 
essentially unchanged, but also his deployment of it in 
successive stages of working out a new theory of atomic 
constitution paralleled that inaugurated in his [1913]. The 
choice of this paper is therefore justified by the fact that 
it contains all the ingredients which underwrite Bohr's 
intuitions about the application of the Correspondence 
Principle in physics. There is also the additional advantage 
that the heuristic use of these intuitions is conspicuously 
displayed in this paper thus throwing further light on how 
the Principle was conceived by its author.
In Bohr [1913], the Principle appears as an assumption 
(without yet receiving its name) according to which for a 
certain range of values of a variable parameter, the 
predictions of the new theory 'coincide' with those of the 
theory to be replaced. This 'coincidence' is then invoked to 
legitimize the use of a hypothesis in the old theory in order 
to find the value of an unknown coefficient in the new 
theory. In Bohr [1918], however, this idea is generalized, 
appearing first as an expectation and later as a requirement 
that any new theory must satisfy if it is to be an acceptable 
replacement for the overthrown theory. Having introduced the 
idea, radically at odds with the classical notions, that 
electromagnetic radiation is emitted from or absorbed by 
atoms only during a discontinuous jump from one stationary 
state to another, Bohr writes: 'If we next consider a
transition between two stationary states, it is obvious at 
once from the essential discontinuity... that in general it
is impossible even approximately to describe this phenomenon 
by means of ordinary mechanics or to calculate the frequency 
of the radiation absorbed or emitted by such a process by 
means of ordinary electrodynamics. On the other hand, from 
the fact that it has been possible by means of ordinary 
mechanics and electrodynamics to account for the phenomenon 
of temperature-radiation in the limiting region of slow 
vibrations, we may expect that any theory capable of 
describing this phenomenon in accordance with observations 
will form some sort of natural generalisation of the ordinary 
theory of radiation.1 (Bohr [1918], reprinted in van der 
Waerden [1967], p. 99). Soon after in the paper, what in the 
quoted passage appeared as an expectation is proposed as 'the 
necessary relation1 (Ibid, p. 101), and 'the necessary 
connection' (Ibid, p. 110) , that should hold between the new 
and the old theories.
In the specific context of working out a viable theory of 
atomic structure, Bohr's intuitions about a new theory being 
a 'natural generalization' of the classical electrodynamics 
is premised on the type of success which the latter enjoyed 
in adequately accounting for a wide range of phenomena. It 
is, therefore, natural to expect that the 'necessary 
relation' he has in mind should obtain in a wider context 
whenever a theory to be replaced has, at least, been 
established as enjoying similar successes. Feyerabend and 
Hanson have launched some rather influential arguments which 
conclude by suggesting that this expectation is unwarranted. 
These arguments will be presented in chapter 3. Feyerabend' s
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argument will be examined in this chapter and found to attack 
only an assumption which Bohr's conception of the 
Correspondence Principle does not contain.
Hanson's case, on the other hand, is premised on the claim 
that the machinery deployed by the formalism of Quantum 
Mechanics is so alien to that deployed by the Classical 
Mechanics that a convergence, in any sense, between the 
concepts of the two theories would be impossible. This he 
presents as an insurmountable obstacle which prevents any 
'correspondence' to hold between the two theories. It will be 
claimed that Hanson's case is based on an interpretation of 
the Quantum formalism which is not the best available. In 
particular, it suffers from the defect of making psychology 
an integral part of physics. It will be argued that there is 
nothing in the machinery deployed by the Quantum formalism to 
make this position an unavoidable consequence. On the 
contrary, a family of interpretations for this formalism 
exits which are superior to the former in that they do not 
share this particular problem. This is not to say that they 
are without problems of their own. Rather, seeking possible 
solutions to these problems does not require hiring help from 
disciplines other than physics itself. The case for these 
claims will be fully developed in chapter 5, at the end of 
this thesis, because it involves a wide range of issues 
concerning the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The aim 
of that rather long chapter, however, will remain basically 
to present a counter-example to Hanson's argument.
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The conception of the Correspondence Principle which is found 
not only to best capture Bohr's intuitions and practice, but 
also suited to the aim pursued in this thesis, turns out to 
be unlike any extant ones in the literature on the subject. 
Depending on the kind of entities theories are taken to be, 
attempts at articulating the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle may be broadly divided into two groups. One group 
views theories roughly as sets of propositions which describe 
events and processes in physical space-time together with 
laws that govern them. It is fair to say that this view, 
which agrees well with common-sense, enjoys a wide-spread 
support among philosophers of science and for this reason it 
may be branded the 'standard' view. The rival group utilises 
model theoretic techniques and regards theories as sets of 
mathematical models (intended or potential) in which the 
formal equations proposed by a theory hold. We may call this 
the 'non-standard' view. These views will be briefly 
discussed in chapter 3 where the standard view be found to 
suit the purposes of this thesis better than its rival.
Within the standard tradition, there are basically two 
strands which nevertheless share the view that in the 
transition between theories related by the Correspondence 
Principle, something must remain somehow unchanged. According 
to one strand the 'correspondence' holds as a relation solely 
between the mathematical equations of the superseded and 
superseding theories. As some parameters in some equations of 
the superseding theory are allowed to tend towards an extreme 
value (either zero.or infinity), these equations would tend
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increasingly to look like their counterparts in the 
superseded theory. In the limit where these extreme values 
are assumed, it is claimed that the respective equations 
would actually become identical. We may call this strand the 
'structural1 conception of the generalized Correspondence 
Principle. According to the other strand, the Correspondence 
Principle demands that part of the ontology of the superseded 
theory carries over, unchanged, to that of the superseding 
one. We may call this the 'ontological1 conception. 
Representative proponents of both these conceptions will be 
presented in chapter 3 and their accounts will be tested 
against the paradigm case contained in Bohr [1913]. Both will 
be found wanting.
The alternative version of the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle conjectured in this thesis rests within the 
standard tradition. Unlike the extant strands within this 
tradition, however, this conception does not require that 
anything should remain unchanged in the transition from the 
superseded to the superseding theories. There will be a 
common range of values for the parameters of both theories 
for which their respective equations will have, on the whole, 
nearly the same empirical consequences. In general, however, 
it is neither the case that some of these equations can be 
'turned into' the others, nor is it the case that there will 
be significant portions in the ontologies proposed by the 
theories involved which escape change in the transition. All 
that is required is that the superseded theory should, in a 
sense that I will try to specify, be a good approximation to
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the superseding one. This conception of the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle, which we may call 'approximational' 
will be presented in chapter 3. It should be emphasized, 
however, that this presentation will be exploratory rather 
than critical; it is intended to serve the purpose of seeing 
how much mileage may be got from it in setting up the desired 
progression for some successive major theories in physics. In 
this connection, the case involving Quantum and Classical 
Mechanics, for the reasons already mentioned, will be dealt 
with separately in the last part of this thesis, chapter 5.
The motivation for choosing the approximational conception is 
twofold. First, the cases in which either the structural or 
the ontological correspondence hold, appear to fall out 
naturally as its special cases. Second, - and this is more 
important for the purposes of this thesis - it appears that 
the approximational conception, if tenable, can lend support 
to a particular brand of realism for handling the problem of 
rational theory choice in physics. The brand of realism in 
question is one among several positions of varying strengths 
which constitute the general realist outlook about scientific 
theories. What all these positions have in common can, 
perhaps, be best highlighted in a comparison with the 
instrumentalist outlook about such theories. According to the 
latter, the merits of scientific theories is exhausted by 
their success in predicting observable phenomena. Thus 
construed, anything these theories appear to say about the 
underlying constitution of the world is either vacuous or 
else irrelevant to their actual epistemic value. Realists, on
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the other hand, share instrumentalists1 high regard for 
empirical success, but consider it only as one of the merits 
of a scientific theory. To them, what a theory says is
neither vacuous nor irrelevant to its cognitive role; a 
scientific theory is comprised of genuine propositions which 
are either true or false depending on how the world is
independently of human cognition and purposes.
The brand of realism I will concentrate on goes even further. 
It incorporates, in addition, the view that scientific 
inquiry is capable of providing, not just a series of
'educated' conjectures, but genuine information about the 
deep structure of the world. According to this position, a 
theory which satisfies all the standard methodological 
desiderata and has accumulated an impressive record of
empirical success, contributes to our knowledge of the world 
even though it may turn out to be false. An adherent to this 
brand of realism is thus not only curious to find out what 
underlies the observable features of the world, but would 
turn partly to physics in order to satisfy this curiosity. 
Because this position rests, in addition to the ontological 
commitment common to all brands of realism, on an additional 
epistemological commitment, I shall call it ’two-tier' 
realism. Arguments for or against this pjosition will not be 
considered in this thesis. It will be presented in chapter 3 
where a case is going to be made for why two-tier realism 
requires a principle that can safeguard the achievements of 
an outstanding but overthrown theory. It will be found that 
one purpose which the approximational conception of the
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Correspondence Principle can serve appears to be the 
fulfilment of this requirement.
Two-tier realism, in addition to being attractive to common 
sense, is not without a pedigree in contemporary philosophy 
of science. Karl Popper, at least at one stage in his 
philosophical career, was certainly committed to it. This was 
the period when he introduced and tried, without success, to 
articulate the idea of verisimilitude. This idea, however, 
remains of vital relevance to a two-tier realist. In the 
absence of any direct cognitive access to the underlying 
constitution of the world, he must be content to turn to 
scientific inquiry in order to gain what knowledge he can 
about it. This, in turn, will bring him face to face with the 
problem of rational theory choice in science.
Here, there are certain (essentially Popperian) 
methodological constraints that would have to be met by any 
theory which is to be acceptable in science. These include 
internal consistency, unity of axioms, symmetry of laws, 
exclusion of ad-hoc stratagems, and last but not least, 
testability. If in addition to satisfying these constraints 
a theory also meets with spectacular empirical success under 
stringent testing conditions, a two-tier realist may be 
tempted, but cannot rationally conclude that it is true. The 
reason, which we owe to Popper, is that we know (a) 
verification of scientific theories is logically impossible, 
and (b) there are theories of this kind which had to be 
rejected subsequently as false. So, the only option that is
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left open to a two-tier realist is to regard a historical 
sequence of such theories as progressing towards the ultimate 
truth about the underlying constitution of the world. This 
option leaves science a promising kind of inquiry: although 
it cannot offer a guarantee to deliver the truth at any time, 
it churns out theories which proceed in the direction towards 
it.
After failing to find a precise and viable definition for 
'verisimilitude1, Popper gave up attempts at bringing this 
notion to bear on the problem of rational theory choice in 
science. As a consequence, his account of theory choice 
remains, so far as the aspirations of a two-tier realist are 
concerned, essentially negative: it can tell him which
theories not to believe, but it cannot recommend the one 
which contributes the most to our knowledge of the world. A 
brief discussion of some issues concerning the notion of 
verisimilitude and Popper's account of it is presented in 
chapter 4. However, the bulk of that chapter will be devoted 
to an exploration of the following question: how can the 
approximational conception of the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle be exploited by two-tier realism to fill the gap 
left by the absence of a formally precise and viable 
definition for the concept of verisimilitude? This is not to 
say that this concept remains undefined; indeed there are 
more than one attempts at formal definitions for it in the 
literature. The point is rather to explore what needs to be 
done, with the approximational conception at hand, towards 
the fulfilment of the aspirations of a two-tier realist
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concerning the question of rational theory choice in physics, 
without having to formally define the notion of 
verisimilitude.
On the whole, the purpose followed in this thesis is to take 
up some ideas in order to see how they can be brought to fit 
together to form, rather like a jigsaw, an account of theory 
choice in physics. Such an account is desirable given the 
point of view of two-tier realism, but is missing in the 
literature. Wherever I have found it necessary, I have tried 
to make the ideas not only as clear as I can, but also 
plausible. I recognize, however, that this is no guarantee 
that they are either free of flaws, or indeed even tenable. 
Delving into questions pertinent to these issues can no doubt 
form the purpose of further study.
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CHAPTER 2
BOHR’S CONCEPTION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE
1. General Features of Bohr's 1913 Theory
The theory of atomic constitution proposed in Bohr [1913], 
despite sharing many of its features with other existing 
theories at the time, has a radically new feature. It boldly 
postulates a process which is in breach of all the familiar 
mechanical explanations, and is not itself explained in any 
way. One could argue that the same could perhaps be said of 
Planck1s theory of black body radiation which proposes that 
electromagnetic energy is absorbed and emitted by charged 
oscillators in discontinuous lumps only. It must be noted, 
however, that even though this discontinuity is indeed alien 
to Classical theories, the process of radiation itself is 
explained purely in mechanical terms. In Planck's theory, 
just as in Maxwell's electrodynamics, electromagnetic 
radiation is the result of disturbances created by an 
accelerating charge in the electromagnetic field.
Bohr had to somehow put a stop to an accelerating charge 
radiating energy in all circumstances. The reason for this 
was the following: Earlier, the results of experiments on the 
scattering of « particles from a few atoms, had forced 
Rutherford to propose the planetary model of the atom in 
1911. This model consisted of a positively charged massive 
nucleus with a sufficient number of negatively charged 
electrons in circular orbits around it, such that the atom 
remains electrically neutral. Since the orbiting electron is 
constantly accelerating, this model along with the Classical 
theory of radiation entail that the electron should radiate
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itself out of energy. As a result, it should soon come to 
rest by collapsing into the nucleus. In order, therefore, for 
the Rutherford model of the atom to be a stable structure, it 
is necessary that the electron should be prevented from 
radiating energy while it remains undisturbed in an orbit. 
Bohr achieves this by fiat.
Bohr's electron is similar to Planck's oscillator in that 
when it does create disturbances in the electromagnetic 
field, the latter propagate as discontinuous lumps of energy. 
Whereas Planck's oscillator, however, is Classical in that 
its acceleration invariably disturbs the field (albeit 
discontinuously), Bohr's electron in an atom exchanges energy 
with the field only when it goes from one nuclear orbit to 
another. This exchange always involves discontinuous lumps of 
energy. The electron goes into an orbit farther away from the 
nucleus when it absorbs energy from the field, while it emits 
energy by going into one with a smaller radius.
There is another important dissimilarity between Bohr's 
electron and Planck's oscillator. According to Planck, in 
every exchange of energy between the oscillator and the 
electromagnetic field, the frequency of radiation is always 
equal to the frequency of the oscillator's periodic motion. 
This, in effect, is how Planck's theory can mechanically 
account for radiation from accelerating charges. Bohr, as we 
shall see shortly, sees no alternative but to break this 
equivalence. Since he offers no explanation for the
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relationship that he proposes between the two, his theory 
ends up with a distinctly non-mechanical character.
The similarities and dissimilarities noted are not, however, 
haphazard. Bohr [1913] cites the results obtained by J. W. 
Nicholson in a series of publications in which he was working 
with a model of atomic structure which appears to be a cross 
between those of J. J. Thompson's and Rutherford's. According 
to this model, the electrons are held, by an inverse-square 
force, on etherial rings that surround a positively charged 
nucleus. The electrons are allowed to oscillate around fixed 
points either horizontally on the plane of the rings, or 
vertically perpendicular to this plane. Using Planck's theory 
of radiation verbatim, Nicholson was able to derive ratios 
between the wavelengths of different sets of tightly packed 
lines in the spectrum of the solar corona, which showed 
excellent agreement with measured results (Bohr [1913],
p. 6]).
Nicholson's theory, however, is incapable of accounting for 
unevenly dispersed lines in the emission spectrum of the 
hydrogen atom, such as the Balmer lines, a phenomenon which 
was known at the time. The reason for this is that as long as 
oscillators whose exchange of energy with the field is 
Planckian, accelerate, they would have to lose energy by 
emitting quanta of radiation. This emission, in turn, should 
change the frequency of the electron's periodic motion 
because the latter is tied up with the frequency of 
radiation. Consequently, a single orbital frequency should
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not be sustained for a prolonged period of time in the 
emission spectrum of the atom (Bohr [1913], p. 7]). The 
lesson Bohr draws here is that a more realistic model of the 
atomic structure should have the electrons behave as 
Planckian oscillators only in the regions where the 
frequencies of radiation correspond to tightly packed 
spectral lines.
A look at the energies and the frequencies associated with 
not only Balmer's, but also the Paschen and Lyman lines in 
the emission spectrum of the hydrogen atom (the latter was 
not yet available at the time), shows that the tighter packed 
lines correspond to lower energies and frequencies. Adopting 
Rutherford's model of the atom, then, Bohr is left with the 
thought that in the higher frequency areas of its orbit, the 
electron must behave in a non-Planckian way, approaching 
Planckian behaviour only as its orbital frequency gets lower 
and lower.
Now, the difference between the regions of high and low 
frequencies cannot be attributed to the orbital motion of the 
electron, since that remains the same in all the orbits. 
However, if the separation between the orbits is different in 
these regions, transitions between orbits could account for 
the difference. It turns out that as the orbital radius 
increases, the separation between the orbits gets smaller and 
smaller. At large distances from the nucleus, therefore, the 
electron could jump from one orbit to another without 
appearing to have changed it at all. It would look as if the
18
electron were radiating in a single orbit, whereas in fact it 
is radiating by jumping between orbits.
2• The Average Rule
Severing the mechanical relationship between frequencies of 
the periodic motion and radiation, can secure stability for 
the electron's orbits in Rutherford's model, but it creates 
a problem. As will become clear later, Bohr needs a numerical 
relation between the two frequencies in order to calculate 
'characteristic' values for the energy of the hydrogen atom, 
as well as the size of the electron's orbit in its most 
stable state.
In Rutherford's model of the hydrogen atom, the electron is 
held in orbit by a mutually attractive Coulomb force between 
it and the positively charged nucleus. If we denote the 
charges on the nucleus and the electron by e and -e 
respectively, this force is Fc = -ke2/r2, where r is the 
radius of orbit and k a constant. When the atom is in 
equilibrium, this force must be equivalent to a centripetal 
force Fp due to the revolution of the electron. If v is the 
velocity of the electron and me its mass, Fp = -mjf/r. v2/r is 
the radial acceleration of the electron, and the minus sign 
indicates the inward direction of the force. Equivalence of 
the two forces yields mev2/r = ke2/r2, or mev2 = ke2/r.
The left hand side of the latter equivalence is twice the 
kinetic energy Ek of the electron. This entails Ek = 1/2
(ke2/r) . The electric field due to the positive nucleus gives 
rise to a potential Vr everywhere on the surface of a 
spherical shell with a radius r from the nucleus. Since the 
electron carries a charge -e, its potential energy Ep at a 
distance r from the nucleus is given by Ep = -Vre. The 
potential Vr, in turn, is given by the work necessary for 
bringing a positive charge e from a point infinitely away 
from the nucleus to a point at a distance r from it. So Vr = 
\ke/r2dr, which yields Vr = ke/r. Since Ep = -Vre, we obtain
'oO
Ep = -ke2/r.
We are now in a position to find the total energy Et of the 
electron: Et = Ek + Ep = 1/2 (ke2/r) - ke2/r = -1/2 (ke2/r) . 
The minus sign indicates that a total energy of 1/2 (ke2/r) 
must be pumped into the system in order to break the electron 
loose from the nuclear hold. Let us call this the 
'characteristic' energy of the electron in its stable orbits, 
and denote it by W. We have then, W = 1/2 (ke2/r) , or r = 1/2 
(ke2/W) .
We note that W has the same value as the kinetic energy of 
the electron in its revolutions at a distance r around the 
nucleus. Assuming the electron travels with a constant speed, 
its speed v in a circular orbit of radius r is related to its 
orbital frequency w by v = 2nrw. Since the kinetic energy of 
the electron is Ek = 1/2 (mev2) , substituting we get Ek = 1/2 
me(4n2r2w2) = 2n2r2w2me = W. From this we get an expression
relating the characteristic energy of the electron to its 
orbital frequency: w = Vw / (V2Vmenr) . Substituting the
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values of r in this relation we obtain: w — 2W/W / (/2/merike2) 
= /2W3/2 / (Vnieiike2) . Now the problem is to get expressions for 
w and W which would enable us to calculate results that can 
be tested against the available experimental data.
According to the postulate laid down by Bohr, the electron 
should emit radiation only when it changes orbits to one 
closer to the nucleus. Suppose initially we start out with an 
electron which is infinitely far from a hydrogen ion, and at 
rest relative to its nucleus. Suppose further that as a 
result of some interaction, the electron gets trapped in the 
mutual nuclear hold, finally settling down at a stable orbit 
of radius r around the nucleus. During this transition, 
radiation is given off whose energy should be, according to 
Planck's theory, nh/x, where h is the Planck's constant, /x the 
frequency of radiation and n a variable ranging over 
integers.
This energy must be equivalent to W, since, as we saw, W is 
just the amount of energy that the electron needs (in reverse 
order) to break loose from the binding nuclear force, thus 
turning the hydrogen atom into an ion. So W = nh/x. If we had 
Planck's theory of radiation in its entirety available at 
this point, we could sail home, because according to this 
theory /x = w. In the absence of this luxury, Bohr comes up 
with the suggestion that the frequency of the radiation 
should be equivalent to the average of the orbital
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frequencies before and after the binding takes place (Bohr 
[1913], p. 4f). Call this proposal, the ’average rule1.
Since the electron was initially at a relative rest, its 
orbital frequency Wi at this stage must be zero. At the final 
stage, the electron would be orbiting the nucleus with the 
frequency wf. The average 1/2 (w± + wf) of these frequencies 
would be just 1/2 (wf) . If by w we now understand any orbital 
frequency to which the electron has settled after initially 
starting at rest relative to the nucleus, and substitute this 
for /x in Planck’s expression for the radiated energy, we get 
W = nhw/2. Substituting this for W in the expression we 
derived for the orbital frequency, we obtain: w =
V*2 (nhw/2)3/2/ /me(nke2), or w = 4men2k2e4/n3h3. We can see that 
this astonishing result gives the orbital frequencies of the 
electron in the hydrogen atom, mostly in terms of constants 
whose values were all available at the time. The only 
variable in this expression is n which ranges over integers. 
With this expression at hand, we can not only determine the 
energies of the electron, but the radii for its stable orbits 
as well. They come out respectively as W = 2men2k2e4/n2h2, and 
r = n2h2/4men2ke2.
We must, at this point, note a change in the interpretation 
of the variable n. In Planck's theory of radiation the values 
of this variable are cardinal numbers, each determining a 
'size' for the amount of the radiated energy. In Bohr's 
theory, the values of n are ordinal numbers each labelling an 
orbit of the electron in the order of their closeness to the
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nucleus. Thus for n = 1 we get the orbit with the smallest 
possible radius; for n = 2, we get the radius for the next 
possible orbit further away, and so on without any orbits 
being allowed in between. So, although nothing is changed so 
far as the numerical results are concerned, where in Planck's 
theory nhju signifies n lumps of h/z energy which are 
simultaneously radiated out, in Bohr's reinterpretation it 
signifies a single lump of energy that is radiated out with 
the frequency nfi. This frequency, in turn, is characteristic 
for a jump from the state in which the electron is at rest 
infinitely far from the nucleus, to the state in which it is 
orbiting the nucleus with a radius determined by n.
Bohr writes in this connection: 'We are thus led to assume
that the interpretation of the equation [W = nhw/2] is not 
that the different stationary states correspond to an 
emission of different numbers of energy-quanta, but that the 
frequency of the energy emitted during the passing of the 
system from a state in which no energy is yet radiated out to 
one of the different stationary states, is equal to different 
multiples of w/2, where w is the frequency of revolution of 
the electron in the state considered.' (Ibid, p. 14).
The value of W is greatest for n = 1 which means that it must 
be the ionization potential for the hydrogen atom. The value 
of this potential was experimentally known in 1913, and the 
agreement between it and the value calculated from his theory 
is claimed by Bohr as its first confirmation. The same goes 
for the value of r- for n = 1, which must fix the dimensions
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of the hydrogen atom at its most stable state. Further 
confirmations are claimed for the agreement between the 
calculated energies and frequencies for transitions between 
orbits corresponding to n > 2 and those measured for Balmer1 s 
lines in the emission spectrum of the hydrogen atom. 
Rydberg's empirically determined relation for the frequencies 
of the line spectra, is also seen to follow directly from 
this theory. All this and more seems to indicate that Bohr 
had struck gold with his average rule. The question is how 
did he come upon that rule?
3. The Informal Justification of the Average Rule
Let us first examine some answers to this question in the 
popularized literature. Holton and Brush [1973] say that it 
was a bold but informed conjecture which happened to meet 
with success. 1 Bohr1, they write, 1... takes a bold step on 
the basis of little more than a hunch; he assumes that if the 
electron is initially at rest at a very large distance from 
the nucleus... and if, when it is captured or bound by the 
atom, it drops into a final state, ... the frequency V of 
the emitted light is simply the average of the initial and 
final frequencies of orbital revolution.1 (Ibid, p. 482). And 
further, 'The critical steps - assuming that the frequency of 
emitted radiation is the average of the frequencies of 
revolution in the two orbits, and then redefining the quantum 
number n - were leaps in the dark which could only be 
justified by their subsequent success.1 (Ibid, p. 486). Short 
of the colourful adjectives, this is pretty much how Olenick
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et al [1986], (pp. 448-452), also tell the story. In neither 
of these expositions is there any mention of the 
Correspondence Principle, which was, as already mentioned, 
only formally articulated in later works of Bohr*s.
Holton and Roller [1958], (pp. 624-628), on the other hand, 
do not mention the average rule at all, but summon the 
Correspondence Principle in an attempt to account for Bohr's 
derivations. After they spell out their case, however, they 
leave the perplexed reader with such a flagrant case of 
inconsistency that must surely discredit the principle they 
correctly claim to be at work. Perhaps Lakatos [1970] was 
influenced by this and similar accounts when it claimed that 
Bohr1s model of the hydrogen atom was developed on
'inconsistent foundations' (pp. 142, 144, and 153). But more 
on this later.
Bohr, Holton and Roller write, 'found a systematic way of 
deducing radii of the allowed orbits in the hydrogen atom by 
a consideration of the following type. When an atom is 
strongly excited, its electron should be moving in an orbit 
with a large diameter. But for a sufficiently large orbit, we 
must expect that the classical electrodynamic theory of 
Maxwell and Hertz applies; in that case the circulating
current (here only one electron) should radiate light at a
frequency equal to the frequency of the orbital motion. At
the same time, Planck's quantum postulate should hold for 
this as for any system with periodic motion, so that the 
energy changes of the orbiting electron should proceed in
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smallest intervals of value hV . Here is a place where 
classical and quantum physics join, and we may assume that 
they overlap without leaving a discontinuous transition. In 
this region the quantum physics and classical physics merge 
into each other, and their predictions must correspond.1 
Holton and Roller [1958], (p. 625).
The fact that Maxwell and Hertz are brought in makes the 
inconsistency especially glaring. For according to their 
theory, electromagnetic radiation is incessantly linked to 
the instantaneous acceleration of electric charges. If there 
is no pause in this acceleration, there would be no gap 
whatsoever in the release of electromagnetic energy into the 
ether. Bohr's theory, in sharp contrast, would allow 
electrons to accelerate around an atomic obit as long as it 
can be sustained, without radiating any energy whatsoever. In 
order for these contradictory accounts to 1merge1 at any 
level, one of them must give way, somehow exempting the 
electrons from behaving in their otherwise natural way. 
Neither, however, appears to allow any such exemption.
According to a serious and detailed study made in Kuhn and 
Heilbron [1969], the average rule was needed to enable Bohr 
to derive Balmer's formula for the spectral lines. However, 
Bohr had no justification to sanction its use. 'In order', 
they write, 'to derive the Balmer formula, Bohr needed a 
quantum condition to determine energy levels. The required 
condition proves to be equation (15), WT = ihwT /2 [where WT 
is the binding energy of the electron at the ith energy-
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level, and wT is its orbital frequency at this level], and 
this equation gains whatever plausibility it possesses from 
its resemblance, emphasized by Bohr, to the quantum condition 
governing Planck*s oscillator. Such an oscillator can emit 
several quanta at a time but only at a single frequency 
determined by its mechanical structure. Equation (15) must, 
by analogy, govern a process in which i quanta are emitted, 
each of frequency wT /2. To reach the Balmer formula Bohr 
will ultimately change this interpretation, saying instead 
that equation (15) represents the emission of a single 
quantum with frequency iwT / 2. That interpretation,
however, at once destroys the analogy between the Bohr and 
Planck radiators, and some other justification for (15) is 
therefore required. In fact, Bohr found none.1 (Ibid, p. 
270) .
A sketch of the correct answer has already been presented, 
and it involves Bohr in neither a leap in the dark, nor 
proceeding from inconsistent assumptions or through 
unjustified moves. Informally speaking, the success of 
Nicholson's application of Planck's theory of radiation to 
the densely packed spectral lines, shows that in the domain 
of low frequencies the behaviour of the electrons is 
observationally indistinguishable from that of Planck's 
oscillators. This domain corresponds to large values for n 
which, in turn, determine large orbital radii for the 
electron. Let us take two adjacent orbits in this domain, 
such that, compared with the dimensions of an unexcited atom 
the radii of these orbits are huge. Since the orbits in this
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domain are closely packed, the difference between the two 
adjacent radii is negligible. Therefore, an electron which 
changes its orbit from the outer to the inner one, would 
appear to be revolving with still the same radius. Assuming 
constant speeds in each orbit, the frequencies of the 
electron's revolution would thus appear unchanged.
If Wi is the frequency in the outer orbit and wf that in the 
inner one, the average rule dictates that the frequency p of 
the radiation, emitted as a result of the jump, should be p 
= 1/2 (Wi + wf). Since ~ wf is an excellent approximation, 
we would have p = 1/2 (2wf) = wf, or p/wf = 1. That is, the 
electron jumping between these orbits, would appear to be 
radiating with its orbital frequency, just as Planck's theory 
says it should. This informal argument shows that the average 
rule is indeed promising in securing convergence, in an 
appropriate domain, between predictions from the picture of 
an electron in a Rutherford atom, and that of a Planck's 
oscillator.
4. The Formal Justification of the Average Rule
In the fully-fledged argument that Bohr launches in [1913] to 
formally account for this convergence, he reveals a clear 
grasp of the heuristic potential of the Correspondence 
Principle (without yet giving it this name or elucidating its 
content). Moreover, he goes on to a brilliant exploitation of 
this potential in order to derive the average rule. As we 
shall see, nowhere in this exploitation is there any hint
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that predictions from two inconsistent theories overlap 
because they 'merge' at some stage.
Bohr starts by noting that his theory of the electron is, in 
some respects (given the change in the interpretation of the 
integral variable), faithful to Planckfs picture of a 
radiating oscillator. 'Firstly1, he writes, 'it will be 
observed that it has not been necessary, in order to account 
for the law of the spectra by help of the expressions. . . for 
the stationary states, to assume that in any case a radiation 
is sent out corresponding to more than a single energy-
quantum, hv. ' Bohr [1913], (p. 12). After all, elsewhere in
the same paper he writes, 'the essential point in Planck's
theory of radiation is that the energy radiated from an 
atomic system does not take place in the continuous way 
assumed in the ordinary electrodynamics, but that it, on the 
contrary, takes place in distinctly separated emissions, the 
amount of energy radiated out from an atomic vibrator of 
frequency v in a single emission being equal to ihv, where i 
is an entire number, and h is a universal constant.' (Ibid, 
p. 4) .
On the crucial question of the relation between the
frequencies of the periodic motion and radiation, he goes on 
to say: 'Further information on the frequency of the
radiation may be obtained by comparing calculations of the 
energy radiation in the region of slow vibrations based on 
the above assumptions with calculations based on the ordinary 
mechanics. As is known, calculations on the latter basis are
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in agreement with experiments on the energy radiation in the 
named region.1 (Ibid, p. 12). This passage encapsulates the 
heuristic deployment of the Correspondence Principle. Since 
the Classical, but refuted, theory is empirically adequate in 
the domain where vibrations are slow, the relation it assumes 
between the frequencies can be exploited to guide the search 
for the one that is to supersede it.
As was noted earlier, the domain of 'slow vibrations' for the 
electron in the hydrogen atom, corresponds to orbits with 
relatively huge radii. Since the latter are determined by 
large values for the integral variable n, let us choose two 
adjacent radii corresponding to two such values of n which we 
name 'N' and 'N-l' respectively. According to Bohr's 
postulate for the emission of radiation, a single quantum of 
energy h/u should be released as a result of the electron 
jumping from the orbit determined by N to that determined by 
N-l. This quantum of energy is, in turn, according to a rule 
postulated by Einstein in 1905 in connection with the 
photoelectric effect, equivalent to the difference of the 
energies possessed by the electron in each of the respective 
orbits.
If we recall, the average rule dictated that the relation 
between the energy W radiated from the hydrogen atom, and the 
orbital frequency w of its electron in a stationary state, 
should be W = (n/2) hw. Now, however, Bohr treats the
multiplier of hw in the last expression, as an unknown, and 
goes on to launch the following argument (Ibid, pp. 12-13):
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We assume only that the multiplier in question should be a 
function /(n) of the integral variable n. We will then have 
W = /(n)hw. Substituting this for the expression we obtained 
linking W and w viz., w = V2 W3/2 / Vme(nke2) , and squaring 
both sides, we get w2 = 2/(n)3h3w3 / meii2k2e4. If we abbreviate 
the denominator to B and solve for w, we get w = B / 2/(n)3h3, 
which, in turn, yields W = B / 2/(n)2h2.
If we now denote the energy of the electron while in the 
orbit determined by N, Wi and that determined by N-l, Wf, 
Einstein's rule tells us Wf - W^  = hju. Substituting the 
expressions we derived for the energies and rearranging, we 
obtain Wf - W± = (B / 2h2) (1//(N-1)2 - 1//(N)2) = h/x.
Solving for jtx, we get /x = (B / 2h3) (l//(N-l)2 - l//(N)2). 
This expression has the same form as Rydberg's empirical 
formula for the frequencies of spectral lines (viz., /x = R 
(l/(nf)2 - l/(ni)2), where R is Rydberg's constant and nL and 
nf are the initial and final values of the integral variable 
respectively).
In Rydberg's formula, if we put nf = 2 and let n± vary, we get 
the frequencies for the Balmer lines. Comparison of the two 
expressions for the frequencies in question suggests that in 
order for Bohr's result to be empirically adequate with 
regard to the Balmer series, /(n) should be the product of a 
constant with the integral variable. This means /(n) = cn, 
where c is a constant. For the choice of n± = N and nf = N-l, 
we will have f (nL) = cN and /(nf) = c(N-l) , respectively.
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Substituting these in the expression for the frequencies of 
the radiation, we will get /i = (B / 2h3) (l/c2(N-l)2)
1/c2N2) , or simply n = (B / 2h3c2) (2N-1 / N2(N-
l)2) •
If wN and wN_! are the orbital frequencies of the electron 
before and after the radiation from the atom, we have wN = B 
/ 2c3N3h3, and wN_a = B / 2c3(N-l)3h3 respectively. As N gets 
larger and larger, wN_!/wN gets closer and closer to 1. We 
would, therefore, not be too far off the mark if we treated 
the orbital frequencies in the domain of large N as 
approximately identical. The fact that Planck's theory of 
radiation has established itself with spectacular success in 
this domain, would then lead us to expect that jti = wN_! is an 
excellent approximation. This expectation yields m /w n-i = !• 
Substituting the expressions for the frequencies, we get c(N- 
1)3 (2N-1) / N2 (N-l)2 = 1. Rearrangement of this yields c = N2 
/ (2N2 - 3N + 1) , or c = N2 / 2N2(1 - 3/2N + 1/2N2) = 1  / 2(1 
- 3/2N + 1/2N2) .
As N tends towards infinity, we can see that the bracket in 
the denominator of the last expression tends towards 1. 
Therefore, only for c = 1/2 would the numerical equivalence 
of the frequencies be an excellent approximation in the 
domain of large N. Inserting this into the expression for the 
radiated energy, we get W = 1/2 (hwf) , which is the same as 
what we obtained using the average rule. Q.E.D.
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5. Methodological Review of Bohr's Argument
The problem facing Bohr [1913] is that Rutherford's planetary 
model of the atomic structure is incompatible with Planck's 
theory of radiation, given the stability of atoms and the 
experimental evidence on the line spectra. Rutherford's model 
established a clear superiority over its rival in dealing 
with the scattering behaviour of « and 3 particles. The 
latter, on the other hand, scored major successes with black 
body radiation as well as with densely packed spectral lines 
associated with low frequencies of radiation from atoms.
Since there was, at the time, no independent evidence for 
questioning the validity of Rutherford's model, the failure 
of Planck's theory in dealing with unevenly dispersed lines 
in the spectrum of the hydrogen atom, suggests that it is 
perhaps in Planck' s theory that the source of the 
incompatibility lies. Bohr chose to question the mechanistic 
assumption in Planck's theory which causally links radiation 
to the acceleration of charged particles in the 
electromagnetic field. This choice can be justified by the 
fact that its benefit outweighs its cost. The cost is that a 
pictorially neat and familiar story for how radiation is 
produced must be given up. The benefit is that not only can 
stability for a viable model of atomic structure be secured, 
but also empirical features of the radiation from the deeper 
levels of this structure can be formally accounted for.
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This choice entails that the frequency of the electron's 
orbit in the atom and that of the radiated energy from it are 
not numerically equivalent. Since, however, a numerical 
relation between the two is needed for calculations of 
interest, the problem becomes more sharply focused as 
follows. What numerical relation should hold between the 
frequencies so that the new theory of radiation, along with 
the Rutherford model, can generate the radiation frequencies 
associated with the line spectra from the hydrogen atom?
That some numerical relation should indeed exist between the 
frequencies, is strongly hinted by the empirical adequacy of 
the Classical theory in 'the area of slow vibrations'. 
Although the numerical equivalence assumed by this theory 
cannot be sustained for all frequencies, its success in this 
area signals the clue that a relation which converges towards 
equivalence under suitable conditions, is there to be found.
There are, therefore, two boundary conditions for the problem 
at hand. At one end, where we empirically probe into the 
finer structure of the atomic constitution, we find the 
unevenly dispersed spectral lines that appear to defy the 
assumption that the frequencies of radiation and periodic 
motion of the electron are numerically equivalent. At the 
opposite end, there is the empirical evidence that in the 
grosser regions of the scale, the ratio of these frequencies 
converges to unity. Bohr uses the first condition to infer 
the form that the unknown relation should have. He then works 
backwards, assuming the other condition for the appropriate
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values of the variable parameter, to deduce the relation that 
he has been looking for.
Bohr makes this point in no uncertain terms: '... taking the 
starting-point in the form of the law of the hydrogen 
spectrum and assuming that the different lines correspond to 
a homogeneous radiation emitted during the passing between 
different stationary states, we shall arrive at exactly the 
same expression for the constant [B / 2h3c2] . . . as that given 
by [the use of the average rule]..., if we only assume (1) 
that the radiation is sent out in quanta hy, and (2) that the 
frequency of the radiation emitted during the passing of the 
system between successive stationary states will coincide 
with the frequency of revolution of the electron in the 
region of slow vibrations.1 (Ibid, p. 14).
The second assumption in the above passage is dictated by the 
view that Planck's theory is an excellent approximation in 
the domain of low frequencies of radiation from the atoms. 
The numerical coincidence of the frequencies follows from a 
theoretical assumption which is incorporated in Planck's 
theory. Even though this theory has proved unsatisfactory in 
accounting for the results from deeper empirical probes into 
the phenomenon in question, it has achieved a spectacular run 
of success in dealing with a range of results from shallower 
layers of empirical investigation into the same phenomenon.
The licence that Bohr takes in assuming some proposals of a 
falsified, but outstanding, theory as a guide in the search
for the new theory he is developing, is premised on the 
adequacy of the former over a limited domain of empirical 
facts. This guiding role, in the case we have been 
considering, can be described in general terms as follows. 
Let be the false theory that has proved empirically 
adequate over the domain D2. Suppose an element of T1 has been 
identified as the source of its shortcoming when this domain 
is extended to cover deeper levels. The task is to rectify 
this shortcoming in a new theory T2 in a way that preserves 
the adequacy of T1 over D2.
The quantitative expression whose introduction in T2 is 
supposed to do the trick may, at first, be represented as a 
qualitative expression, some of whose formal features can be 
conjectured from the available information. To preserve the 
adequacy of T2 over Dlr however, T2 must recognize that the 
defective element in T2 is valid (in the sense of being a 
good approximation) for those values of its parameters that 
coincide with values contained in r>2. If now an equation can 
be set up assuming this proposal of Tlr such that all the 
parameters in it range over D2 and the only unknown is the 
quantitative expression which is being sought, it may be 
solved and the unknown found.
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CHAPTER 3
GENERALIZED CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE 
AND TWO-TIER REALISM
1. Conceptions of The Generalized Correspondence Principle
Once a new theory T2 has been put together, heuristically 
exploiting the successes of T2 in a domain Dlr T2 entails that 
T2 is a good approximation to it. That is to say, T2 will 
contain parameters such that when they are given values 
approaching those contained in Dlf conditional predictions of 
T2 will become virtually indistinguishable from those 
yielded by T2. The question is whether in physics a theory 
that is to supersede one which has been established as 
outstanding over a certain domain, should invariably entail 
that the latter is a good approximation in that domain. The 
conception of the Correspondence Principle which is strong 
enough to serve the purposes of this thesis must include the 
imperative that it should. The family of conceptions which 
share this imperative, because of their generality, is 
usually referred to as the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle. Any conception of the Correspondence Principle 
which is generalized, imposes a constraint on a superseding 
theory which otherwise does not have to be there. It is 
possible that T2 is a theory which has nothing to say about 
the phenomena contained in Dlr but is empirically adequate 
over the domain where T2 has failed. What we want to know, 
therefore, is whether the imposition of such a constraint can 
be justified across the board in physics. Before the search 
for such a justification is undertaken, however, we need a 
clear and workable conception of the Correspondence 
Principle.
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Depending on the kind of entities theories are taken to be, 
attempts at articulating the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle may be broadly divided into two groups. One group 
views theories roughly as sets of propositions which purport 
to describe laws and processes which hold between events in 
the world. It is fair to say that this view enjoys the most 
widespread support among the philosophers of science and for 
this reason it may be branded the 'standard' view. The rival 
group utilises model theoretic techniques and regards 
theories as sets of mathematical models (intended or 
potential) in which the descriptions and laws proposed by a 
theory hold. The proponents of this view are still in 
minority among the philosophers of science and their approach 
may be branded 'non-standard' (it is sometimes called the 
'semantic' view of theories, but this name is in some way 
unsatisfactory).
Within the non-standard tradition, Moulines [1984] and Pearce 
and Rantala [1984] offer representative formulations of the 
Correspondence Principle as a general intertheory relation. 
Redhead [1975] introduces the novelty of viewing a theory as 
'a unary relation on a generalized function space' (Ibid, p. 
90) , but his approach remains within the non-standard 
tradition in that it seeks to 'effectively reduce the problem 
of intertheory relations to one of relations between 
mathematical structures' (Ibid, p. 89).
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The main advantage claimed for this approach appears to be 
its ability to capture intuitions about the relation between 
theories which satisfy the Correspondence Principle.
According to these intuitions (which underlie approaches
within the standard tradition as well), the theory that is 
superseded must somehow 'approximate' what is proposed to be 
the case by the new theory. It was once customary to
understand this property in terms of the relation of 
reduction between the superseded and superseding theories. 
The idea of the reduction of one theory to another was
originally introduced within the standard tradition. It was 
first explicated in Nagel [1961] in terms of a strictly 
deductive relation between the superseding theory plus some 
additional statements (called 'bridge laws'), and the 
superseded theory. In Causey [1977] the idea was further 
articulated in considerable detail, and the bridge laws 
replaced by 'non causal and synthetic identity statements'. 
The function which these additional statements are required 
to perform is to somehow bridge over the conceptual gap which 
must exist between two theories that make inconsistent claims 
about the underlying constitution of the world.
One problem that emerged from the discussion of this type of 
intertheory relations was the possibility of some loss in 
content in the transition from one theory to another. This 
problem was raised in Kuhn [1970] and has, subsequently, been 
known as the problem of 'Kuhn-loss'. The alleged difficulty 
with regard to this possibility is that in case the 
superseded theory has a greater content than the superseding
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one, the strictly deductive relation between the two would be 
untenable even with the introduction of bridging statements 
(Kuhn [1970] goes even further and claims this possibility as 
a reason for the theories involved being incommensurate). 
Detailed case studies (e.g. in Koertge [1969], Worrall 
[1989a] and Worrall [1989b]) suggest that there is no loss of 
empirical content in transition from one theory to another. 
Assuming that there is no Kuhn-loss in empirical content (or 
if there is, there is always a common part in which the 
claims of both theories 1 intersect with regard to their 
reference1), Post [1971], operating within the standard 
tradition, introduces the idea of 'slicing' a theory into 
various explanatory levels. (Redhead [1975] endorses this 
idea, but claims that it is also best articulated within the 
non-standard approach). The 'General Correspondence 
Principle', as Post calls it, is then formulated as a 
relation between those parts of the relevant theories that 
share common empirical contents.
According to Post, if S is the successful but superseded 
theory, and S* a 'slice' of S which has proved empirically 
adequate over a range of phenomena, 'the new theory must 
correspond to the old theory, in the sense of coinciding with 
S*, the working part of the old theory in the range in which 
S has been found to work. According to the General 
Correspondence Principle, this is a necessary requirement.' 
(Post [1971], p. 233). To achieve correspondence in this 
sense between theories that make radically different claims 
about the constitution of the world, 'we need ... a system of
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translation T, from the language of L [the superseding 
theory] into that of S, with the necessary restriction on T 
that it should carry the statement of a given event in L into 
the statement of the same event ... in S ...' (Ibid, p. 230).
The picture that emerges from this account is that successive 
successful theories in the history of science which satisfy 
the Correspondence Principle, 1build on' the successes of 
previous theories by somehow taking over slices from them. 
'Quite generally, the thesis may be put this way: no theory 
that ever 'worked' adequately turned out to be a blind 
alley... The most radical revolutions have destroyed the top 
levels and give a somewhat different interpretation to the 
lower levels, but they have not destroyed the whole of the 
lower-level structure.' (Post [1971], p. 237).
Within the same tradition, there exists a rival view about 
how the successes of a superseded theory are preserved by the 
superseding theory. This view introduces the idea of 
'structure' in the world and attributes the successes of 
outstanding theories in the history of physics to the 
discovery of some of these. The theme of one theory 
preserving the discovery of some 'structure' by the 
successful, but falsified, theory it replaces, is adopted in 
Worrall [1989], and its pedigree traced back to Poincare. 
Like Post [1971], the task of safeguarding this preservation 
is given to the Correspondence Principle. It appears, 
however, that unlike Post [1971], the preservation Worrall 
has in mind occurs, not between whole theories (or parts of
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their ontology) , but some of their formal laws only. Worrall 
is not alone in holding this view; Zahar [1983] and [1989], 
Krajewski [1977], Yoshida [1977], Fadner [1985] and Radder 
[1991] all concur in conceiving the Correspondence Principle 
as holding between formal laws rather than theories as 
wholes.
The reason for adopting this view is that the only part of a 
superseded theory that appears salvageable by being deducible 
from the superseding theory, is its mathematical equations 
(which are equated with the formal laws laid down by a 
theory). In other words, the mainstream conviction that 
cumulative progress in science can only be safeguarded if 
there is some logical bond between successive successful 
theories, forces the selection of mathematical equations as 
units of correspondence. The ontological interpretations of 
the equations, according to this view, changes too radically 
in some transitions to make it possible to secure a deductive 
relation between theories as wholes. Uninterpreted equations, 
however, can survive these radical changes. If one set of 
equations belonging to a falsified but successful theory can 
somehow be derived from its counterpart in the superseding 
theory (sometimes with the use of conditions imposed on some 
of the latter's parameters), the feeling is that the 
desideratum of cumulative progress in science is essentially 
achieved. What matters most in the old theory, namely its 
main equations, is thus preserved by the new.
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Post [1971], Koertge [1969] and Worrall [1989a] share the 
belief that some sort of a term-by-term (or phrase by phrase) 
correlation or mapping (or as Post calls it, a 'translation1) 
between the languages of the appropriate theories is 
necessary in a correspondence (those who take formal laws as 
units of correspondence appear not to). Koertge operates with 
Post's idea of slicing, whereas Worrall does not. This 
enables Koertge to incorporate non-mathematical scientific 
theories, such as Stahl's and Lavoisier's theories of 
chemical reactions, into a correspondence scheme. The 
advantage gained in Worrall's position, however, is that the 
notion of structure invariance which never received 
sufficient clarification in Post [1971] and Koertge [1969], 
can be clearly unpacked in terms of the sameness of 
mathematical equations.
In Worrall's account 'structure' is preserved in the 
transition between two theories if the following condition is 
satisfied: after establishing a mapping between the referring 
terms of the theories, some of their mathematical equations 
either remain identical, or else those of the superseding 
theory become identical with those of the superseded one when 
certain limiting conditions are imposed on some of the 
former's parameters. This enables Worrall to say that 
irrespective of whatever entities or attributes each theory 
postulates at the ontological level, what they, jointly get 
right are the relations that prevail between whatever are the 
real constituents of the world. Ontological claims may come 
and go, but the formal feature of the relations between the
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entities that actually inhabit the world, remains preserved 
through the succession of successful theories. 'The rule1, 
Worrall [1989a] claims, * in the history of physics seems to 
be that, whenever a theory replaces a predecessor, which has 
however itself enjoyed genuine predictive success, the 
'correspondence principle' applies... But the principle 
applies purely at the mathematical level and hence is quite 
compatible with the new theory's basic theoretical 
assumptions (which interpret the terms in the equations) 
being entirely at odds with those of the old. I can see no 
clear sense in which an action-at-a-distance force of gravity 
is a 'limiting case' of or 'approximates' a space-time 
curvature... Yet Einstein's equations undeniably go over to 
Newton's in certain limiting special cases. In this sense, 
there is 'approximate continuity' of structure in this case.' 
(Ibid, p. 120) .
The trouble with this account is that from the realist point 
of view equations in physics are not merely a set of 
uninterpreted mathematical symbols 'hanging in a limbo'. If 
one adopted an instrumentalist outlook on theories, there 
would of course be no problem here. Mathematical equations in 
this outlook are merely formal tools for the prediction of 
future events from a set of available data irrespective of 
what actually is the case in the real world. From the realist 
point of view, on the other hand, all the parameters 
occurring in a mathematical equation in physics stand as 
interpreted signs. If an equation from Einstein's theory 
actually does turn into the equation that states Newton's
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second law when certain limiting conditions are imposed on 
it, then the former must have turned into a formal relation 
that holds between masses, their accelerations and the forces 
acting on them in a three dimensional Euclidean space in 
which the passage of time is everywhere invariant. In the 
realist*s book, a mathematical statement of Newton's second 
law is never identical to a mere formal relation. The 
formalist procedure of separating the formalism from its 
interpretation, so fruitful in the foundational studies of 
mathematics, does not carry over to physics so far as a 
realist is concerned. For the two-tier realist, in 
particular, the story a theory tells in physics together with 
the equations it proposes, form a single net, as it were, 
that is cast to capture as many states of the observed 
physical systems as is possible.
2. The Approximational Conception of the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle
The stumbling block which prevents authors in the field from 
making any sense of the idea that one theory can be an 
'approximation' to another while they clash on both the 
ontological (clearly stated in the quoted passage from 
Worrall [1989a]), as well as the formal level, is that for 
this relation to hold they require some significant part of 
the superseded theory to somehow carry over to the 
superseding one. Only then, they feel, from the standpoint of 
the superseding theory can one claim that the superseded 
theory achieved something which would warrant regarding it as
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an approximation to a better theory. The question is, if this 
requirement is to be given up, what alternative conception of 
the Correspondence Principle can be stated?
The study of Bohr [1913] in chapter 2 revealed a case 
involving theories between which the Correspondence Principle 
has to hold (otherwise the value of an important parameter in 
the new theory could not be justified) . This study also 
suggests the possibility that the Correspondence Principle 
may hold between two successive theories where no significant 
part of the ontology or formalism of the superseded theory 
can remain preserved in the transition. What in Bohr [1913] 
is taken as a good approximation to a better future theory, 
is a theory which the Cambridge astronomer J. N. Nicholson 
had proposed in a series of publications in 1911 and 1912. In 
Nicholson [1911], a model of the atom is proposed in which 
the positive charge is concentrated in a massive nucleus and 
the electrons are embedded in fixed positions on an aetherial 
ring which rotates slowly around the nucleus. The potential 
responsible for holding this system together is worked out 
using Thompson's calculations. The ring is set to rotate with 
a velocity sufficiently small for no detectable radiation to 
be observed. This is the first major difference between the 
ontologies of Bohr's theory of atomic constitution and that 
which it supersedes.
The second difference in this category, has to do with the 
mechanism for radiation from the atom. In Nicholson [1911] 
detectible radiation is emitted from the atom as a result of
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the electrons either flying off the ring (due to acquiring 
excess energy), or else vibrating horizontally or vertically 
(relative to the plane of the ring) round their fixed 
positions in the ring. Here, no mention of Planckfs 
quantization of the field is made. Postulating a hypothetical 
element whose ring contains four electrons (named 
'Nebulium'), and making all the calculations based on 
Thompson's theory of the atom, Nicholson [1911] manages to 
derive the main lines in the spectrum of Orion and three 
other nebulae with an error of '3 or 4 tenth-meters 1 (ibid, 
p. 52), which translates into an accuracy of '3.6 in about 
4400' (ibid, p. 55). Later in Nicholson [1912], another 
hypothetical element (named 'Protofluorine1) is introduced 
whose ring is postulated to hold five electrons. Here the 
idea of Planck's oscillator is applied to these atoms in 
order to account for the lines in the spectrum of the solar 
corona. Each line in this spectrum is produced by 
oscillations performed by the atom as a whole as a result of 
its electrons vibrating within the ring. When one electron is 
ejected from or gained by the atom, the angular momentum of 
the oscillator changes abruptly. The new mode of vibration by 
the oscillator differs from the previous one discretely, thus 
giving rise to the appearance of a new separate line in the 
spectrum. Assuming that the energy given off by such an 
oscillator is always Planckian (i.e. of the order nh/x, where 
n is an integer, h the Planck's constant and n the frequency 
of the oscillator), Nicholson accounted for 14 lines in the 
spectrum of the solar corona with an accuracy of 3 or 4 parts 
in 1000. This theory also managed to predict, with an
accuracy of 1 in 10,000, a previously undetected line in this 
spectrum.
The characteristic (ontological) features of Nicholson's 
ringed model of the atom are the following: (1) it obeys the 
Classical law of 'no acceleration by charges in the 
electromagnetic field without radiation'; (2) the relation 
between the frequency of its oscillations and the optical 
frequency of the resulting radiation has a mechanical 
explanation; and (3) it releases energy into the field always 
as a 'bundle' of n individual quanta (n being an integer). 
Bohr's theory differs from Nicholson's on every significant 
count. First, it is based on a planetary model of the atom in 
which the electrons are moving round the nucleus due to the 
action of central forces (as opposed to being carried by a 
vehicle). Second, by introducing the idea of stationary 
states it not only violates the Classical law governing the 
acceleration of charged particles in the field, but also 
provides no explanation for the transitions between these 
states. Third, it postulates the release of energy from the 
atom always as a single quantum whose optical frequency in 
different emissions changes by an integral multiple. Fourth, 
the optical frequency of the radiation is linked to the 
orbital frequency of the electrons without there being any 
mechanical explanation for this link (the only explanation 
Bohr provides is based on the use of the Correspondence 
Principle).
48
These differences at the ontological level lead to 
differences at the level of formalism which cannot be bridged 
over. First, in Nicholson [1912], the general equation 
linking the mechanical energy of the system to that of the 
radiation from it is of the form 2nmna2/z2 = ihcj), where m is 
the mass of an electron, n their number in the ring, a the 
radius of the ring, fj, the frequency of oscillations, x an 
integer, h Planck's constant and <j> the frequency of 
radiation. The integer i in this equation, just as in 
Planck's theory, is a cardinal number since it indicates how 
many quanta of energy are being simultaneously released. The 
same integer which also appears in Bohr's theory, however, is 
an ordinal number indicating the order of the final orbit to 
which the electron has settled in the atom after the exchange 
of energy between the system and the field has taken place. 
Apart from the fact that cardinals are very different species 
of number than ordinals, there is no way that one can be 
turned into the other under certain circumstances.
Second, the expressions for the total energy of the atom are 
clearly different in the two theories. In Nicholson's theory 
no quantum number appears in this expression, while in Bohr's 
theory such numbers are always present (when the atom is not 
radiating there is only one of these present, indicating its 
stationary state, and when it is radiating, there are two of 
these present, each indicating the states between which a 
transition has occurred). According to the structural 
approach (within the standard tradition), these expressions 
have to become identical under some limiting conditions
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because the Correspondence Principle clearly holds between 
the two theories. Zahar [1989] expresses this point of view 
by stating the structural conception of the Correspondence 
Principle more precisely than other members of this approach 
as follows: '... [W]e should note that the correspondence
principle can be given the form of a meta-statement... [L]et 
0 = 0 denote a known law which is to be modified; the 
correspondence principle could read as follows: "The new law 
is of the form $ = 0, where $ is a function of the 
quantity r such that $ -> 0 as r -> 0" [the arrow reads 
'tends towards']1. (Zahar [1989], p. 22). We are no longer 
asked to deduce the old law from the new, but instead require 
that the equation yielded by the new law should be of such a 
form that as a parameter in terms of which it is formulated 
tends towards zero, it gradually turns into that yielded by 
the old law.
Let us take the parameter introduced in the equation for 
Bohr's law governing the frequency of radiation from the 
hydrogen atom, say, to be the inverse of the integral 
variable nj (so that as the values for the latter get larger, 
the parameter in question would tend towards zero). Even in 
the domain of extremely slow vibrations, the equation 
expressing Bohr's law would contain terms referring to both 
an initial and a final nf. This is because Bohr's atom 
radiates only when its electron jumps from an orbit further 
away from the nucleus to one nearer to it and never when it 
is on the same orbit. The sole condition under which the 
reference in Bohr's equation to two values for the integral
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variable could be eliminated, is when ni = nf and there is no 
change in the electron's orbit. In that case, Bohr's theory 
allows no radiation whatsoever from the atom.
According to Planck's theory of radiation, on the other hand, 
the atom should be radiating so long as its bound electron is 
in accelerated motion. Suppose we somehow incorporate Bohr's 
interpretation of the integral variable within Planck's 
theory. A single value of this variable, within certain 
limits, determines an orbit for the electron. Since in 
Planck's theory the atom should radiate energy even when its 
electron stays on the same orbit, the equation offered by 
Planck's theory for the frequency of radiation from the atom, 
contains a single occurrence of this variable. Bohr's and 
Planck's equations, therefore, cannot possibly turn into one 
another under any circumstances. True, in the event that the 
integral variable takes infinity as its value (i.e. when the 
atom's electron is at a distance infinitely away from its 
nucleus), both equations predict zero radiation from the 
atom. But they do so for entirely different reasons, i.e. by 
containing expressions which remain different under all 
conditions.
This situation invites an alternative conjecture about what 
is demanded by the Generalized Correspondence Principle. One 
conjecture, which was named approximational in the 
Introduction, if tenable, appears to avoid these 
difficulties. For the purposes of this thesis it is 
preferable that this conjecture should rest within the
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standard tradition of viewing theories. The two-tier 
realist's interest in scientific theories is primarily- 
geared to what they have to say about the actual world. The 
standard view of theories serves this interest quite 
naturally. Sets of possible models as suggested by the non­
standard tradition, on the other hand, is non-committal as to 
which model reflects the actual world. For the two-tier 
realist this disadvantage offsets any formal advantages this 
tradition may offer for the articulation of intertheory 
relations.
The approximational conception may be stated as follows: A
theory T2 is a good approximation to a theory T2 just in case
(1) Ti is an empirically successful but falsified theory, and
(2) relative to the standards of experimental accuracy which 
were operative in the confirmation of Tx, T2 at least matches 
all the successes of T2 and, moreover, succeeds where T1 has 
failed (perhaps it even scores successes where Tx has nothing 
to say). Now, Tx and T2 may say things about the underlying 
physical constitution of the world which are logically 
incompatible with one another. But so long as their
conditional predictions (i.e. 'if such and such is the case
here and now, so and so would be the case there and then')
over a common domain differ at most within the relative
margin of experimental error, Tx may be regarded as a good 
approximation to T2. I take the standards of experimental 
accuracy, and the margin of experimental error, to be
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determined by the scientific practices of the day. In this 
conception, one theory may be a good approximation to 
another, while no explanatory 'slices' or mathematical 
equations in the two necessarily remain the same. The 
essential feature that such theories must share is rather 
that over a common domain, they should perform similarly (in 
the sense just articulated).
With regard to this notion of similarity of performance, 
several points need to be made clear. First, two theories may 
make observationally indistinguishable conditional 
predictions while the theoretical (metaphysical) attributes 
which each ascribes to observable entities differ hugely. In 
astronomy, for example, the Copernican and Tychonic theories 
of the solar system yield observationally indistinguishable 
predictions for the behaviour of the planets as well as the 
sun from the vantage point of the earth. But in one theory 
the earth is not a planet and must rest stationary at the 
centre of the universe while the sun would be rotating around 
it dragging the planets (which are in orbit around it) along. 
According to the other theory, the earth does not occupy a 
privileged position in the universe; it is a planet and 
together with the rest of the planets it orbits the sun which 
lies immobile at the centre of the universe.
Secondly, this notion of similarity is general enough to 
allow as special cases the identity of either some
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equations or ontological portions. Two theories which perform 
similarly with regard to some observable entities, may share 
some common ontology or equations, or indeed one can have 
some equations which are convertible to those of the other 
under appropriate limiting conditions. Lastly, this notion, 
if tenable, ties up naturally with the idea of progress, and 
in particular the related idea of verisimilitude in physics. 
If T1 is a good approximation to T2 in the sense just 
articulated, then there is a clear sense in which T: may be 
said to bear a resemblance to T2; T1 resembles T2 not in what 
it says, but in what it does. The transition from one to the 
other may be regarded as progress because while T2 
outperforms Tlf it nonetheless safeguards the achievements of 
the latter through this resemblance. This idea of similarity 
of performance appears to capture Bohr's intuition that the 
superseding theory should be a 'natural generalization' of 
the superseded one while the two remain incompatible both on 
the ontological as well as the formal levels. Moreover, if 
there is, in a branch of physics, an ultimate theory towards 
which a succession of outstanding but falsified theories 
converge, and which manages to capture the truth of the 
matter in the corresponding field, then all its successful 
predecessors would bear some resemblance to it to the extent 
determined by the position which they occupy within this 
succession. The closer a theory lies in this succession to 
the ultimate theory, the greater its resemblance to the 
truth. More on this point later.
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It is possible that there may be cases where the statement of 
the approximational conception, as presented above, fails to 
effect a discrimination as to which superseded theory is a 
good approximation to a superseding one. I shall present a 
pseudo-historical case exemplifying this possibility later in 
an argument concerning the two-tier realist assessment of a 
theory*s success. Suppose Tx and T2 are rival theories which 
despite being incompatible at the ontolological 
(metaphysical) level, are nevertheless equally empirically 
adequate. Suppose T3 is a theory which (1) supersedes both Ti 
and T2, (2) is ontologically different from both to different 
extents, and (3) is distinguishable from both at the 
observational level to exactly the same extent. In this case 
if the approximational conception is to help us single out 
either Ti or T2 (but not both) as a good approximation to T3, 
it will have to be augmented with an additional proviso. We 
may find this proviso by considering the nature of the 
differences between the theories involved at the ontological 
level. That theory would be a good approximation to T3 which 
exhibits, in its ontological claims, a closer continuity to 
those of the latter than its rival. Admittedly, this is a 
rather vague stipulation. Since, however, we are here dealing 
with a hypothetical eventuality, we may postpone further 
discussion until we come to present the promised pseudo- 
historical case which involves Kepler*s theory on the one 
side and the Tychonic as well as a version of the Copernican 
theory on the other.
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The approximational conception, I submit, is not without a 
respectable pedigree, but is rather suggested by the general 
intertheory relation which Bohr saw as holding whenever the 
Correspondence Principle is satisfied in physics. Bohr is the 
first author to notice not only the existence of this 
principle in physics, but its heuristic potential. He also 
inaugurated attempts to articulate it. It is, therefore, 
surprising to find that very little attention has been paid 
by philosophers interested in the subject to his work (in 
Post [1971], for example, which is regarded by many as a 
classic in this subject, reference to Bohr [1913] appears in 
a footnote and only in passing).
3. Objections to Generalization of the Correspondence 
Principle
Since the heuristic potential of an outstanding theory that 
is to be superseded would not be available for use in the 
context of discovery without the constraint imposed on the 
superseding theory by the Correspondence Principle, the 
availability of this resource can very well justify the 
admission of the Principle. It may be felt, however, that to 
get just this benefit out of a theory that is to be 
superseded, the imposition of such a far reaching constraint 
is not necessary. The empirical adequacy of a theory over a 
certain domain can be exploited in one particular 
circumstance for the purposes of discovery, without requiring 
that superseding theories in general and in all circumstances
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should live up to the demands of the Correspondence 
Principle.
Indeed this appears to be the position argued for in 
Feyerabend [1962] and [1981]. Here, however, the motivation 
for taking this position stems from a particular reading of 
the Correspondence Principle according to which it obliges 
the superseding theory either to •contain* the theory it 
supersedes or be consistent with it. 'The argument runs as 
follows: (A) a good theory is a summary of facts; (B) the
predictive success of T1 ... has shown T 1 to be a good theory 
inside [the domain] D1; hence (T) if T, too, is to be 
successful inside D 1, then it must either give us all the 
facts contained in T 1, i.e. it must give us T', or at least 
it must be compatible with T 1.' (Feyerabend [1962], in 
Feyerabend [1981], p. 69). This constraint is then claimed to 
impose a straight-jacket stifling the creativity of 
scientists in the field who must inevitably be working not 
only in different sociological and cultural environments, but 
also under a variety of aesthetic influences as well. '...
[I]t is to be expected that theoreticians working in 
different countries, will arrive at theories which, although 
in agreement with all the known facts, are mutually 
inconsistent. Indeed, any consistency over a long period of 
time would have to be regarded not... as a methodological 
virtue, but as an alarming sign that no new ideas are being 
produced and that the activity of theorizing has come to an 
end.1 (Ibid, p. 60).
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As for Bohr's heuristic deployment of the Principle, 
Feyerabend [1981] insists that it should be viewed as being 
restricted locally only to the calculation results in the 
particular problem he was trying to solve. '...Bohr has., 
repeatedly emphasized that "the principle of correspondence 
must be regarded as a purely quantum-theoretical law which 
cannot in any way diminish the contrast between the 
postulates... and electrodynamic theory."' (Ibid, p. 253n). 
And, 'Thus Bohr warns us in 1922... "that the asymptotic 
connexion" between the quantum theory and classical physics 
"as it is assumed in the principle of correspondence. . . does 
not at all entail a gradual disappearance of the difference 
between the quantum theoretical treatment of radiation 
phenomena and the ideas of classical electrodynamics; all 
that is asserted is an asymptotic agreement of the numerical 
statistical results". In other words, the principle of 
correspondence asserts an agreement of numbers, not of 
concepts.' (Ibid, p. 253) .
Two things must be said about Feyerabend's reservations. 
Firstly, the conception of the Correspondence Principle under 
exploration in this thesis does in no way require the 
obliteration of fundamental differences between two 
inconsistent theories, one of which is to supersede the 
other, at any level. On the contrary, an attempt has been 
made to accommodate the intuitions which Feyerabend rightly 
attributes to Bohr. Thus, this concern of Feyerabend's 
relates to a non-existent feature in the conception in 
question, and he has no other reasons that would warrant
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barring its applicability across the board in physics. This 
seems to be especially the case since he appears to be quite 
happy regarding it as a law in Quantum theory. In the 
absence, therefore, of the feature that worries him, it seems 
that no cogent reasons remain within his position against 
regarding the Principle as a law in the rest of physics as 
well. Secondly, on my reading, the distinction that he, and 
not Bohr, introduces between the agreement of numbers and 
'concepts' does not appear to make much sense. If Bohr's 
theory along with the right initial conditions entails that 
the numerical equivalence of the frequencies is a good 
approximation over the domain of slow vibrations, this also 
means that the Classical idea of the mechanical relation 
between the frequencies works quite well in that domain. Even 
though that idea does not reflect the truth anywhere, the 
phenomena included in this domain appear to conform to it, 
and in the light of the new theory we can, as we have seen, 
explain exactly why they do.
Hanson [1961], reflects very much the same sentiments 
although he appears not to go too far against the current of 
mainstream physics, so far as some sort of global validity 
for a version of the Correspondence Principle is concerned. 
His main reservation about the constraint imposed by the 
Principle is that, unless it is restricted merely to 
calculation results, it would force a continuity in the 
languages of a superseding and superseded theories which he 
feels is not maintained everywhere in physics. 'Theoretical 
works... appeal to.the correspondence principle in at least
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two ways, both legitimate and clear. (1) In the formative 
days, namely 1913-27, quantum physicists often used classical 
mechanics as a criterion for the correctness of their 
calculations, and as a storehouse of suggestions about 
research and development within the theory... (2) It is a 
standard in all science that whatever the other merits of a 
new theory, unless it explains everything that could be 
explained by the theory it purports to replace, it is a non­
starter. 1 (Hanson [1961], p. 226).
One claim the second clause in this passage is making in 
particular, is that whenever in science a new theory is to be 
developed with the aim of accounting for phenomena which 
proved the downfall of an otherwise successful extant theory, 
the transition from the latter to the new theory must be 
continuous. This is just the basic requirement of all the 
conceptions belonging to the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle. The first clause, on the other hand, by appealing 
to a historical fact, appears to express the same sentiment 
that was expressed by Feyerabend on the basis of 
distinguishing 'agreement between numbers' from that between 
'concepts'. This is confirmed in the following passages from 
Hanson [1961]. 'That (4n2e4m/h3ni3) (ni - nf) gives a 'classical' 
frequency for the transition A n  = 1 proves at most that 
there are formal analogies between certain reaches of quantum 
theory and certain reaches of classical theory.' (Ibid, p. 
154f) . And, 'As an indication of how the mathematics of 
elementary particle physics can be managed, the 
correspondence principle is clear and useful. But when
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spoken of in more spectacular ways... the nature of 
intelligibility in physics hangs in the balance.* (Ibid, p. 
157) .
What, according to Hanson [1961], puts 'the nature of 
intelligibility' in the balance, is reading 'the preservation 
of continuity' as the preservation of the language of the old 
theory by the new one. To see the kind of breakdown in 
intelligibility which is allegedly overlooked by some 
conceptions of the Correspondence Principle, Hanson [1961] 
discusses the relation between the Quantum Theory and 
Classical Mechanics in some detail. 'In classical mechanics 
uncertainties in state determination are in principle 
eradicable. Expositions refer to punctiform masses, the 
paradigm examples of mechanical behaviour. Point-particles 
are distinct possibilities within classical particle 
physics... Elementary particle physics presents a different 
logical situation..., the discoveries of 1900-30... forced 
physicists to combine concepts in unprecedented ways... A 
direct consequence of these combinations of concepts is 
expressed in Ap . A v  = h/m, where Ap and Av are the limits 
of uncertainty in a particle's co-determined position and 
velocity. Within quantum theory, to speak of the co-ordinates 
and momentum of an elementary particle at time t is to make 
no intelligible assertion at all...' (Ibid, p. 150).
In Classical Mechanics the state of a particle at any one 
time is fully determined by single values of at least two 
appropriate dynamical parameters. In any fully developed
versions of Quantum Mechanics, on the other hand, such pairs 
of values do not, in general, determine a state for the 
particle. Instead, a new parameter is introduced and its 
distribution over all the points in the space of either one 
of the dynamical parameters at any one time, is taken to 
determine the state of the particle at that time. This 
distribution, in turn, determines probability distributions 
for possible values that the corresponding dynamical 
parameters are allowed to possess at the time. The 
Uncertainty Principle is the statement of a relation that 
holds between the range of possible values that each member 
of the appropriate pair of the dynamical parameters of the 
particle in a given state are allowed to possess with varying 
probabilities.
'Here the perplexity arises. A certain cluster of symbols S 
expresses an intelligible assertion in classical mechanics, 
yet that same S may not be so regarded in quantum 
mechanics... If S can be used to express an intelligible 
statement in one context, but not in another, it would be 
natural to conclude that the languages involved in these 
different contexts were different and discontinuous... 
Ordinarily this would be conclusive evidence that the 
languages are... logically discontinuous. But the 
correspondence principle apparently instructs us to regard 
them as continuous; quantum theory embraces the old classical 
laws as a limiting case... Either the uncertainty principle 
holds: that is, the S of classical physics makes no assertion 
in quantum physics., or the correspondence principle holds:
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that is, the S of classical physics is a limiting case of 
quantum physics; but not both.1 (Ibid, pp. 151-152) .
These remarks suggest, not that in Quantum Mechanics single 
values for a particle*s position and velocity are inadequate 
for the determination of its state at any one time, but 
rather that the sentence which says they possess such values, 
is devoid of meaning. That is, if one were literate only in 
the language(s) of Quantum Mechanics, one would fail to 
understand that any proposition is expressed by the sentence 
in question. That this suggestion is in fact false, requires 
a closer look at Quantum Mechanics and in a considerably more 
detailed manner. This will be done in chapter 5. It will be 
shown there not only that in Quantum Mechanics to speak of a 
particle's exact position and velocity at a certain time 
makes as precise a sense as it does in Classical Mechanics, 
but that to speak in any other terms would render the 
assertions of the former, if not entirely unintelligible, 
obscure beyond reasonable possibilities of comprehension. The 
chapter will also suggest that, contrary to the claim just 
quoted, the Uncertainty Principle may hold together with* the 
view that Classical Mechanics (minus a theory of gravitation) 
is a limiting case of Quantum Mechanics. In the meanwhile I 
shall assume that the reservations expressed in Hanson [1961] 
do not threaten the justification of the global validity of 
the Correspondence Principle, as I read it, in physics.
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4. The Charge of Inconsistency
In Lakatos [1970] concerns of an entirely different kind are 
expressed about the role of the Correspondence Principle. 
Although the heuristic efficacy of this principle, as 
deployed in Bohr [1913], is acknowledged, the Principle is 
nevertheless described as an 'ad hoc' stratagem, 'the only 
purpose of which is to hide' a 'deficiency' (p. 142) . The 
deficiency in question refers to an alleged inconsistency 
which supposedly lies at the heart of Bohr's theory of 
electrons in atomic orbit. 'The background problem was the 
riddle of how Rutherford atoms... can remain stable; for, 
according to the well-corroborated Maxwell-Lorentz theory of 
electromagnetism they should collapse. But Rutherford's 
theory was well-corroborated too. Bohr's suggestion was to 
ignore for the time being the inconsistency and consciously 
develop a research programme whose 'refutable' versions were 
inconsistent with the Maxwell-Lorentz theory.' (Lakatos 
[1970], p. 141).
If there has been any suggestion by Bohr to ignore the 
inconsistency between his theory and the Classical 
electrodynamics, it is not to be found in his [1913]. There 
is, and we have noted this, an element of fiat in Bohr's 
proposal for overcoming the difficulties he had faced. But 
postulating changes by fiat, unsatisfactory as it may be, is 
not to countenance inconsistencies. Lakatos' s description of 
the role of the Correspondence Principle in Bohr [1913] is, 
therefore, incorrect and misleading. Incorrect, because there
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is no inconsistency which Bohr intended to hide. Misleading, 
because it presents a legitimate principle which performs an 
effective function in the context of discovery as a mere 
trick towards obtaining a desired result. This function, 
although unnoticed until Bohr, was always available for 
exploitation by physicists throughout the ages and may also 
have been used implicitly by some of them.
From the examination of the heuristic potentials of the 
Correspondence Principle in the particular case of Bohr 
[1913], we notice another function that it performs. Besides 
guiding the search for a new relation between the 
frequencies, it enables the theory that finally incorporates 
this relation, to explain why the old theory is successful in 
the domain of low frequencies. In the light of the new 
theory, this domain is seen to correspond to larger and 
larger values of the integral variable which determines 
various orbits of the electron. From the new theory it can, 
therefore, be demonstrated that treating the frequency of the 
radiation from the atom as numerically equivalent to that of 
the periodic motion of its electron, is a perfectly adequate 
approximation for large values of the integral variable.
Radiation from the atom in the new theory is attributed to 
the electron jumping from a higher to a lower nuclear orbit. 
But the new theory also correlates increases in the radius of 
the electron's orbit to larger and larger values for the 
integral variable. When this radius becomes so large that 
separations between, adjacent orbits can hardly be detected at
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all, the atom appears to be radiating as though the electron 
remains on a stationary orbit. The relation that the new 
theory postulates between the frequencies of orbit and 
radiation, then yields results that for jumps between such 
orbits are, for all practical purposes, virtually
indistinguishable from those yielded by the old relation.
Going back to our T2 and T2, we can generalize this point. If 
T2, along with some initial conditions, entails that T2 is a 
good approximation in a certain domain of phenomena, then T2 
explains why T2 is successful over that domain. Since the 
Correspondence Principle requires T2 to entail (with the 
right initial conditions) that T1 is a good approximation in 
the appropriate domain, it requires that T2 should explain 
the successes of T2. Indeed, the heuristic efficacy of the 
Correspondence Principle in the context of discovery stems 
from this very requirement. For since this efficacy consists 
in allowing the use of some of 2V s assumptions in the 
development of T2, even though they are false, this use can 
be justified only if T2 explains why those assumptions have 
a limited validity.
5. The Two-tier Realist Conception of Theories
The extra explanatory burden that the Correspondence 
Principle puts on a superseding theory, assumes a particular 
urgency for the two-tier realist view of theories. According 
to this view it is desirable to assess the empirical 
successes of a theory that is methodologically sound, in
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terms of a truth-related property. The best candidate for 
such a property in physics appears to be something like 
progress in the direction of capturing the underlying 
physical constitution of the world. However, mere combination 
of empirical success and methodological soundness is not 
sufficient for such an assessment. Without an additional 
requirement that would preserve some continuity in the 
transition between theories, the two-tier realist assessment 
of outstanding theories could face the danger of running into 
inconsistency.
Two circumstances can be envisaged in which basing the two- 
tier realist assessment of successive theories on 
methodological soundness and empirical success alone, is 
vitiated. Let us, to begin with, assume that this combination 
suffices for the assessment in question: (T) Suppose Tz is a 
methodologically sound theory with an impressive record of 
empirical success. According to our assumption, Tz must be 
regarded as having progressed in the right direction towards 
the truth. Suppose now that Tx is falsified, and replaced 
with a theory T2 which is just as methodologically sound, but 
with a more impressive record of empirical success. The 
inclination would be to say that on these scores T2 has 
progressed further than Tz in the direction of the truth. But 
suppose that T2 clashes with Tz on most fundamental issues in 
their respective descriptions of the underlying constitution 
of the world without, in the meanwhile, offering any 
recognition of T1 as a legitimate theory over a certain 
domain (i.e. as a .step in the right direction towards the
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truth) . In the light of the assessment of T2 as progress 
towards the truth, it would be awkward to maintain that T: is 
also progress along the same direction, but only to a lesser 
extent.
(II) This time suppose that Tx and T2 are both 
methodologically sound theories which have an equally 
impressive record of empirical success. According to our 
assumption, they must both be assessed as having progressed 
to the same extent in the direction of capturing the 
underlying physical constitution of the world. However, let 
the two theories, as before, clash on most fundamental issues 
in their description of this constitution. The assessment of 
the two theories in this case would then amount to regarding 
radically different descriptions of the world as enjoying the 
same proximity to the truth.
In both (J) and (JJ) it appears that the two-tier realist 
assessment that is accorded to one theory cannot hold when it 
is made, on the same grounds, of its rival. In (T) , T2 is 
assessed as having progressed towards the truth on the 
grounds of its methodological soundness as well as empirical 
successes. But when T2 is assessed on the same grounds, it 
becomes necessary to revise the original assessment of Tlf 
and perhaps even to reverse it completely. In (II), assessing 
T2 and T2 on the same grounds would have to accord to both the 
same proximity to the truth. This assessment, however, cannot 
be consistently maintained since the two offer radically 
different descriptions of the underlying constitution of the
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world. The two-tier realist assessment of theories, 
therefore, needs to be modified if it is to handle the 
relation between superseding and superseded theories in 
general.
6. Some Concrete Examples
Let me illustrate the point with the help of some examples 
that I take from the history of science. In order to 
accommodate these examples to my purposes, I shall have to 
make some contrary-to-fact assumptions which are otherwise 
innocuous. Consider the Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories 
realistically interpreted. For the Copernican theory, 
however, let us not take the product completed by Copernicus 
himself by the time of his death in 1543 (presented in the 
Commentariolus, and De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium). 
Instead, let us take the version that incorporates all the 
modifications introduced by Kepler, not only in his Mysterium 
Cosmographicum of 1596 (Dreyer [1953], pp. 376-378), but also 
by the end of the year 1604 (Ibid, p. 382).
Kepler's motivation in choosing the Copernican theory against 
its chief rivals was not only that it is more fertile in the 
explanation of the known facts and the prediction of new 
ones, but also that it allows for greater unity and symmetry. 
He expresses this preference in no ambiguous terms at the 
beginning of Mysterium Cosmographicum: 'My confidence was
first established by the magnificent agreement of everything 
that is observed in the heavens with Copernicus's theories;
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since he not only derived the past motions which have been 
recapitulated from the remotest antiquity, but also predicted 
future motions, not indeed with great certainty, but far more 
certainly than Ptolemy, Alfonso, and the rest.1 Kepler 
[1596], p. 75. And shortly afterwards, 'For, to turn from 
astronomy to physics or cosmography, these hypotheses of 
Copernicus not only do not offend against the Nature of 
things, but do much more to assist her. She loves simplicity, 
she loves unity. Nothing ever exists in her which is useless 
or superfluous, but more often she uses one cause for many 
effects. 1 (Ibid, p. 77) . Let us look at these points one by 
one.
I. Explanatory improvements
(a) In the Ptolemaic systems, the observed stations and 
retrogressions of the planets (i.e. the reversal of the 
direction of their motion after a short period during which 
they appear to stand stationary) has to be accounted for, in 
each individual case, by adjusting the size of the epicycles 
which are pegged on the principal circles which are, in turn, 
assigned to take them round the centre of the universe (i.e. 
the earth) . In the Copernican system, these fall out (albeit 
not with great accuracy) naturally from the geometry of the 
sun-centred orbits without requiring such ad-hoc adjustments.
(jb) The observed positions of the inferior planets (those 
whose orbits lie between the earth and the sun) , namely Venus 
and Mercury, never exceeds a fixed distance from the observed 
position of the sun.. This fact could only be accounted for in
the Ptolemaic systems by means of an ad-hoc requirement 
according to which the centres of each planet's epicycle must 
always lie on a straight line connecting the earth and the 
sun. In the Copernican system, on the other hand, because the 
earth orbits the sun with the orbits of these planets lying 
in-between, their positions, as viewed from the earth, can 
never deviate from that of the sun by more than a fixed 
amount. The facts in this case, therefore, follow from the 
sun-centred arrangement of the orbits in the Copernican 
system.
(c) The frequencies of the retrogressions of the inferior 
planets are hugely different: That of Venus is once in 584 
days, and that of Mercury is once in 116 days. In the 
Ptolemaic systems, this fact could only be accounted for by 
requiring the epicycle of Mercury to rotate with a speed five 
times greater than that of Venus. This requirement, however, 
must be imposed for no other reason than saving the 
appearances. In the Copernican system, on the other hand, the 
difference in these frequencies follows naturally from the 
fact that the orbit of Mercury is smaller than that of Venus, 
and the latter smaller than that of the earth.
II. Predictive improvements
(a) For the inferior planets, the angle of elongation (i.e. 
the angle by which the position of a planet, as viewed on 
earth, deviates from that of the sun) is always acute. The 
maximum elongation of Venus, however, is greater than that of 
Mercury. Since in the Ptolemaic systems it is necessary for
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Venus and Mercury to be carried on epicycles, the relative 
order of their deferents (i.e. the principal circle around 
the centre of the planetary system on the circumference of 
which epicycles are centred) must be determined arbitrarily. 
These maximums can be reproduced by either putting Mercury's 
deferent closer to the sun than that of Venus, or vice versa, 
adjusting the sizes of their respective epicycles accordingly 
(as in Figure 1).
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In the Copernican system, on the other hand, the relative 
sizes of the orbits of the inferior planets can be determined 
from the geometry of the sun-centred orbits plus the values 
of their maximum elongations. The greater the maximum of 
elongation of an inferior planet, the larger the radius of 
its orbit from the sun (as can be seen from Figure 2).
(Jb) Sizes of the orbits of all the planets can be 
determined using the Copernican system plus some initial
conditions. The same, however, cannot be said of the
Ptolemaic systems. For the inferior planets, their maximum 
elongation is used for this purpose. At this maximum, the 
distance between the earth and the planet lies along the 
tangent to the planet's orbit (see Figure 2). It, 
therefore, forms an angle of 90° with the radius of this 
orbit. Together with the radius of the earth's orbit, these 
form a right-angled triangle, one acute angle of which is 
known. The value of one acute angle of a right-angled
triangle fixes the ratios of its sides. From these ratios,
in turn, the relative sizes of the inferior planets' orbits 
can be deduced. Similar, but more complicated, calculations
$2- 6.ion<fltxlicn Venus
ercury
0,  Mox»nuJ«n £ op Me r c u r y
Figure 2
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could be used to derive the relative sizes of the other 
planets (Kuhn [1957], pp. 175-176).
(c) The periods of all the planets can be calculated using 
the Copernican system and some direct measurements. The same 
cannot be said of the Ptolemaic systems. Let F be the 
frequency of the event that a planet and the earth lie on a 
straight line to the sun. From the geometry of the sun- 
centred orbits, F is determined by the difference of the 
frequencies of the earth1s and the planet's revolutions. If 
we represent the period of the planet's revolution by T, the 
frequency of its revolution is 1/T. We then have:
F = 1/T - 1/365, for the inferior planets, and 
F = 1/365 - 1/T, for the others.
F can be measured by taking the time interval between two 
successive retrogressions. T can, therefore, be calculated. 
It is interesting to note that with this calculation we can 
test the order of the inferior planets' orbits which were 
independently derived using their maximum elongations. 
Assuming a direct proportionality between the period of a 
planet and the size of its orbit, it follows that a planet 
with a longer period must have a greater orbit around the 
sun. We can, therefore, compare the order of the orbits 
dictated by the maximum elongations, with that derived from 
the frequency calculation.
(Ill) Improvements of unity
(a) A common requirement in both the Ptolemaic and 
Copernican systems is that the planets should move along
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circular paths with uniform speeds. In the Ptolemaic systems, 
the deferents of the sun and the planets are centred on the 
earth. The speed of their rotation, however, can only be 
viewed as uniform, not with respect to this centre, but with 
respect to a geometrical point, called the 'equant1, some 
distance away from the centre. This necessity introduces an 
element of asymmetry in the cosmological presuppositions 
underlying the Ptolemaic systems. Realistically interpreted, 
the deferents are, in accordance with the physical principles 
of Aristotle, geometrical representations of corporeal 
spheres. These are all centred around the earth because the 
latter has a privileged position in the universe. That the 
speed of their rotation should be uniform not with respect to 
this centre, therefore, begs an explanation which is not 
provided.
In the Copernican system, all points of equant are done away 
with. This was, in fact, claimed by Copernicus as the major 
advantage of the sun-centred cosmology over its rivals. The 
new system, however, had problems of its own in this respect. 
Although the sun was now claimed to be the centre of the
universe, Copernicus never managed to centre all the
deferents on the position of the sun. So, although the speed 
of the deferents could be viewed as uniform with respect to 
their centres, these did not coincide with the centre of the 
universe. Nevertheless, if a way could be found in which the
centres of the deferents are brought to coincide with the
position of the sun, a major advantage, so far as the unity 
of the system is concerned, could be claimed. This must have
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provided Kepler with a strong motivation for seeking to 
improve the Copernican system.
(Jb) In the Ptolemaic systems, the sizes of the orbits (and 
not all of them at that, as we have seen) could only be 
determined by taking on board an additional assumption 
(besides that of the proportionality of the periods to the 
distances), commonly known as the 'principle of plenitude'. 
According to this principle, physical space contains no empty 
places and is filled by spheres made of an ephemeral material 
that are tightly packed one inside the other in a cogwheel- 
type arrangement. This principle also plays a dynamical role 
in that it allows the motion of the stellar sphere - the 
outermost sphere in the hierarchy of spheres - to be imparted 
to all other spheres that must rotate around the earth. But 
this role is secured only at the cost of banishing the 
primary cause of all motions (which is necessary to set the 
stellar sphere in rotation), namely the 'prime mover', to 
outside the realm of physics. So, there is an additional 
source of asymmetry in the cosmology underlying the Ptolemaic 
systems: physical as well as non-physical causes are required 
to account for the motions of corporeal entities.
In the Copernican system, the principle of plenitude is, as 
we have seen, not needed for calculating the sizes of the 
orbits. In addition, because the stellar sphere is set at 
rest at a vast distance from the last rotating sphere (in 
order to avoid parallax), its violation is strongly 
suggested. This affords the chance for seeking only physical
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causes from within the universe in order to account for the 
motion of the planets. Kepler sought these causes first in 
terms of forces emanating from the sun alone. This appears to 
tie up nicely with the assumption of the direct 
proportionality between the length of the periods and the 
size of the orbits. If, therefore, progress could be made in 
the direction of securing centrality for the sun, a more 
unified cosmological account would, in its light, appear as 
a promising prospect.
The best Kepler could achieve by proceeding in this 
direction, while preserving the assumptions of the 
circularity of the orbits and the uniformity of the planets' 
speeds, was to introduce the following modifications to the 
Copernican system: (i) Copernicus had conceived the planes of 
the planetary orbits as intersecting in the centre of the 
earth's orbit. Not being able to adopt the position of the 
sun as the centre of this orbit, the best he could do was to 
set it on an epicyclic rotation around a circle centred on 
the sun (see Figure 3). The circle which carries the centre 
of a planet's orbit is called an 'eccentric'. The effect 
produced by this construction is to approximate, by means of 
circles, the eccentricity in a planet's orbit which we now 
know (and Kepler soon afterwards discovered) is due to its 
elliptical shape.
76
/J
\
Orbit
Figure 3
By making the planes of planetary orbits intersect in the 
position of the sun itself, Kepler observed that considerable 
improvements result for the latitudes (deviations north and 
south from the plane of the ecliptic) of all the planets 
(Kuhn [1957], p. 210, and Dreyer [1953], pp. 383, 393). (ii) 
Copernicus had used two different origins for the 
eccentricities of the planetary orbits. The eccentricity of 
the earth's was measured from the sun (as in Figure 3), while 
those of every other planets' were measured from the centre 
of the earth's orbit. The latter was motivated by the wish to 
account for his belief, based partly on inaccuracies in the 
data available to him, that the eccentricities of Mars and 
Venus had undergone some change since the time of Ptolemy 
(Kuhn [1957], pp. 210-211, Dreyer [1953], p. 378. Note that 
Kuhn names Mercury rather than Mars in this regard. A 
comparison with Kepler [1596],
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pp. 161, 181, and 183 shows that this is a
mis identification) . By measuring all eccentricities from the
sun, Kepler observed that these variations disappear and a 
better fit to more accurate data is achieved.
The theory which emerges from Kepler1s gloss on the
Copernican system (let us, for brevity fs sake, call it
'Kop'), appears to hold encouraging promises for a fully 
fledged sun-centred cosmology. Moreover, in comparison with 
the best available version of the Ptolemaic system (let us 
call it 'Ptol'), Kop proves superior on methodological, as 
well as empirical, grounds. From the realist point of view, 
therefore, it merits the property of being closer to the 
truth than its rival.
7. The 'Paradox' of the Two-tier Realist Assessment of 
Success
As has been noted, Ptol suffers from serious methodological 
shortcomings. However, for the sake of the argument, let us 
overlook them and assume that during the period in which it 
faced no serious rival, it could be assessed, from the same 
realist point of view, as progress in the direction of 
capturing the cosmological order in the universe. This 
assumption, however, does not appear capable of holding its 
ground when the same realist considerations are applied to 
the superior Kop, which must also be assessed as progress in 
this direction. For not only on almost all the points at 
issue between them Kop and Ptol offer diametrically opposed
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conceptions, but also there is nothing in Kop in the light of 
which Ptol could be considered as a fairly good approximation 
if the cosmological story that Kop has to tell is assumed to 
be true.
First, there is a clash between the two on the conception of 
the physical space. Ptol says 'no place without a substance1, 
whereas Kop asserts the existence of vast regions of empty 
places. Moreover, physical space in Ptol is highly 
regimented: (i) The centre is the place for substances whose 
•natural state1 is that of rest. Everywhere else is reserved 
for substances whose natural state is that of uniform motion, 
(ii) The central region is inhabitable only by substances 
which have weight and are subject to change and decay. The 
rest can be inhabited only by substances which are weightless 
and unperishable. Physical space in Kop, on the other hand, 
is not at all sensitive to the kind of entities that can or 
cannot occupy it. The centre allows motion like everywhere 
else; and any region can be occupied by perishable 
substances.
Second, the earth in Ptol is regarded as the stationary 
centre of the universe, whereas in Kop it appears as a 
wanderer like all the other planets. Moreover, dynamical 
states of rest or motions in Kop are not 1 natural1 to 
particular kinds of substances. A celestial object such as 
the stellar sphere is allowed to stay at rest, while the 
earth is set in perpetual motion (of three different kinds, 
at that).
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Third, the moon appears in Ptol as a planet going around the 
centre of the universe like all the other planets. In Kop it 
is portrayed as a satellite orbiting the planet Earth, just 
as the moons of Jupiter, discovered earlier by Galileo, are 
satellites orbiting that planet. Finally, the cause of 
planetary motions is conceived in Kop as residing in a 
physical object, the sun, and placed within the universe. In 
Ptol it is viewed as originating in a supernatural entity 
which resides outside the physical universe.
The descriptions of the physical universe offered by the two 
theories are too far apart to make it easy to consider them 
in the same league so far as progress towards the truth is 
concerned. The new theory, furthermore, makes no allowance 
whatsoever for sustaining the assumption of progress that we 
attributed to the old theory. Consequently, there is no 
continuity in the transition from the old to the new theory; 
no meeting point on the basis of which the progress of the 
new theory could be viewed as somehow having been built on 
the progress of the old. Any merit, therefore, that is due to 
the account Kop offers, on the grounds of its superiority, 
must be claimed at the expense of whatever merit that we were 
previously led to ascribe to Ptol. If Kop is to be considered 
as having made some progress towards capturing the truth of 
the cosmic constitution, Ptol must, in the light of the 
changed circumstances, be considered as having been on the 
wrong track all along.
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Historically, in fact, we do not face the problem of such 
radical reversal of decision in the transition from Ptol to 
Kop. Ptol actually suffers enough methodological shortcomings 
for the two-tier realist to consider it out of serious 
contention for his truth-related property of merit. It lacked 
predictive fertility and achieved most of its empirical 
'successes' by making ad hoc adjustments to the incoming, as 
well as improved, data. But if, contrary to facts, Ptol were 
not to suffer from all these shortcomings, and there were no 
requirements on the theory succeeding it to entail that it 
was a good approximation, its two-tier realist assessment 
could endow it with the merit of progress towards the truth 
at one time, only to strip it of this merit altogether when 
it is superseded.
If such a situation were to prevail for theories which not 
only are satisfactorily adequate over an empirical domain, 
but pass the methodological test of soundness as well, the 
two-tier realist conception of theories could be faced with 
something like a paradox. In the absence of continuity in the 
transition from one theory to another, this outlook could 
appear to allocate contradictory assessments on a refuted, 
but otherwise outstanding, theory. On the one hand, limited 
but hard won success is interpreted as indicating partial 
progress towards capturing the truth. On the other, it would 
appear to amount to no such thing at all when the theory that 
once achieved it is superseded by one which offers a 
radically different account.
81
The problem appears more pronounced when we consider the 
possibility of rivalry between two theories that are equally 
outstanding, but radically different in accounting for the 
same facts. Once again, let me take an example from the 
history of science and tailor it for my purposes by making an 
innocuous counterfactual assumption. In 1588 Tycho Brahe 
published his De Mundi aetherei recentioribus phaenomenis 
liber secundus, in which a new system of planetary 
arrangements was presented. The novelty of this system 
consisted in grafting portions of the Copernican system on to 
the geocentric view of the universe in such a way that all 
the explanatory, as well as predictive, advantages of the 
former over the Ptolemaic systems are preserved.
Tycho was an astronomer par excellence, in the sixteenth 
century sense of the word, and hence with his attention 
firmly focused on the agreement of calculations, based on 
geometrical constructions, with observational data. Thus the 
fact that his proposed system was, from the view point of 
physical cosmology, very awkward, to say the least, appeared 
not to trouble him at all. The rough outline of his system 
has the earth positioned at the centre of the universe, with 
the moon and the sun in orbits around it. The rest of the 
planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn) are set on 
orbits centred at the sun (in that order).
Tycho, himself, refused to believe in the reality of 
celestial spheres (Letter to Kepler of 9 December 1599; in 
Koyre [1973], pp. 161-162), which makes it difficult to
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accommodate a causal account of the motions of the celestial 
objects within his system. But even if these spheres are to 
be introduced to his system, there is no physical mechanism 
whereby the motion of the stellar sphere could be imparted to 
the spheres of the moon, the sun, and the inferior planets. 
The reason is that the stellar sphere, along with the spheres 
of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars would have to rotate in the 
opposite direction to those of the rest (Kuhn [1957], p. 
202).
Let us overlook these shortcomings and assume, again for the 
sake of the argument, that the Tychonic system is, from the 
methodological point of view, as good as Kop. Since 
empirically the two systems are equally adequate, in the 
light of our assumption they must both be regarded by the 
realist as having equal merits. The Tychonic system, however, 
is deeply entrenched in the same cosmological principles that 
underlie the Ptolemaic systems. In fact, it was in an attempt 
to uphold these very principles in the face of serious 
challenges that were raised against them that this system was 
produced. In comparing Kop and Ptol, we saw that these 
principles pull in opposite directions. The Tychonic system 
and Kop, therefore, cannot both be regarded as progress to 
the same extent towards the truth. We seem to face an 
inconsistency in our assessment of these theories.
Although the impasse we face in both this example and the one 
we contrived involving Ptol and Kop, stems from the same 
problem (viz. the insufficiency of methodological soundness
and empirical adequacy, on their own, for the assessment of 
the proximity of a theory to the truth) , the situation is 
different in the two cases. In the latter, we are forced to 
assess Kop as closer to the truth than Ptol. This assessment, 
however, also forces us to reverse the decision we made 
earlier regarding Ptol when it was unrivalled. But that 
decision was made on exactly the same grounds as the one 
which forced us to assess Kop as a closer theory to the 
truth. One and the same criterion, therefore, appears to 
produce contradictory assessments of a theory depending on 
whether or not a suitable rival is on the scene. This makes 
the truth-related property that the two-tier realist wishes 
to detect in theories, rather too shaky for comfort. After we 
decide that it is there in a theory, it can evaporate merely 
as a result of the appearance of an eligible rival on the 
scene. On the other hand, in cases exemplified by the rivalry 
which we set up between the Tychonic system and Kop, the 
assessment that seems to be equally deserved by the 
protagonists cannot be accorded to them both. Assessing the 
two theories by the same criterion, we are forced to regard 
them as equally close to the truth. This assessment, however, 
cannot be maintained because the two are diametrically 
opposed in their descriptions of the underlying constitution 
of the universe.
8. Resolution of the 'Paradox'
Obviously the two-tier realist wishes his belief in the 
relative proximity of a theory to the truth to have a sound
objective basis. It is, therefore, desirable that if this 
property is detected in a theory, it is consistently upheld 
vis a vis the kinds of challenges we have been considering. 
The explanatory burden that the Correspondence Principle 
imposes in physics, appears to meet this desideratum 
admirably. Let us see how this is done in the particular 
cases we have been considering.
In the case of an outstanding theory T2 that has run into 
trouble, the requirement that the Correspondence Principle 
imposes amounts to the following: a theory T2 is a suitable 
replacement for Tx if it is not only methodologically sound 
and empirically superior, but also entails that Tz is a good 
approximation over the domain where it proves empirically 
adequate. By meeting this requirement, T2 ensures that the 
merit achieved by T1 in virtue of its successes is preserved, 
no matter how deeply the accounts offered by the two theories 
clash. The assessment of T2 as progress towards the truth, 
far from necessitating the reversal of the earlier decision 
about the proximity of Tx to the truth, secures for the 
latter the assessment that it is also progress, though to a 
lesser extent, in the same direction. By taking on board the 
additional requirement demanded by the Correspondence 
Principle, therefore, the problem of reversing the decision 
about the merits of a successful theory is resolved.
In the case we discussed involving Ptol and Kop, the latter 
proved a superior theory to the former without, in fact, 
offering any explanation of its successes. This can be
accounted for by observing that Ptol, as we saw, suffered 
from serious methodological shortcomings. But since Kop not 
only does not share these defects, but proved to be a 
promising theory, one should expect that an outstanding 
theory that would supersede it fulfils the requirement 
demanded by the Correspondence Principle. Such a theory was 
produced by Kepler and was partly presented in his Astronomia 
Nova of 1609, and partly in his Epitome Astronomiae 
Copernicanae of 1618, 1620, and 1621 (Dreyer [1953], p. 395).
Apart from a few remnants from the Copernican system, 
Kepler's theory is radically different from extant 
cosmological theories at the time. It sets the boundary of 
the universe in the stationary stellar sphere; it has the sun 
firmly positioned at the centre of this sphere; and it treats 
the earth as a planet. However, it jettisons the laws of 
circular motions and uniform speeds, and assigns to each 
planet a simple elliptical orbit, fixed around the sun at one 
of the foci, as well as a varying (though law-governed) 
speed. It banishes standard devices such as eccentrics, 
deferents and epicycles from astronomy once and for all, and 
introduces new laws and dynamical causes to cosmology.
One of the laws governs the speed of the planets. According 
to this law each planet moves with such a speed that during 
equal time-intervals, the straight line connecting the planet 
to the sun sweeps out equal areas. Consequently, the speed 
with which a planet moves at a given time is inversely 
proportional to its distance from the sun at that time. When
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the planet is farther away from the sun, it moves slower than 
when it is nearer the sun. The other law connects the ratio 
of the periods of any two planets to that of their average 
distances from the sun, and was presented separately in 
Harmonice Mundi of 1619.
In Kepler's theory there are two essentially physical causes 
responsible for planetary behaviour. One originates from the 
sun alone and is the moving force which perpetually pushes 
the planets along their orbits. This may be visualized as 
lines of force that emanate from the sun, like spokes of a 
bicycle wheel, across the plane of planetary orbits around 
the sun. The sun spins round a fixed axis with uniform speed, 
turning, as a result, the lines of force that extend from it 
to all the planets. In positions nearer the sun these lines 
are more densely packed. Therefore, planets in orbits closer 
to the sun are, at any one time, driven by more lines of 
force than those with orbits further apart. This accounts for 
the increase in the length of a planet's period as the size 
of its orbit increases.
The shape of the planetary orbits and variations in the 
orbital speeds of the planets are accounted for by the action 
of magnetic forces which Kepler ascribes to the sun as well 
as to each planet. This idea was reinforced, if not 
motivated, by the fact that William Gilbert had established, 
in his On the Magnet, that the earth was itself 'a huge round 
magnet' (Dryer [1953], pp. 394-395). The magnetic property 
which Kepler attributes to the sun turns out to be very
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peculiar indeed. Its south pole is buried deep in the centre 
of the sun, so that it can exert no influence at all; and its 
north pole is distributed uniformly all over the sun's 
surface. The planets, in turn, have their magnetic poles, 
very much like those of the earth's, at the opposite ends of 
an axis that remains parallel to itself throughout their 
orbits (Kuhn [1957], p. 246).
The upshot of this arrangement is that a planet throughout 
its orbit is always under the influence of the north pole of 
the sun. There are, however, two positions at the opposite 
ends of its journey where both magnetic poles of a planet are 
equally distanced from the sun's north pole. The net magnetic 
influence of the sun on the planet's motion is zero when the 
latter occupies these positions. In between these positions, 
as the planet is gradually pushed along its orbit, the 
distance between one of the planet's poles and the sun's 
north pole decreases towards a minimum. When this happens to 
the south pole of the planet, the latter is attracted towards 
the sun. When it happens to the north pole of the planet, the 
latter is repelled from the sun. As this minimum is passed 
for one pole, the planets' poles approach the position of 
equidistance, after which the distance involving the opposite 
pole begins to decrease, and so on.
The net effect of a planet's periodic attraction towards, and 
repulsion away from, the sun, while constantly being pushed 
around by the turning lines of force, is a motion round an 
elliptic path. As the planet gets closer to the sun, it meets
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a greater number of lines of force (because they are more 
densely packed in such regions). It, therefore, experiences 
a greater pushing force, and thus will move with a greater 
speed than when it is farther away. The elliptical orbit, as 
well as variations in the speed, of the planets are thus 
accounted for by the action of two forces.
As the magnetic interaction that Kepler postulated to hold 
between the sun and the planets, is allowed to diminish in 
strength, the periodic swing that the planets make towards 
and away from the sun, would become less and less pronounced 
(in fact it is less pronounced already in the case of the 
outermost planets). In the limit, where this interaction 
vanishes altogether, one would expect the planets to move 
along circular orbits centred at the sun. Under such 
circumstances, the number of lines of force that extend from 
the sun to each planet would remain constant at all times. 
Since the sun is spinning uniformly, it follows that the 
planets should move with constant speeds on their orbits.
The system of planets which orbit the sun in circles with 
uniform speeds was the very system that Copernicus presented 
in his Commentarlolus as an ideal towards which astronomy 
should strive. He never managed to attain to this ideal 
himself, but Kop went as far as it is possible to achieve it. 
It managed to position the sun not only at the centre of the 
stellar sphere, but at the centre of the planes of all 
planetary orbits as well. In addition, it endowed the sun
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with moving forces which alone were responsible for all 
planetary motions.
Now, Kop is crowded with eccentrics, deferents and epicycles. 
But if we cut it down to the same rough form as the system 
presented in Copernicus's Commentariolus, we will have a 
heliocentric system of planets that move in circular orbits, 
with uniform speeds and on account of a dynamical influence 
from the sun. This system differs from Kepler's own in 
empirical adequacy. But it does so only in so far as it 
ignores the magnetic interaction between the sun and the 
planets. In fact if we just introduce this interaction into 
this rough form of Kop, we will get precisely the system that 
Kepler finally arrived at through a much more arduous route. 
From the vantage point of Kepler's theory, therefore, it is 
seen that Kop is the best one can get if the magnetic 
interaction between the sun and the planets is not taken into 
account.
Kepler's theory thus ensures that the merit of Kop as a step 
in the right direction towards the truth is preserved no 
matter how radically the two theories differ from one 
another. Therefore, the assessment of Kepler's theory as 
progress towards the truth also secures for Kop the 
assessment that it is also progress (though to a lesser 
extent) in the same direction. The same, however, cannot be 
said of Ptol. There is nothing in Kepler's theory which can 
shed any light on the reasons for the empirical successes 
achieved by Ptol; no parameter whose behaviour in certain
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regions of empirical phenomena may suggest that Ptol is a 
good approximation to the underlying structure of the 
universe. As it happens, we know that Ptol is 
methodologically unsound. May be that has something to do 
with its being off course in the direction of the truth. 
Intriguing as this question may be, I cannot go into it here. 
What I wanted to show is how the requirement imposed by the 
Correspondence Principle ensures that a two-tier realist 
assessment of methodologically sound and empirically adequate 
theories which differ fundamentally from one another in their 
description of the world can be consistently maintained.
The Generalized Correspondence Principle is equally 
efficacious in deciding which of the two radically different 
theories which enjoy the same degree of empirical adequacy is 
the one that is directed towards the truth. The case in point 
is that which I contrived between Kop and the Tychonic 
system. Here the problem arose when both theories were 
assumed to demand the assessment of being equally close to 
the truth, but could not be so assessed because the stories 
they offered clashed radically with one another. In cases 
such as this if the constraint imposed by the Correspondence 
Principle is respected generally, the question can be decided 
by the appearance of the theory that supersedes both 
protagonists. That theory has the merit of being progress 
towards the truth which is singled out as a good 
approximation by the superseding theory.
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In my example, the theory which superseded both Kop and the 
Tychonic system was Kepler's theory. Its methodological 
soundness, as well as empirical superiority, suggest that it 
has the merit of being closer to the truth than either of the 
theories which it supersedes. Kepler's theory, in turn, meets 
the requirement demanded by the Correspondence Principle by 
entailing that Kop, and not the Tychonic system, is a good 
approximation to what it describes as the truth of the 
matter. Therefore, the assessment of Kepler's theory as 
progress towards the truth singles out Kop as progress, 
though to a lesser extent, in the same direction. This 
assessment leaves the Tychonic system out of the contention 
for this merit altogether. The question, 'which of the two 
theories, Kop or the Tychonic system, while equally adequate 
in dealing with the empirical phenomena, enjoys proximity to 
the truth?' is thus decided.
Like Ptol, the Tychonic system too is, in fact, 
unsatisfactory on methodological grounds. The traditional 
explanation for why the celestial objects revolve around the 
earth was that it is stationary and occupies a privileged 
position at the centre of the universe. Neither of these 
properties is, in the Tychonic system, possessed by the sun; 
yet all the planets are set to revolve around it. Moreover, 
there does not seem to be a physical mechanism which is 
capable of sustaining this system. The point is, however, 
that even if it did not suffer from any such defects, the 
Tychonic system would lack the merit of being progress 
towards the truth because the superior theory that supersedes
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it and its rival Kop, picks the latter as a good 
approximation to the truth. Again, a problem which the two- 
tier realist may face in assessing two equally empirically 
adequate theories which clash fundamentally in their 
descriptions of the world, is resolved if the satisfaction of 
the requirement demanded by the Correspondence Principle is 
deemed compulsory in physics.
What emerges from this discussion is that if theories are 
conceived from the two-tier realist point of view, then the 
Correspondence Principle must be an essential requirement in 
physics. Non-realist conceptions of theories have no need for 
such a principle, because they are not interested in any 
truth-related (in the realist sense of 'truth') properties of 
theories. Their primary interest lies generally in finding 
expedient schemes for making predictions which by fitting the 
widest available data would provide reliable estimates for 
what is to be expected in the future. Discontinuity in the 
change between theories, therefore, is not something which 
would pose a problem for them.
It is, of course, very much a matter of debate how much of 
the business of doing physics relies on the two-tier realist 
conception of theories. Certainly in the early days when 
Quantum Mechanics was in the making and physicists working in 
this area were very much groping in the dark, non-realist 
sentiments were quite often aired by some prominent 
contributors to this development. Nor is this the only period 
in which sentiments of this kind are expressed by prominent
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physicists. More often than not, when the adequacy of a 
particular account offered by a spectacularly successful 
theory is in question because it faces a serious crisis, such 
sentiments appear to gain force and popularity. To what 
extent the two-tier realist interpretation of theories is 
essential in physics is a question which does not concern me 
here. What does concern me here is (1) which conception of 
the Correspondence Principle can have the chance of holding 
generally in physics, and (2) to what extent this conception 
may be viewed as entrenched within physics. The conception I 
have proposed in this chapter, if at all tenable, appears to 
be general not only in the sense of holding in more than one 
branch of physics, but also in the sense of having the 
reductionist, as well as the ontological and the structural 
conceptions as its special cases. It also appears to account 
for cases of correspondence in which they fail to hold. I 
have also tried to show that heuristic considerations apart, 
the requirement demanded by the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle must be maintained if the success of theories in 
physics is to be consistently assessed from the two-tier 
realist point of view.
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CHAPTER 4
VERISIMILITUDE AND RATIONAL THEORY CHOICE IN PHYSICS
1. The Correspondence Relation
The empirical adequacy of Kepler's theory does not extend 
beyond the domain of phenomena over which Kop may be 
considered as a good approximation. It is a better theory 
over exactly the same domain. Newton's theory, however, not 
only improves on Kepler's over this very domain, but is also 
adequate over a larger domain. It covers terrestrial as well 
as celestial motions. This large difference apart, the 
relation between Newton's theory and Kepler's is essentially 
the same as that between the latter and Kop. The two theories 
are radically different, and Newton's theory explains why 
Kepler's was successful in accounting for planetary motions. 
The moving force postulated by Kepler's theory to emanate 
from the sun is done away with in Newton's theory, and the 
magnetic properties of the planets or the sun play no role in 
the motions in the solar system. Instead, the latter 
postulates a single attractive force, gravitation, which acts 
between massive bodies in proportion to their masses, and in 
inverse proportion to the square of the distance between 
them.
The law of gravitation proposed by Newton's theory, when 
applied to the mass possessed by each planet and the sun, 
given the distances between them, predicts roughly elliptical 
orbits for the former with the sun oscillating around one of 
the foci. The reason for this effect is that just as the sun 
exerts an attractive force on a planet, the latter also 
exerts an attractive force on the former. When the planet
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involved has a mass much smaller than that of the sun, this 
effect is negligible. But when the planet has a considerable 
mass (as is the case, for example, with Jupiter) then the 
effect becomes detectable at times. Also, according to this 
law, there is an influence on the motion of one planet by the 
attraction exerted on it from its neighbours. Depending on 
the masses and the distances between them, this effect can 
become pronounced thereby producing perturbations in the 
otherwise smooth path of a given planet.
When all these effects are taken into account, a better fit 
between calculations and data is observed than was the case 
using Kepler's theory. However, from the vantage point of 
Newton' s theory it can be seen why Kepler1 s theory was 
successful. If the masses of those planets whose orbits lie 
closer to the sun are negligible compared to that of the sun, 
then they can exercise very little effect on the sun itself. 
Likewise, if the more massive planets have orbits far away 
from the sun, their effect on the sun would be very little 
too. Under these circumstances the suggestion that the 
position of the sun remains stationary approximates the real 
situation very well. In addition, if the masses of the 
planets are very small compared to that of the sun, and the 
orbits are well spread out, the effect each planet would 
experience from its neighbours would be negligible compared 
to that it experiences from the sun. Given these facts, the 
suggestion that each planet orbits the sun in such a way that 
it is only under the influence of the latter, would not be 
far from what is the case according to Newton's theory.
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As the gravitational pull which a given planet exerts on the 
sun and on the other planets is allowed to diminish, the 
perturbations in the orbits of the planets, as well as the 
position of the sun, decrease accordingly. For those values 
of the mass of the planets and distances between them that 
this pull is so small as to be negligible, the displacements 
of the sun from the foci of planetary orbits, as well as 
perturbations in the planets's orbits, would fall within the 
limits of experimental accuracy which were operative in the 
confirmation of Kepler's theory. Under these conditions the 
planets would appear to behave as they would if Kepler's 
theory were true, namely turning around the sun while 
concurrently being pulled in and pushed out periodically by 
the latter. The description of their behaviour in terms of 
Kepler's laws (simple elliptical orbits; equal areas in equal 
times; and the periods law) would thus be a good 
approximation to the description offered by Newton's theory. 
Newton's theory, therefore, entails that as the gravitational 
effect that each planet exerts on all other planets and the 
sun is diminished, so the solar system would tend to become 
Keplerian. Since this pull effect throughout the solar system 
is minute compared to the gravitational pull of the sun, 
Kepler's theory works as a good approximation, in the sense 
outlined in the previous chapter, to what Newton's theory 
describes to be the underlying constitution of the solar 
system.
We have seen that Kop can be singled out as the very first 
cosmological theory which not only was methodologically
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sound, but showed better empirical adequacy in comparison to 
its extant rivals as well. We have also seen that, unlike its 
extant rivals, assessment of it as progress towards the truth 
survived its replacement by a superior theory which was 
radically at odds with its description of the underlying 
constitution of the cosmos. The reason this assessment 
survived the transition to Kepler's theory, was seen to be 
the fact that the latter complied with the requirement 
demanded by the Correspondence Principle with respect to it 
rather than to its extant rivals. Similarly, the assessment 
of Kepler's theory as better progress in the same direction 
was, in turn, seen to survive its replacement with Newton's 
theory. The reason for the survival of this latter assessment 
is the same: Newton's theory satisfies the demand imposed by 
the Correspondence Principle on any theory that is to 
supersede Kepler's.
Newton's theory, in turn, is not only sound so far as our 
methodological requirements are concerned, but empirically 
more adequate than any theory which had been proposed prior 
to it. The Correspondence Principle, therefore, requires that 
any theory Tm which in the future is to replace it should, 
with appropriate initial conditions, entail that it is a good 
approximation to what Tm describes to be the case. Taking Kop 
as the starting point and moving up to Newton's theory, we 
see a succession of theories which satisfy the following 
conditions: (i) all are methodologically sound, (ii) each is 
relatively more adequate over a domain of empirical phenomena 
than those which come before it in the succession, and (iii)
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should the need arise, each is required to be superseded by 
a theory which, together with the right initial conditions, 
entails that it is a good approximation to the new 
description of the underlying physical constitution of world.
A succession of theories which satisfy all these conditions 
exhibits an order that may be called, for obvious reasons, 
the 'Correspondence Relation'. Any theory T± that is a member 
of the sequence ordered by the Correspondence Relation, 
stands in a definite temporal relationship to all other 
members of the sequence. If T± occupies a position in the 
sequence which lies between one theory which it entails to be 
a good approximation, and another theory which entails that 
it is a good approximation, then Tj_ is proposed after the 
former and before the latter. If T± does not have any 
successors, it is proposed after all other members of the 
sequence. That theory which precedes T± in the sequence and 
which Ti entails to be a good approximation, I call a 
•limiting case' of T±.
The Correspondence Relation has the following properties 
which Krajewski [1977], pp. 51-53, also points out. It is 
irreflexive, because a theory cannot be a limiting case of 
itself. It is, moreover, asymmetric, because if T2 is a 
limiting case of T2, then T2 cannot be a limiting case of T1. 
Finally, it is transitive. Let T1 be a limiting case of T2, 
and the latter a limiting case of T3. Since T3, along with the 
appropriate initial conditions, entails that T2 is a good 
approximation over the domain of empirical facts D2, and T2
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likewise entails that T2 is a good approximation over the 
domain Dlr then provided D2 is contained in D2, T3 also 
entails that T2 is a good approximation over D1.
It must be pointed out, however, that the definition offered 
in Krajewski [1977] for the Correspondence Relation is not 
only at odds with that offered here, but it is unsatisfactory 
as well. There, the relation (abbreviated as CR) is defined 
in the following terms: a new theory T2 is in CR with an
old one T2 when there is a CR between basic laws of T2 and 
T2. ' (Ibid, p. 6) . And, 'A law L2 is in a CR with a law L2 if 
the equation F2(x) = 0 of L2 passes asymptotically into the 
equation F2(x) = 0 of L2 when some characteristic for L2
parameters p2 tend to zero (p2 -> 0) . If we assume that they 
reach the limit (p2 = 0) , we may deduce the equation of L2 
from the equation of L2: F2(x) = 0 & p2(x) = 0 => F2(x) = 0. 1 
(Ibid, p. 42).
This definition is, for most cases at any rate, satisfied 
only vacuously. For, presumably the new theory works better 
than the old because of the essential role that parameter p± 
plays in the equations prompted by its 'basic laws'. This 
parameter, in turn, is assigned, by T2, either a constant 
value, in which case it cannot vanishes altogether. Or, it is 
allowed to vary, in which case so long as the physical effect 
that T2 and T2 are attempting to account for is present, p2 
cannot quite assume zero as a value (even though it may 
approach values that, compared to those assumed by the other 
parameters, become less and less significant). The equation
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prompted by the basic law L2 of the theory T2, therefore, 
presupposes that p± does, under no circumstances of interest, 
vanish altogether. In most cases, therefore, the conjunction 
of this equation with the condition that the value of p± is 
zero, is inconsistent. Since from inconsistent premises any 
proposition follows, we can deduce any equation we like from 
Krajewski's condition. This makes not only Tlt but any other 
theory at all a limiting case of T2.
Once a theory is the only one in a branch of physics which 
satisfies all the methodological conditions required by the 
two-tier realist conception of theories, and establishes 
itself as empirically adequate over a domain not smaller than 
that of any of its predecessors, the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle ensures that it should be a limiting 
case of any theory that in future may supersede it. This 
status, in turn, would guarantee that in case the theory runs 
into refuting circumstances, any theory that would replace it 
in the future must stand in the Correspondence Relation to 
it. The Generalized Correspondence Principle, therefore, 
ensures that such a theory is guaranteed a place in the 
sequence ordered by the Correspondence Relation.
In the branch of physical astronomy or cosmology, the first 
three members of this sequence, as we have seen, displayed a 
smooth progression of the domains of empirical phenomena 
which they cover. After Newtonian mechanics, however, the 
great theoretical advances that were made in physics do not 
always preserve the same smooth extension of empirical
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domains. For example, Maxwell*s theory of electromagnetism, 
though an outstanding achievement in every respect, covers a 
domain of empirical phenomena which has no overlap with that 
covered by Newton's theory. Einstein's theory of relativity 
extends Lorentz transformations, presupposed by Maxwell's 
equations, to the domain covered by Newton's theory. It thus 
proposes a radically new theory of gravitation. It 
nevertheless fails to account for such quantum phenomena as 
radiation from the atoms, the photo-electric effect, as well 
as a variety of phenomena involving the so-called 'weak' and 
'strong' nuclear forces. Quantum Mechanics, on the other 
hand, can deal with these and many more like them adequately, 
and (as will become apparent in the next chapter) may, with 
some difficulties outstanding, be regarded as a natural 
extension of not only the Hamilton-Jacobi theory of Classical 
Mechanics, but Maxwell's electromagnetism as well. It has, 
nonetheless, not been able, so far, to come to terms with the 
phenomenon of gravitation satisfactorily.
2. The Relative Proximity of a Theory to the Truth
Glossing over these problems (any one of which may prove 
fatal for the overall success of the project under 
exploration in this thesis), the progression of theories, 
wherever it is ordered by the Correspondence Relation in 
physics, at least so far as the two-tier realist view of it 
is concerned, aims to discover the underlying physical 
constitution of the world in the appropriate domain. Since 
this constitution determines the truth of the matter in that
102
domain, the place a theory occupies in this progression may 
be taken as an indication of the advance it has made towards 
the truth. Popper once thought that the idea of advancing 
towards the truth can be salvaged, on purely logical grounds, 
from the kind of transitions considered. His intuition was 
that the content of a theory can always be divided into 
classes of its true and false consequences. The better of the 
two theories, according to this intuition, must have (1) a 
greater overall content, (2) a larger class of true 
consequences and (3) a class of false consequences which is 
smaller or at least not larger. These classes, the hope was, 
can thus be compared, pair-wise, for size between the 
theories in question, and a decision about which has advanced 
more towards the truth can be made on the outcome.
Popper [1972] introduces these ideas as follows: '... I have
introduced a logical notion of verisimilitude by combining 
two notions, both originally introduced by Tarski: (a) the
notion of truth, and (b) the notion of the (logical) content 
of a statement; that is, the class of all statements 
logically entailed by it... The class of all the true 
statements which follow from a given statement... and which 
are not tautological can be called its truth content... The 
class of false statements entailed by a statement - the 
subclass of its content which consists of exactly those 
statements which are false - might be called... its 1 falsity 
content'...1 (Popper [1972], pp. 47-48).
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After making these notions more precise he concludes: 'With
the help of these ideas we can now explain more clearly what 
we intuitively mean by truthlikeness or verisimilitude. 
Intuitively speaking, a theory Tx has less verisimilitude 
than a theory T2 if and only if (a) their truth contents and 
falsity contents... are comparable, and either (b) the truth 
content, but not the falsity content, of T2 is smaller than 
that of T2, or else (c) the truth content of T2 is not greater 
than that of T2f but its falsity content is greater. In 
brief, we say that T2 is nearer to the truth... than is Tlr 
if and only if more true statements follow from it, but not 
more false statements, or at least equally many true 
statements but fewer false statements.1 (Ibid, p. 52)
A collection of papers by David Miller, John Harris, and 
Pavel Tichy which were simultaneously published in The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, (1974),
demonstrated that conditions (a) - (c) in the above passage 
can be satisfied only if T2 is true. All the outstanding 
theories in physics which we would like to regard as having 
made some advances in the direction of the truth, have either 
been decided to be false, or else cannot be decided to be 
true. It follows, therefore, that comparative assessment of 
verisimilitude, on such logical grounds, between the theories 
of interest in physics is untenable.
The argument can be presented as follows: Since the classes 
of true and false consequences of theories of interest in 
physics are infinite, any comparison of their sizes will have
to be made in terms of the set-theoretic relation of 
inclusion. Couched in these terms, if T2(T) and ^(F) are 
respectively classes of the true and false consequences of 
T±, (i=l,2,...), according to conditions (b) - (c), T2 would 
have greater verisimilitude than T2 just in case either (i) 
T2(T) d  T2(T) , and T2(F) d  T2(F) ; or (ii) T2(T) Cl T2(T) , and 
T2( F ) d T 2(F).
If (i) is to be the case, there will be at least one true 
consequence of T2 which is not a consequence of T2. Let us 
call it 1 tj*. Assuming that T2 is false, we can take any one 
of its false consequences, say fjr and conjoin it with tj. The 
resulting statement tj & fj will be a false consequence of T2 
which is not a consequence of T2. If, on the other hand, (ii) 
were to be the case, assuming that T2 is false, it would have 
at least one false consequence which is not a consequence of 
T2. Let us call it 'f/ . If now we take the disjunction f*V 
-'fj, we would have a true consequence of T2 which is not a 
consequence of T2. It follows that neither (i) nor (ii) could 
hold if both T2 and T2 are false; hence T2 and T2 are 
incomparable as to their closeness to the truth in terms we 
set out to compare them.
As an alternative to the determination of the relative 
verisimilitude of theories by means of the comparison of 
their contents, it may be thought that perhaps the relative 
accuracy of predictions from them ought to be taken as the 
criterion. The theory which yields better predictions for the 
observable quantities of interest is, according to this
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alternative, the one which could be regarded as closer to the 
truth than its rivals. General Relativity, for example, may 
be regarded as closer to the truth than Newtonian Mechanics 
on the grounds that there are domains of empirical data over 
which predictions from the two theories are in conflict, and 
those from the former are invariably more accurate than those 
from the latter.
Miller [1975] produces an argument whose stated target is to 
demolish this alternative as well. Despite formal 
complexities present in the original, the gist of Miller's 
argument has been presented, in rough but very simple terms, 
in Oddie [1986], (pp. 156 - 157). Let us take theories under 
comparison to be Tz and T2 again. Let us assume that 
predictions from T2 for every measured value of a standard 
quantity Q are, on the whole, more accurate than those 
obtained from T2 (but not always the same as the measured 
ones) . The main move involves the introduction of a 
transformation by means of which a non-standard quantity is 
defined such that (a) it appears that the new quantity is 
indistinguishable, from the logical point of view, from Q, 
and (b) the accuracy of predictions for the latter from the 
two theories, is exactly reversed. The aim is to show that if 
T2 is claimed to be closer to the truth on the grounds that 
its predictions for Q are more accurate than those from Tlf 
the latter can equally be claimed to be closer to the truth 
than T2 on the grounds that it predicts more accurate values 
for the contrived quantity than T2.
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This can be done as follows: Let the true values of Q be 
determined in terms of the variable X by the function F(X). 
Let F1 (X) and F2(X) be the functions by means of which Tx and 
T2 predict values for Q respectively. We assume that F2(X), 
on the whole, predicts values for Q that are better 
approximations to those determined by F(X) than values 
predicted by Fa(X). We can always define a transformation f 
which for every X takes the value determined by Fi(X) and 
replaces it with that determined by F2(X), and vice versa; 
i.e.
f (x, Fj (X) ) if Q(X) = F2(X),
f(X,C(X)) = 1 (X, F2 (X) ) if Q(X) = Fi (X) ,
1 (X, Q(X) otherwise.
Under this transformation a new quantity K emerges whose 
values are determined by a new variable X', i.e. (X', K(X')) 
= f (X, Q(X)) . The true values of K are determined by K(X') = 
F(X'), and theories T2 and T2 predict values for K according 
to K(x') = F2(Xf) and K(X') = F^X') respectively. The truth 
in terms of K is the same as the truth in terms of Q; and 
just as K is defined in terms of Q by means of the function 
f, the latter is definable in terms of the former by exactly 
the same function. So, the argument goes, there is no reason, 
from the logical point of view, to regard one as somehow 
meriting a privileged status vis a vis the other. Rather, 
just as T2 'outsmarts' (to use a phrase from Miller [1975], 
p. 170, Tz with respect to Q, Tz outsmarts T2, with respect to 
K in exactly the same way. It is finally concluded that as 
long as none of the theories being compared get all their 
predictions for a standard quantity right (which is typically
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relatively better results cannot justifiably be taken as an 
indication of its closer proximity to the truth.
That this result, if correct, goes far beyond the issue of 
verisimilitude is effectively highlighted in Oddie [1986].
' . . . Miller-argument does not just hit truthlikeness - it 
will also hit confirmation and refutation. For suppose that 
we have two curves expressed by two theories, and a 
collection of data {(X^ Y1),..., (Xn, Yn)}. Typically the data 
will not fit either curve exactly, but will fit one curve 
better than the other.
K-r (/£ rvlc u 'V  ( CblSSccat ^r^cLci^X )
" c * [ (
$ —
3l5
'Consider, for example,... a graph of the classical and 
relativistic predictions for K, kinetic energy, against 
velocity (u) found in standard physics textbooks... The data 
is taken to confirm the relativistic prediction... But we now 
have a recipe for reversing this by means of a 
transformation. We have:
Classical relation: K = 1/2 mcu2,
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Relativistic relation: K = m0 c2 [(1/(1 - u2/o2)H) - 1].
The appropriate transformation is the following:
( (u, 1/2 lOoU2) if v = m0c2 [(1/(1 - uVc2)*1) - 11 
t(u, v) = / (u, i^c2 [(1/(1 - u2/c2)*) - 1] if v = 1/2 iti^u2
| (u, v) otherwise.
'This transformation exactly reverses the relation of the 
classical and relativistic theories of kinetic energy to the 
data... If Miller is correct then...[t]he data confirms the 
relativistic formula no better than it confirms the classical 
formula.' (Ibid, pp. 157-158)
Indeed, for this very reason, Miller's argument, as hinted in 
Oddie [1986], p. 158, may be taken as a reductlo against the 
premise that the quantities in question are logically 
indistinguishable from one another. To shed more light on 
this point, let me offer the following variation on the same 
theme: Suppose there are two points A and B which are exactly 
10 meters apart on a flat stretch of land. We are given two 
straight sticks S1 and S2 of fixed lengths, to use as whole 
units in terms of which this distance should best be divided 
into segments of roughly equal lengths. S1 is about 1.249 
meters long and S2, about 1.66 meters long. We are then asked 
to judge which stick is relatively more suitable to do the 
job. Using S1 eight times we can divide up the distance 
nicely except for a residue of less than 1 centimetre after 
the final segment. On the other hand, the best we can do with 
S2 is to use it six times and end up with a left over of 
about 4 centimetres.
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If we represent the distance in question by D, the truth of 
the matter is D = 10 meters. A rough division of this 
distance in terms of S1 would produce the estimate D = 8Slf 
which evidently fits the bill better than the rival estimate 
D = 6S2. So if Sx and S2 were all there was to divide the 
distance roughly into segments of equal lengths, Sx would be 
more suitable for the job. Now a Miller type conversion can 
be produced for this case with exactly the same results as in 
the theoretical cases we have considered. It is possible to 
define a new quantity C by the following transformation f on 
D:
( 6S2 if D = 8S!,
C = f(D) = / 8S! if D = 6S2,
] D otherwise.
Dividing up C six times with S2 leaves a residue of less than
one centimetre, while doing the same eight times with Sx
leaves a residue of about four centimetres. C has exactly the 
same dimension as D; the truth of the matter is the same for 
both D and C; and D can be defined in terms of C by means of 
the same transformation f. However, to divide up C according 
to the available scales Sx and S2 forces a complete reversal 
of the previous judgement. S2 is now seen to be more accurate 
than its rival, and, therefore, a better choice for dividing 
up a quantity that appears to be logically indistinguishable 
from D.
This argument, naturally, fails to cast any doubt on the 
wisdom of choosing S1 as a better alternative for dividing up 
the distance between A and B. One suspects that it is for
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very much the same reasons that such contrived predicates as 
Goodman's grue and bleen, as well as Miller's Minnesotan and 
Arizonan, have failed to make their way into talks about 
diamonds and the weather. That there is a connection between 
these predicates and the concocted quantities we have been 
considering is hinted in Miller [1975], p. 183, and discussed 
in Oddie [1986], chapter six, in considerable detail. The 
point is not that logic alone can not be expected to decide 
which quantities we chose to measure, or which predicates are 
more suitable for describing the world. Nobody in their right 
mind would turn to logic for making this decision. The fact 
remains, however, that logically indistinguishable quantities 
or predicates should be interchangeable, every thing else 
remaining the same.
Oddie [1986] chooses to question, with apparent success, the 
legitimacy of claims that such contrived constructions are in 
fact logically indistinguishable from predicates and 
quantities that enjoy widespread circulation. His motivation 
for choosing this line of attack, as stated in Oddie [1986], 
p. 158, is the observation that arguments based on these 
concoctions do not just target isolated notions such as 
'accuracy' and 'truthlikeness'. They go much further and 
threaten to render a whole array of notions such as 
'structure, change, sameness of state, confirmation and 
disconfirmation' as 'spurious'.
Arguments and counter-arguments such as these have prompted 
some authors of realist persuasion to steer clear of the
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notion of verisimilitude in connection with the problem of 
rational theory choice in science altogether. A paradigm case 
in point is presented in Watkins [1984]. The project pursued 
here is to articulate a set of methodological desiderata in 
terms of which an 'optimum aim for science1 may be defined. 
A theory which best satisfies these against its rivals at any 
one time, can rationally be chosen on the grounds that it 
best fulfils this aim and thus is the best theory available. 
It is clear that from the view-point of the two-tier realism 
this prescription leaves something to be desired. A two-tier 
realist in his choice of theories is not motivated by abiding 
by rules which do not clearly link up to the truth. He wants 
to know which theory offers a description of the underlying 
constitution of the world that is closest to the truth than 
any of its rivals at any one time. Better accuracy of 
predictions, or the superiority of the size of a theory's 
content on their own (or even jointly together) , may not 
count as sufficient reasons for the judgement that a theory 
has made more advances in the direction of the truth than its 
rivals. As was argued in the previous chapter, the two-tier 
realist supposition, prompted by the successes achieved by a 
methodologically sound theory at the empirical level, that it 
has latched on to a truth-related property, needs to be 
strengthened by the additional constraint imposed by the 
Generalized Correspondence Principle.
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3. The Ultimate Theory
In attempting to circumvent the problems associated with the 
notion of advancement towards the truth or verisimilitude 
while fulfilling the aspirations of the two-tier realist, two 
points beg immediate clarification. The first is what exactly 
should be taken to represent the truth, and the second is how 
the proximity of a theory to it is to be indicated. Since the 
Correspondence Relation is an intertheory relation, if it is 
to have a bearing on the second question, it would be natural 
to expect that what represents the truth should either be a 
single true theory, or a package of several true theories. If 
there exists a theory (or a package of theories), let us call 
it 'T1, that mirrors the underlying physical constitution of 
the world (either in some or all the branches of physics) , 
then whatever it says about the world would be true. In that 
case, T may be identified as the ultimate goal towards the 
discovery of which physics aims. In this capacity, it could 
then serve as the upper bound in the sequence of theories 
ordered by the Correspondence Relation. However, T must, in 
line with what we took for granted at the outset, satisfy all 
the required methodological conditions. These conditions, in 
turn, push successive theories in the direction of having 
greater explanatory, as well as predictive, fertility while 
utilizing fewer number of independent axioms. T (or each 
single theory in it if it is a package of true theories) , 
therefore, would have to possess these attributes more than 
any other theory in physics.
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A question immediately arises: In assuming that T exists, do 
we not commit ourselves to more metaphysics than we can 
possibly justify? The assumption that there are a few axioms 
and laws which capture all the complexities of the physical 
world down to their most intricate details, imputes to the 
world a specific kind of underlying structure. If our
experience with the kinds of theories that have been proposed 
up to now in physics is anything to go by, indications are 
that this structure would involve something like a few basic 
entities and a handful of basic relations between them. But 
we do not know that the world is like that; and to
extrapolate, on the basis of the successes that more and more 
unified theories have achieved so far, that it ought to be 
like that, is to commit an unjustifiable inductive leap.
Watkins [1984] suggests that the assumption of the existence 
of theories such as T, amounts to taking a side in a 
metaphysical dispute, and for this reason, should not be 
countenanced by the aim for science. 'The issue is whether or 
not there is, in the constitution of the physical world, a 
bottom layer consisting of irreducible entities (simples,
elements, atoms, or whatever) such that: (i) science could, 
in principle, explain the nature of all things at all layers 
above this layer in terms of the intrinsic properties of, and 
mutual relations between, such ultimate entities; (ii)
science could not explain their nature in terms of the 
properties of further entities because there are no further 
entities. If there is such a layer, then there is the
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possibility of ultimate explanations; otherwise not1. (Ibid, 
p. 131).
The issue, Watkins [1984] goes on, is the subject of an 
undecidable metaphysical dispute. As an example of an extant 
metaphysical position Watkins [1984], p. 131, cites Leibniz's 
theory of the infinity of structures in the world. According 
to this theory, 'If we could penetrate ever deeper into the 
microstructure of things, we would always discover worlds 
within worlds, each as richly complex as the last.' (Ibid). 
'So', he concludes, if the aim for science '...is to be
impartial between this metaphysical thesis and the thesis of 
classical atomism that there are ultimate bits, we should 
discard the ideal of ultimate explanations and retain that of 
ever deeper explanations.' (Ibid).
Several things may be said about this reservation. First, if 
physics is to be regarded as a truth-directed inquiry (and 
being firmly grounded in the realist position, this is 
granted in Watkins [1984]: 'Science aspires after truth'
(Ibid, p. 155), and again, '... what science aspires after is 
truth' (Ibid, p. 280), then the idea that it should aim at
'ever deeper explanations' presupposes some kind of structure
in the world (without picking any particular one). Surely, 
the latter is a position very much in dispute amongst 
metaphysicians. There are extant metaphysical theories (any 
brand of idealism would do) that deny any structure at all in 
the world.
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If, however, it is unobjectionable to take this much 
metaphysics on board, why should it be objectionable to add 
a bit more? I realize that it sometimes is more prudent to be 
as economical as possible. But then again, how much it is 
wise to carry depends very much on what one can get in 
return. If there are no standard 'weight limits' on how much 
metaphysics one is allowed to carry, then if one can solve a 
few problems by taking one more bit of 'baggage' along, one 
may justifiably be excused for not being able to produce 
justifications for it. This strategy has paid well in science 
itself, and there is no reason why it should not be put to 
good use in its methodology as well.
Second, aiming to get greater fertility from fewer axioms is 
not a dictate which has been imposed on physics from the 
outside. Successive generations of physicists have produced 
theories that, on the whole, appear to have manifested this 
property to greater and greater extents. So, for someone who 
is interested in describing developments in theoretical 
physics, the suggestion that it progresses in the direction 
of more unified theories is, by far, the best account of the 
facts. The question is, whether it is better to view this 
progression as open-ended or as converging to something like 
the above T?
Frankly, I cannot see any particular vice, per se, in viewing 
this progression as having an end; nor any particular virtue 
inherent in the belief that it is open-ended. Popper [1972] 
suggests that there is a vice associated with the conjecture
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that the former is the case. This vice appears to be a 
violation of the aim of science, and is alleged to commit us 
to the existence of essences: fIf it is the aim of science to 
explain, then it will also be its aim to explain what so far 
has been accepted as an explican; for example, a law of 
nature. Thus the task of science constantly renews itself.1 
(Ibid, p. 194). But surely, one can retort, if it so happens 
that a theory such as T exists - and we have seen no reason, 
so far, to rule out this possibility - then if physics ever 
attained it, there would be no more explanation to be had. It 
may be deemed desirable to seek metaphysical explanations for 
the laws proposed by T . But physics has, in the shape of T 
all the explanations it has been aiming for. The mere fact, 
then, that physics aims for explanations does not, by itself, 
establish that it is not possible for an ultimate explanation 
of the physical constitution of the world to exist. We may 
never be able to decide, even when we happen to stumble on T, 
that we have at last reached the end of the line in physics. 
But what reason is there for believing that there is no 
theory such as T for us to stumble upon?
Popper [1972], p. 195, answers this question as follows: 
'There can be no explanation which is not in need of a 
further explanation, for none can be a self-explanatory 
description of an essence...1 Granting, with Popper, the 
obscurantism of the doctrine of essences, I do not see why T 
should contain anything even remotely resembling essences. 
Like most extant outstanding theories in physics, T 
presumably contains a few principles which together stipulate
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certain laws of nature. T differs from the rest, however, 
only in that its proposed laws are the most comprehensive 
there is, and they happen to coincide with the actual laws 
that govern the physical world.
So far as laws of nature are concerned, they may be viewed in 
the very sense that Popper takes them: 'Laws of nature are
conceived... as (conjectural) descriptions of the structural 
properties of nature. . . ' (Ibid, p. 196) . The laws that T 
presumably proposes can easily fit this description. If they 
are ever proposed, they could not possibly be proposed as 
anything but conjectures; and they would describe the 
structural, as opposed to the 'essential', properties of the 
physical world just as our extant theories in physics attempt 
to do. Popper [1972], p. 195) regards as 'essential' those 
properties which are 'inherent in each individual or singular 
thing1, and 'which may be appealed to as the explanation of 
this thing's behaviour. ' The laws that T presumably puts 
forward are no more descriptions of 'essential' properties in 
this sense, than the laws proposed by other extant 
outstanding theories in physics aspire to be.
Popper's case for denying the existence of T, in the end, 
becomes rather confusing, to say the least. He starts by 
appealing to the role of explanations in the aim of science. 
We saw, however, that just because science aims at 
explanations, it does not follow that there could not be an 
ultimate explanation which itself can have no scientific 
explanation. Then the argument shifts to essentialism. The
118
belief in the existence of an ultimate explanation in physics 
is presented as amounting to the belief in the existence of 
essences. We saw that nothing of the sort is entailed by the 
belief in the existence of a theory such as T. So, the 
pitfalls that Popper [1972] wished to warn us against in 
connection with the belief in the existence of T, do not 
appear to be there to threaten us.
The fact of the matter is that the issue concerning the 
existence or otherwise of T is not only undecidable, but, at 
the moment at least, there is no a priori consideration that 
would tilt the balance either way. Therefore, if we opt for 
the conjecture that T exists, we would be no more in danger 
of committing a sin against intellectual propriety than if we 
had sided with its rival. True, the first conjecture is 
stronger than the second. But as long as this extra strength 
can be employed to do some good work, our indulgence in 
adopting it would be well rewarded, and therefore, excused.
4. The Truth-likeness Sequence
With T in place, we proceed to deal with the second question, 
viz. how is the relative proximity of a theory to the truth 
to be indicated? As a first step towards answering this 
question I observe that the Correspondence Relation is 
transitive. Suppose theories Tlf T2, and T3 are ordered by the 
Correspondence Relation such that T2 is a limiting case of T2r 
and the latter, in turn, that of T3. Suppose, further, that 
Dlr D2, and D3 are domains of empirical facts over which Tlr
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T2, and T3 are, respectively adequate. If D1 is contained in 
D2, and D2 in D3, then by safeguarding the successes of T2 
over D2, T3 also safeguards the successes of T2 over D:.
Next, I claim that the condition for the membership of a 
theory in the sequence of theories ordered by the 
Correspondence Relation, is that it should be a limiting case 
of any future theory that may supersede it. I shall attempt 
to specify this condition. It will then be observed that, 
given a finite period of time, the question whether a theory 
satisfies this condition is decidable.
With the help of two assumptions, these observations will be 
employed to realize the two-tier realist ambition of 
grounding the choice of a theory in physics on its relative 
proximity to the truth. One assumption is that in whichever 
branch of physics where the Correspondence Relation is 
defined, it is bounded on both ends; and the other is that 
its upper bound is T (or in T if it is a package of 
theories). The first assumption is natural to make. The 
history of physics in any of its many branches, starts 
somewhere, and the very first theory in a given field which 
satisfied the necessary methodological conditions, and 
managed to achieve an acceptable degree of empirical adequacy 
over a certain domain of empirical phenomena, qualifies as 
the lower bound of the Relation in that field. In physical 
astronomy, for instance, this theory may be identified as the 
physical version of the Copernican theory which was worked 
out by Kepler by the end of 1604.
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The proposition that T is the upper bound of the 
Correspondence Relation follows from the assumption of its 
existence and the indispensability of the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle. If T exists, it would be both 
methodologically and empirically adequate. The Generalized 
Correspondence Principle would, therefore, require that if it 
were to be superseded, it should be a good approximation to 
the theory that replaces it. Thus, T would belong to the 
sequence of theories ordered by the Correspondence Relation. 
Since there are no theories superseding T, it follows that it 
would be the upper bound of the Relation where it is defined.
With T in place as the upper bound of the Correspondence 
Relation, I have all the pieces I need to put together my 
argument. Given that this relation is transitive, it follows 
that every member of the sequence S of theories ordered by 
the Relation, is a limiting case of T. Since T captures the 
entire truth that is of interest to physics, every member of 
S, compared with those theories that fail membership in it, 
could be considered as having gone some ways towards 
capturing this truth. Moreover, if T± is a member of S, then 
compared to all theories that are its limiting cases, T± 
could be considered as having gone the farthest in this 
direction. If, therefore, it has been decided that a theory 
qualifies for membership in S, and there is no theory 
available that has it as a limiting case, this theory can be 
chosen as one that has gone the farthest in the direction of 
capturing the truth.
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Granted these assumptions, the succession of theories 
wherever ordered by the Correspondence Relation would 
converge towards T. Because T is the best theory (or package 
of theories) in physics, it must be methodologically sound as 
well as empirically adequate. Since, moreover, the 
requirement demanded by the Correspondence Principle is 
globally valid in physics, T is also obliged to satisfy it. 
Therefore, T is a member of the sequence ordered by the 
Correspondence Relation. Since there is no other alternative 
which would surpass T in capturing the underlying physical 
constitution of the world, T must be the last member of this 
succession. Hence, the succession ordered by the 
Correspondence Relation converges to T .
Because the Correspondence Relation is transitive, every 
member of the succession ordered by it would be a limiting 
case of T. Moreover, because T is true, each member of this 
succession can be regarded as a step closer to the truth than 
the theory which immediately precedes it in the succession. 
For these reasons, this succession of theories may be called 
the truth-likeness sequence. A member of the truth-likeness 
sequence may be said to resemble the truth to a greater 
extent than its predecessors on the grounds that it goes 
further towards T than any of them.
5. The Problem of Rational Theory Choice
With the notion of the truth-likeness sequence, we appear to 
be well poised to solve the problem of rational theory choice
within the context originally envisaged by Popper. In this 
context what was needed, but never attained by Popper, was a 
clear and objective account that would satisfactorily capture 
the two-tier realist intuition about hard won successes of a 
theory. According to this intuition, spectacular successes 
achieved by a theory plus methodological soundness, add up to 
indicate that it has made some progress towards the truth. 
The constraint that this account has to satisfy in order to 
entail that this intuition is rational, is that it should 
rely, either tacitly or explicitly, on no inference which is 
in violation of the requirements of validity in ordinary 
logic.
Although membership in the truth-likeness sequence is 
performance-related, it requires no invalid inference for its 
justification. Whether a theory is methodologically sound is 
a question which can be effectively decided by carrying out 
a specific number of checks. Empirical adequacy, in the sense 
required for a theory to qualify as a limiting case of any 
future theory that may supersede it, too, is an effectively 
decidable characteristic. A theory in physics is customarily 
deemed empirically adequate in this sense, if a sufficient 
number of measurements, from a sufficient variety of 
experiments, bear out its predictions in the following 
manner.
Let Q be an observable quantity, measurements on which under 
conditions Ci, within a certain period up to the time t, have 
been observed to fall within a finite set of values whose
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average we denote by Q±. Let T± be a theory whose prediction 
for Q with Ci as initial conditions, is q^ There is always 
an interval of tolerance which we may designate by a positive 
number e (and which includes experimental errors), such that 
in order for the predictions of T± to be acceptable at all,
I <Ii ” Qi I * e- Let us call the quantity |q± - Q± | , the 
deviation from the mean of the value q±.
If at time t it has just been observed that all established 
measurements of all the observable quantities for which T± 
has predictions, yield deviations from the mean which are 
better than those obtained for any other available theory, T± 
may be considered promising, so far as empirical adequacy is 
concerned. If a promising theory sustains its run of success 
for a variety of additional measurements over a sufficiently 
long (but always finite) period of time, it will, as a rule, 
be established as empirically adequate for the purpose of 
being a limiting case of any theory that in the future may 
supersede it. Establishment of the empirical adequacy of a 
theory, in this sense, does not appear to require a logically 
inadmissible inference. Consequently, the membership of a 
theory in the truth-likeness sequence can be decided in a 
finite number of steps, without violating any rules for 
logical validity.
By the time the membership of an unfalsified theory T± in the 
truth-likeness sequence is confirmed, that is, once it 
becomes incumbent on any future theory that may supersede T± 
to entail that it. is a good approximation over a certain
domain, T± would be established as a step in the right 
direction towards the truth. In so far as T± occupies a 
position in this sequence which is nearer than all other 
theories already in it to T, it is a theory which among all 
the available ones is the closest to the truth. The proximity 
of T± to the truth in this sense can be decided on the basis 
of the number of theories which are its limiting cases. At 
any given time, the theory with the greatest number of 
limiting cases is the closest theory to the truth. Choosing 
it as the best available theory would, therefore, be a 
rational choice based on its proximity to the truth.
It is possible, however, that at a certain time t the 
decision about the proximity of T± cannot be made even though 
it does satisfy all the requirements we have been demanding. 
Suppose that concurrently with T* there is also a theory T'± 
on the scene which is not only methodologically as sound as 
Tif but also equally adequate empirically. Suppose that
neither T± nor T* ± have been falsified up to t, and that both
have the last falsified member of the truth-likeness sequence 
as their limiting case. If T’± seriously clashes with T± on 
its description of the underlying physical constitution of 
the world, then we would be unable to decide at t, which is 
a closer theory to the truth.
Here, again, the Generalized Correspondence Principle comes 
to our aid. Even though both T± and T9 ± qualify as limiting 
cases of the theory Ti+1 which in the future may supersede
them both, only one of them can be entailed by Ti+1 as a good
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approximation. Whichever, therefore, is singled out as its 
limiting case by Ti+1 when the latter is discovered, it would 
be found to be a member of the truth-likeness sequence. 
Assuming that a finite period of time is required for the 
discovery of Ti+1, it follows that the question of the 
proximity of T± or T* ± to the truth can be decided in a finite 
period of time. Note that the same cannot be said of the 
methodologies which recommend choice solely on the basis of 
the empirical performance of outstanding theories. As long as 
the theories remain unfalsified, the question of which one is 
better is undecided. But in case they are falsified 
simultaneously, while remaining equally empirically adequate, 
this question must remain undecided for ever.
6. Convergent Realism and Verisimilitude
The account that emerges from these considerations falls 
under a family of positions which goes under the generic name 
'convergent realism'. It must, however, be distinguished from 
a version first proposed in Putnam [1978], and subsequently 
attacked in Laudan [1981]. This version is a variation on the 
traditional theme of cumulative success in terms of the 
preservation of some ingredients of a superseded theory in 
the superseding one. Only, what here is preserved is neither 
'explanatory structure' nor mathematical equations, but the 
reference of terms. The superseding theory is claimed to 
preserve the reference of the terms employed by the 
successful but false theory it replaces, thereby rendering 
the latter as ' approximately true'. This idea is then claimed
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to be justified because it provides the best explanation for 
how scientists behave and why science is successful.
'To begin with', we read in Putnam [1978], pp. 20-21, 'let me 
say that I think there is something to the idea of 
convergence in scientific knowledge. What there is is best 
explained... by means of two principles: (1) Terms in a
mature science typically refer. (2) The laws of a theory
belonging to a mature science are typically approximately 
true... [S]dentists act as they do because they believe (1) 
and (2) , and their strategy works because (1) and (2) are 
true. One of the most interesting things about this argument 
is that, if it is correct, the notions of 'truth' and 
'reference' have a causal-explanatory role in epistemology. 
(1) and (2) are premises in an explanation of the behaviour 
of scientists and the success of science - and they 
essentially contain concepts from referential semantics. '
The reason that this is not a cogent argument is twofold: On 
the one hand the strategy that is ascribed to scientists 
could work even if (1) and (2) were false. On the other, we 
would like to be able to regard a theory as a limiting case 
of another even if from the vantage-point of the latter some 
of the former's terms are found not to refer at all. That 
Kepler's theory of planetary motion is a limiting case of the 
Newtonian theory of gravitation may be taken as 
uncontroversial. However, the dynamical behaviour of the 
planets in Newton's theory is accounted for by a mutual 
gravitational attraction acting between them and the sun,
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thereby scrapping Kepler's vis (or anima) motrix as a 
mechanical attribute of the sun alone.
I am not at all certain how strongly scientists feel about 
preserving the reference of terms deployed in outstanding, 
but falsified, theories. I do not even know how one may 
proceed to ascertain either the strength of this feeling or 
the claim that it is shared by all scientists throughout the 
ages. For my part, where I do have to bring in scientists' 
attitudes, it has to do with a respect for consistency. Since 
everywhere else in the practice of science staying within the 
bounds of consistency is of paramount importance, it is not 
too much to require that in the particular case of assessing 
the successes of one and the same theory which has 
established itself as an outstanding contribution in a field, 
those of a two-tier realist persuasion will want to stay 
within the same bounds as well.
The resources which I have employed to draw up my account of 
convergent realism are either drawn from the practice of 
physics or else are consistent with it. The Generalized 
Correspondence Principle, which is my main resource, has an 
indispensable heuristic role to play in the development of 
new theories. Another resource, the assumption that T exists, 
though perhaps not shared by all physicists or 
methodologists, has no cogent arguments against it and is 
consistent with the practice of physics. With the aid of 
these resources, I have drawn up a procedure for gauging the 
comparative proximity of a theory to the truth. This
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procedure, I hope, will live up to the aspirations of a two- 
tier realist who turns to physics in order to satisfy his 
curiosity about what the world is like.
The account of the progression of successful theories towards 
the truth which emerges in this thesis is not generally 
conservative. No part, either in the ontological claims or 
the mathematical equations, of the superseded theory is 
required to be preserved in the superseding theory. It may be 
felt that this is an unacceptable feature of my account. For 
in the conservative accounts, two inconsistent theories may 
be regarded as approximations to the truth by virtue of 
sharing some parts with the ultimate truth. Successful 
theories, in these accounts, are successful in virtue of 
having discovered something about the world which will 
naturally be incorporated in any future theory that may 
supersede them.
I find that this conception of progress towards the truth, 
though attractive, is not supported by all cases in which, in 
particular, the Correspondence Principle applies. What 
emerges from my study of Bohr's deployment of this principle 
in his [1913] is that it applies between theories which have 
nothing in common save the ability to ascribe and forecast 
similar behaviour for observed physical systems in a 
restricted domain. That this ability in a superseded theory 
is indicative that it has proceeded a step in the right 
direction towards the truth, is grounded, not in the fact 
that some bits of it will be preserved by any future theory
129
that may supersede it, but by the fact that it thus qualifies 
as a member of the Correspondence Relation,
In my account, attempts at the description of the physical 
constitution of the world fall basically into two groups. One 
containing theories which proceed in the general direction 
towards the truth (even if they are false) , and the other, 
those that lie off this course altogether. The property of 
proceeding in the general direction of the truth is possessed 
by a theory which qualifies as a member of the truth-likeness 
sequence. This sequence may not hold as a linear ordering in 
the whole of physics, one theory following another smoothly 
towards T, There may be branches of physics that despite the 
hope and endeavours of some physicists may never be brought 
in line with others. But so long as all branches ultimately 
lead to T (in the words of Post [1971], so long as there are 
no 'blind alleys' culminating in a methodologically sound, 
empirically adequate and false theory), my purposes are 
satisfied. Moreover, the proximity of a given member of this 
sequence to the truth, relative to all the extant members in 
its branch, can be specified on the basis of the position it 
occupies relative to them. The greater the number of theories 
that are limiting cases of a chosen theory, the closer it is 
to the truth compared to the rest. Finally, at any given 
time, the choice of a theory which qualifies as a member of 
this sequence, and has the greatest number of theories in its 
branch as its limiting cases, not only best satisfies the 
aspirations of a two-tier realist, but is rational in the 
Popperian sense of not involving any inductive leaps as well.
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CHAPTER 5
IS QUANTUM MECHANICS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEMAND OF THE 
GENERALIZED CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE?
1. Introduction
The question whether Classical Mechanics can, in some sense, 
be conceived as a 'limiting case1 of Quantum Mechanics has 
been a subject of a long controversy among interested 
philosophers. Opinions on the issue range from denying that 
it can, through proposing a piecemeal 'correspondence' 
between the two, to insisting that the equations of one 
theory are reducible, wholesale, to those of the other. 
Representatives of the 1 denial school' have been discussed 
when we considered the arguments of Hanson and Feyerabend 
(Post [1971] is also a member of this school, but for 
different reasons).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, a concise statement of 
the wholesale reductionist position is offered in Yoshida 
[1977]: 'In the standard discussion of the classical limit of 
quantum mechanics one considers a particle in a potential 
V(r) with the modulus and phase in its wave function 
separated, i.e., ^(r) = A(r) exp (i/fi) S(r) ; one substitutes
the wave function in the Schrodinger equation; then by 
separating the real and imaginary parts one obtains two 
equations:
( 9 5 /3 0  + ( VSl/2m)+  V= K M / A ) ,  ( i )
and tn(dA/dt)*(VA-VS) + (A/2) AS = 0 ;
then by setting -ft = 0, the right side of equation (1) 
vanishes and the result is taken to be the Hamilton-Jacobi 
equation.' (Ibid, p. 51).
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Apart from general considerations, already discussed, that 
speak against this reductionist view, there are serious 
technical problems with this particular proposal. One, 
highlighted in Redhead [1993], (p. 332), is that for the
value zero of ii, treated as a variable, the state function in 
question would turn into a singularity. Thus whatever is 
gained by the imposition of this limiting condition on the 
Schrodinger equation, is obliterated by losing the state 
description altogether. The second problem is that there is 
a clear sense in which Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism 
can be conceived as a limiting case of Quantum Mechanics. The 
principal equations of Maxwell's theory (the celebrated 
Maxwell equations) , however, contrary to the Hamilton-Jacobi 
equations, are linear. If a simple substitution of 'ft = 0 into 
the Schrodinger equation turns it into the non-linear 
Hamilton-Jacobi equation, it surely cannot deliver Maxwell's 
equations as well. Yet Schrodinger's equation is the equation 
of motion governing the behaviour of photons as well as other 
sub-atomic particles.
Lastly, the idea of 'piecemeal correspondence' is premised on 
a belief in the existence of cumulative progress in physics 
on the one hand, and the denial of the tenability of 
wholesale reduction, in general, on the other. 
Representatives of this school of thought may be found in 
Radder [1991] and Redhead [1993]. According to them, for 
cumulative progress to obtain in physics it is enough that 
some of the equations (in the case of Radder, for instance) , 
or solutions to equations (in the case of Redhead) , of a
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superseded theory, under appropriate limiting conditions, 
become identical to those of the superseded theory. As I have 
argued earlier, there appear to be serious problems in 
upholding this position as being generally the case; there 
are some important instances where one wants to speak of 
cumulative progress where neither equations nor their 
solutions remain (or become) identical. If, however, in an 
intertheory transition some equations or their solutions do 
remain (or become) identical, we may have a special case of 
the approximational conception of Correspondence, provided 
the other conditions for one theory being a good 
approximation to another (as spelled out in chapter 3) are 
also satisfied.
(
The question whether Quantum Mechanics stands in the 
Correspondence Relation to Classical Mechanics presents 
additional problems. If, for the purposes of this thesis, we 
take Schrodinger's mathematical formalism in its non- 
relativistic form, then, unlike other extant cases in 
physics, there are not one but several competing 
interpretations for this formalism ( as well as the 
’Orthodox’ interpretation, one may mention de Broglie's 
'Pilot-Wave', Bohm's 'Ontological’, DeWitt and Graham's 
'Many-World', Nicholas Maxwell's 'Propensiton', 'GRW' and 
'Modal' interpretations). The idea of Correspondence Relation 
put forward in this thesis, rests on the approximational 
conception of the Correspondence Principle. This conception, 
in turn, is premised on viewing theories in physics as whole 
packages containing mathematical equations together with
their interpretations. To proceed, therefore, with a 
discussion of the above question it is necessary that an 
interpretation is adopted for the non-relativistic 
Schrodinger equation. To justify the choice of one 
interpretation from the class of extant ones, however, 
requires a thoroughgoing critical examination of all of them 
which is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. My main 
purpose in this chapter is to dispel claims, such as made in 
Hanson [1961], to the effect that (i) Schrodinger1 s 
mathematical formalism requires for its interpretation a 
language which is untranslatable to that of Classical 
Mechanics, and as a consequence, (ii) the uncertainty 
principle (an indispensable part of Quantum Mechanics) is 
incompatible with the Generalized Correspondence Principle 
(which is required £pr the conception of theory choice being 
conjectured in this thesis).
Claims that have been made on the basis of (i) and (ii) stem 
from a reading of the Quantum formalism which is commonly 
referred to as the 'orthodox' interpretation. According to 
this reading, it is necessary to postulate, at the sub-atomic 
level, entities which must be considered, in some sense, both 
as particles and as waves. The credibility of this reading 
will be examined in this chapter in some detail and it will 
be concluded that far from facilitating a comprehension of 
the formalism it stretches intelligibility to its limit. Upon 
further scrutiny, I shall subsequently argue, the orthodox 
interpretation is found to suffer from more serious defects 
than this. These will be identified as having to extend an
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unjustifiable invitation to psychology and epistemology to 
intervene for the task of providing a physical interpretation 
of Schrodinger’s mathematical formalism.
These conclusions, however, have only a negative character; 
they would suggest that such claims as launched in Hanson 
[1961] are based on an unsatisfactory interpretation of 
Schrodinger's formalism. The question whether a viable 
interpretation of this formalism is possible which does not 
suffer from these defects and which can lend itself to the 
demands of the Generalized Correspondence Principle vis a vis 
Classical Mechanics, still remains unanswered. To settle this 
question, in turn, it suffices to find an appropriate 
interpretation that appears promising in delivering the 
desired goods. This,\ however, has proved to be no easy task. 
It may be the case that there is no interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics which has Classical Mechanics as its 'limiting 
case', even in the weak sense specified in chapter 3. If this 
proves to be the case, and if Quantum Mechanics remains a 
deeply entrenched theory in physics, then the idea being 
explored in this thesis, namely that the Correspondence 
Principle should govern theory choice, would have to be 
restricted to those branches in physics where a truth-like 
sequence can be defined.
In this chapter, I will outline an interpretation which, 
prima facie, appears to me to be promising in rendering 
Classical Mechanics as a limiting case of Quantum Mechanics 
(in the sense of chapter 3). The interpretation in question
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is based on regarding the wave function in Schrodinger1 s
equation as representing a real physical entity. The first
attempt to view the wave function in this light is due to de
Broglie. He, however, felt obliged to abandon it for a while
due to attacks from Bohr and his followers. The idea was
revived in a somewhat different form in the early 1950’s by
Bohm and has been gaining increasing strength and popularity
in recent years. Regarding the wave function as a real
physical entity, makes the interpretation to be outlined in
this chapter particularly akin to the spirit of two-tier
realism which lies at the heart of the conception of theory
choice being conjectured in this thesis. I will also attempt
to show in this chapter that the interpretation to be
proposed has the advantage of not suffering from the two
\
major defects specified above which beset the Orthodox 
interpretation. To set the background to the discussion, I 
will start from a description of general features of Quantum 
Mechanics in comparison to Classical Mechanics. Because the 
issues involved pertain to questions of the interpretation of 
Quantum formalism, I shall try to keep the discussion as non­
technical as I can.
Before the emergence of Quantum Mechanics, the fact that an 
event was observed to occur with a certain frequency was 
explained without introducing an extra physical reality, 
besides those already postulated by Classical Mechanics. 
Apart from masses, forces and a degree of randomness in the 
interactions between the systems, which typically arise from
i
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a degree of uncertainty in the initial conditions, there was 
nothing else that was thought to play a causal role in 
determining how an event is to occur.
Take the case of Classical particles passing through a 
barrier with two slits suitably separated from one another, 
for example. If a large number of particles could be released 
from their source one by one, so that they would only pass 
through the centre of either slits (without encountering 
either the gap between the slits or their edges ), Classical 
theory does not allow for probabilities to enter into the 
outcome. However, if at the point of release the degree of 
freedom of the particles is increased, so that directions of 
the outgoing particles now span a small angle (allowing them 
to arrive at the barrier on either sides of the slits, as 
well as on the gap in between), an element of randomness will 
thus be introduced in the behaviour of those that emerge on 
the other side. According to the Classical theory, this is 
entirely due to the collision of the passing particles with 
the edges of the slits in a manner that is not controlled by 
the initial conditions, and their subsequent scattering in 
directions which are not controlled as a result.
When the emerging particles are captured on a screen some 
distance away from the barrier, based on these 
considerations, one would expect the frequencies with which 
each spot on the screen receives particles from the barrier, 
to be smoothly distributed over a circular area in the centre 
of the screen. On the centre region in this area, the
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frequency with which particles arrive should be the highest, 
gradually decreasing towards the circumference, and 
diminishing beyond . If we take a long exposure photograph of 
all these particles, travelling one after the other from the 
source to the screen, we would expect to have a picture that 
resembles Figure 1.
Retiree
Figure 1
This distribution of frequencies can be represented by a 
bell-shaped solid, the cross-section of which on a plane 
perpendicular to the plane of the screen would look like 
Figure 2.
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The outcome should remain the same if, instead, all the 
particles are released together within the same angular span 
as before, and a snapshot of their travel from the source to 
the screen is taken. Repeating this experiment with only a 
single slit open should, on the basis of the same theory, 
lead us to expect similarly shaped distributions of the 
frequencies. The only difference occurs on the sizes of the 
peaks, as well as the area over which the particles are 
spread. The number of particles that arrive on the central 
region of the distribution on the screen when only a single 
slit is open, should be half that of the same when both slits 
are open. This suggests that the frequency or probability 
(more on this later) of particles arriving on the screen from 
the two slits, is a simple sum of the frequencies or 
probabilities from each of the slits on their own.
« ii >
Probability distribution 
from slit no. 1
Prob. dist. 
from slit no. 2
Prob. dist. 
from both slits
Figure 3
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2. Anomalous Results from Slit-Experiments
This Classical picture breaks down when we start dealing with 
particles whose parameters range over values on a scale close 
to Planck’s constant (i.e. in the region of 10~34 Joules). The 
same initial and boundary conditions together with the 
Classical theory, lead us to distribution patterns which 
simply are never observed. In what follows, we are going to 
continue talking about experiments involving such particles 
passing through barriers with slits, or mirrors, or other 
gadgets that detect their presence in a region. This is more 
a matter of convenience than, in some cases, strict accuracy. 
Some such experiments may never have been performed, or
indeed not even possible to perform, in the manner that we
/
are going to describe here. But our description is consistent 
with all the relevant results that have actually been 
accumulated through a variety of experiments, and manage to 
show in simple, schematic ways, the essential features that 
characterize the peculiar behaviour of the systems we wish to 
consider.
Although passage of the particles in question through a 
single slit does produce, under appropriate conditions, 
similar bell-shaped curves to the Classical case, when two 
slits are opened at an appropriate distance from one another, 
the resulting distribution is never observed to be a simple 
sura of such curves. Instead of an enlarged bell-shaped curve, 
what is actually obtained is a pattern resembling a
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diffraction pattern typical of ordinary waves interfering 
with each other. , ~
The resemblance of the distribution of our particles from the 
double-slits to a typical diffraction pattern, is unaltered 
either when it is obtained from a swarm of identically 
prepared particles falling on the screen at one go, or from 
the cumulative traces left by them arriving there in 
succession, over a period of time. Obviously a simple 
scattering explanation along with the Classical picture of 
the initial and the boundary conditions does not suffice to 
account for this outcome. In the new distribution pattern, 
there are areas on the screen where no particle passing 
through the double-slits is ever observed to land. However, 
the very same areas appear quite permissible when the same 
sort of particles are all made to go through only one slit on 
its own. So, instead of increasing the chances of arrival on
Probability distribution 
from slit no. 1
Prob. dist. 
from slit no. 2
Prob. dist. 
from both slits
Figure 4
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those areas, when two slits are left open simultaneously, 
this option actually prevents them from ever arriving there.
3. 'Wave-Particle Duality'
Because of a striking resemblance to the diffraction pattern 
produced by undulatory phenomena under similar circumstances, 
the natural reaction is to bring some kind of wave behaviour 
to bear on this situation. The problem that would have to be 
faced as a consequence, is how to reconcile this behaviour 
with entities which otherwise display quite distinct 
corpuscular constitution.
One popular solution to this problem has been to suggest that 
unlike the ordinary phenomena, which is divided by Classical 
Mechanics into mutually exclusive categories of particles and 
waves, the phenomena whose parameters take on only 
exceedingly small values, are neither waves nor particles on 
their own. However, the ohservahle traces that the latter 
leave on ordinary objects with which they interact are, under 
certain circumstances, corpuscular in character, and 
undulatory under others. This, in general, is neither ad hoc 
nor untenable. For there are extant theories which by filling 
the physical space with an all-pervasive field manage, with 
considerable success in some cases, to reconstruct 
corpuscular features (by concentrating the intensity of the 
field in a confined region of space), as well as undulatory 
ones (by propagating disturbances in the field in various 
directions).
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Take a disturbance in the electromagnetic field, for example, 
such as a flash of light with an exceeding low intensity. 
When passing through a slit with suitable aperture, the 
emergent radiation appears to behave in a particle-like 
manner. When passing through a double- slit barrier with 
suitable apertures and separation, the radiation that emerges 
appears to possess continuous wave-like characteristics.
 ^ 1 }  Vv«M/e
Weak intensity Single-slit Double-slit Photographic 
light barrier barrier plate
Figure 5
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The problem arises when the intensity of the electromagnetic 
radiation from a source is so weakened that to observe its 
effect on a photographic film installed on the screen in a 
double-slit experiment, long exposures of a highly sensitive 
film in a tightly insulated environment is required. The 
first result would appear as a few dots scattered randomly 
over the film area. As the time of exposure is increased, 
more and more dots would appear, gradually arranging 
themselves in a pattern converging on a diffraction pattern 
produced by interfering waves.
Development of the pattern on the photographic 
plate as the time of exposure is prolonged.
Figure 6 
(Reproduced from Rae [1986], p. 7)
The dots on the film clearly suggest that what has been 
arriving there from the slits are indeed a succession of 
individual particles rather than a continuous wave. The 
strange thing is that individual particles should, by the 
mere fact of going through two rather than one slit, not 
only arrive on the film only at those regions where a
constructive interference between two waves from the slits 
would otherwise take place, but also in numbers that is 
directly proportional to the intensity of the resultant wave 
at those locations.
In line with the sentiments of some of the early contributors 
to the formulation of the Quantum theory, Rae [1986] suggests 
that as a rule, the character of physical systems should be 
viewed as determined by their interaction with particular 
types of apparatus deployed to observe them. That is, we 
should revise the attitude shaped by common sense, and 
legitimized by Classical Mechanics, whereby physical systems 
are pictured as having definite characteristics which they 
retain independently of whether or not they are interacting 
with measuring devices on which they leave observable traces. 
He writes: 'The fact that processes like two-slit
interference require light to exhibit both particle and wave 
properties is known as wave-particle duality. It illustrates 
a general property of quantum physics which is that the 
nature of the model required to describe a system depends on 
the nature of the apparatus it is interacting with: light is 
a wave when passing through a pair of slits, but it is a 
stream of photons when it strikes a detector or a 
photographic film.* (Rae, [1986], p. 9). When two different 
interactions are combined, as in a double-slit experiment, 
according to this view, it should come as no surprise that 
the exposed parts of the photographic film show up as lots of 
grains arranged in a diffraction pattern.
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4. Some Critical Remarks
The trouble with suggestions such as this is that they are 
easier said than understood in connection with' the particular 
cases we have been considering . For suppose that the film in 
a double-slit set up is exposed to a very weak source of 
light, only so long that just a single dot appears on it. 
This suggests that the field has been absorbed by the film at 
a finely localized spot on its surface. Yet the same field is 
alleged to have spread out all over the space between the 
double-slit barrier and the film. How a wave-form, which is 
supposed to permeate through the whole volume confined by the 
set-up, suddenly contracts at the instant of making contact
with the film, to leave its mark at a spot on the latter’s
/
surface, is a mystery for which no physical explanation is 
offered.
Let us look at this mystery from a slightly different angle. 
Since light passing through some single-slit barriers (those 
just large enough as not to give rise to a diffraction 
phenomenon) allegedly behaves in a corpuscular manner, it 
should, in principle, be possible to isolate a single photon 
on the other side, if light from a sufficiently weak source 
is directed at it. If, now, the same photon is brought to 
pass through a double-slit barrier, according to the 
suggestion under review, it should somehow emerge on the 
other side as a continuous wave emanating from both slits. 
The introduction of an additional slit, suitably separated 
from the first, is supposed to transform a highly localized
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field intensity into a wave-form which would now burst open 
all over the space beyond.
A question that immediately comes to mind is exactly when 
this transformation is supposed to take place. Is it 
immediately before the photon makes contact with the barrier? 
If this were the case, how would it recognize that there are 
two, rather than one openings waiting for it to go through so 
as to adjust its posture afterwards accordingly?
Perhaps, one might say, it is at the very instant that the
contact is actually made that the necessary adjustments are
executed. If this were the case, then surely just prior to
the time of contact the field must still be in its localized
/
form. At this instant, one possibility is that at the next
t
instant it would enter the opening provided by either one of 
the slits, i.e. when it does make contact with the barrier, 
it would find itself within the opening provided by one of 
the slits. But then at the time when the contact has actually 
been made, the field, so far as it is concerned, is in the 
situation of interacting with a single slit and should remain 
as localized as before. How does the mere presence of another 
opening some distance away disturb its localized posture, 
spread it out, making it somehow emanate from the other side 
of the barrier as two wave-forms?
None of this makes any sense. Yet the view that leads to 
these mysteries by no means suffers from lack of endorsement. 
Authors of considerable weight and authority persist in
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writing as though such mysteries must be tolerated/ perhaps 
as a necessary price to pay when we attempt to come to terms 
with the intricacies of nature at levels to which we have no 
direct access. Penrose, for instance, writes: '...each
individual photon behaves like a wave entirely on its own! In 
some sense, each particle travels through both silts at once 
and it interferes with itself I' (Penrose [1989], p. 304).
The standard retort to the difficulties raised here is that 
they highlight the futility of trying to advance beyond an 
essential limitation when description of small-scale physical 
systems is being sought. We meet with nonsense, it is 
claimed, only when we attempt to describe systems in states 
that remain unobserved. The state of a field when it is in- 
between interactions where it has actually left detectible 
traces, remains unobserved. When attempts are made to 
extrapolate a particular picture which is suggested by an 
observed trace a field has left on another system, to states 
from which no such traces are at hand, difficulties ensue. In 
1927 Heisenberg even went so far as to suggest that the very 
meaning of the observable terms in our language, such as 
’position1, should be strictly restricted only to the 
observed states of a system. 'If one wants to clarify1, he 
wrote, 'what is meant by "position of an object",... for 
example of an electron,... one has to describe an experiment 
by which the "position of an electron" can be measured; 
otherwise, this term has no meaning at all.' (Jammer [1966], 
p. 328).
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In whichever guise it is stated, the limitation prescribed 
here results in the abandonment of an ambition which 
underlined the tradition of seeking descriptions of systems 
and their time-development in physics. This ambition consists 
of seeking a coherent view of physical systems which is 
capable of providing the information we require about their 
behaviour at all states, observed or unobserved.
Resorting to such limitations is not, in itself, an 
illegitimate move which ought to invite resistance at all 
cost; mere entrenchment of an ambition within a tradition is, 
after all, not a sufficient justification for believing in 
its merits. Equally, giving up the ambition in question, 
unless it is shown to be inevitable by the physics of the 
situation, is bound to raise legitimate questions about its 
wisdom. So far, we have not mentioned anything about the 
physics of the situation apart from schematically describing 
some experimental results which defy satisfactory explanation 
from Classical Mechanics.
5. The Conception of State in Classical Mechanics
Historically, proposals such as mentioned and briefly 
examined here were advanced subsequent to the birth of 
Quantum Mechanics. The mathematical formalism of this theory 
has proved amply adequate to deal with the numerical data as 
well as the distribution patterns obtained, not only from the 
experiments schematized above, but from numerous others 
besides. This highlights the fact that the difficulties
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touched upon relate to conceptual matters that arise when the 
formalism is subjected to physical interpretation. Before 
proceeding any further, however, we must have a brief look at 
what this formalism has to deal with, and in what respects 
the latter demands departures from the formal devices 
employed by the Classical theory.
Let ’ C' denote the class of physical systems whose behaviour 
is satisfactorily described by Classical Mechanics (CM for 
short). Descriptions in CM proceed by attributing to each 
member of C a set of parameters S. For each system, some of 
these parameters, such as electric charge or mass (in non- 
relativistic descriptions), take on values which remain 
constant throughout its behaviour, while others, such as 
location in physical space or velocity, are allowed to vary 
as the states of the system evolve. We must pause to point 
out here, that all our discussion is going to be restricted 
to non-relativistic descriptions, since it is on this 
territory that all the major battles over interpretation are 
fought.
In each case, a set of constraints determined by the physical 
conditions under which the system is to evolve, is specified 
which limit the values its parameters can take. Within these 
limitations, the members of S take; as their values, any real 
number in a continuous range. At any instant t, each 
parameter takes on one and only one value. Let us call a set 
of values for S ’complete1, if every number in this set is a 
value of a distinct parameter, and for every member of S
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there is one and only one value in this set. A complete set 
of values for S at t; identifies a unique state of *the system 
at t.
CM postulates a set of rules R, which uniquely determines a 
complete set of values for S at time t, given a complete set 
of values for a proper subset of S at t. Let us call the 
latter, the set of 'D-parameters1 of the system. At any given 
time, therefore, a complete set of values for the D- 
parameters of a system uniquely determines the state of the 
system at that time. At least two parameters are needed in 
order to define a set of D-parameters for any system, and 
they usually are taken to be its location (if the system is 
a single particle), or its configuration (if a system is a 
combination of particles) in the physical space, and its 
velocity (or generalized momenta, if the system is complex). 
Because a complete set of values for a pair of D-parameters 
of a system exists at any one time, the parameters may be 
regarded as compatible.
It is implicitly assumed in CM that a complete set of values 
for the D-parameters of a system can be measured at any time. 
A set of laws, L, are further provided which, given the state 
of a system at any one time, uniquely determine all its 
subsequent states at every later times. Together with R and 
L, a complete set of values for the D-parameters of a C- 
system suffice for the comprehensive and unqualified 
description of the evolution of its states through time.
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6. The Quantum Mechanical Situation
Quantum Mechanics (QM for short), may be described as a 
theory which grew out of attempts to pursue the aspirations 
of CM for the description of a class Q of physical systems 
whose behaviour indicates violation of some of the former's 
precepts. First, there was the observation that in certain 
circumstances, some parameters of Q-systems take only on 
values which fall within a discrete set of real numbers, 
instead of ranging over a continuum. For certain parameters, 
such as the total energy or the angular momentum of some Q- 
systems, this set is observed always to contain values that 
are only integral multiples of a certain constant, 
irrespective of the initial conditions or the frame of 
reference used to measure them.
Then came the discovery that not only (i) a complete set of 
values for S at a given time t, does not always determine a 
unique state for a Q-system (meaning that one such set may 
correspond to different states), but also (ii) a complete set 
of values for what in CM is singled out as the D-parameters 
of a Q-system at t, together with some modifications of R and 
L, do not always determine its states subsequent to t.
Against this background, however, came the evidence of 
remarkable statistical regularities among the values obtained 
from repeated measurements of the parameters of identically 
prepared Q-systems. When individual parameters are singled
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out, and their values measured by identical procedures for a 
large number of Q-systems, all of which start initially under 
identical conditions (we will clarify in more detail what 
this involves later; for the moment, let us take it as 
sufficiently understood), distributions are obtained which 
display invariant features. Furthermore, when such 
distributions are compared with those obtained for other 
parameters under the same conditions (using, in each case, 
appropriate but invariant measuring procedures), invariant 
relations appear to be exhibited between them.
7. The Uncertainty Principle
The quantitative expression of the latter fact was formulated 
by Heisenberg, and is known as the Uncertainty Principle. 
Suppose we take a large number of a certain kind of Q-systems 
(electrons, for example), and prepare them initially under 
identical conditions. Suppose, further, that we conduct an 
experiment with these (like, for instance, a double-slit 
experiment) in the outcome of which we hope to measure their 
positions. It does not matter if we do this for each 
individual one by one, or for all of them together in one go 
(although the latter will prove very difficult with 
electrons).
Let A q represent the interval in the scale we use to measure 
these positions, within which the values we obtain are 
observed to fall with varying frequencies. Next, suppose we 
take the same number of the same kind of systems, initially
prepare them in the same manner as before, and conduct an 
experiment (not necessarily the same one as before), in the 
outcome of which we hope to measure their momenta, that is, 
roughly, their velocities raised throughout by a constant 
factor equivalent to the value of their mass. Let A p  
represent the interval in the scale used for this purpose, 
within which the values obtained are observed to occur with 
different frequencies. The Uncertainty Principle legislates 
that values thus obtained for the quantities A q  and A p  
should always obey the relation A q  • Ap£ h &, where 'fi 
is the Planck’s constant divided by 2ti.
Starting from these facts, several schemes were proposed to 
capture the behaviour of Q-systems, which although they 
shared more or less the same physical content, differed by 
employing different mathematical techniques. One, due to 
Schrodinger, sets out to describe the evolution of Q-systems 
by employing the customary phase space. Phase space is a 
mathematical construction, developed in the later part of the 
evolution of CM, which is made up of a set of D-parameters of 
a physical system, namely its configuration in the physical 
space, as well as its momenta in an abstract momentum space.
8. Phase Space and the States of Physical Systems
Suppose a system consists of number of particles. Each 
particle, at an instant, is located somewhere in physical 
space which itself is three dimensional. So, the 
instantaneous location of each particle in this space can be
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specified by three coordinates in a certain frame of 
reference. The rate at which this location changes, that is, 
the instantaneous velocity of each particle, can also be 
projected onto three components, each one of which 
corresponds to a principal direction in the physical space. 
An abstract three dimensional space can, therefore, be 
constructed in which an instantaneous velocity of a particle 
can be represented as a point specified by three coordinates. 
Each of these coordinates would then represent the component 
of the instantaneous velocity of the particle along an 
appropriate principal direction in physical space.
If these two spaces are now put together such that all the 
axes form a linearly independent set (which, for our purposes 
at this point, roughly means that no one axis can be 
reconstructed by adding up different multiples of the 
others), a six dimensional space is formed in which the 
location of a particle in the physical space at a given 
instant, as well as its velocity at that same instant, can be 
represented by a single point. This newly constructed space 
is called the 'phase space1 for a single particle. Since the 
location and momentum of a particle jointly determine a set 
of D-parameters for it in CM, each point in the phase space 
represents a unique instantaneous state of the particle. As 
the number of particles which make up a physical system 
increases, so does the number of dimensions needed to 
represent its states, accordingly. To represent the states of 
a system which comprises a total of N particles, a space of 
6N (linearly independent) dimensions would be required.
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For a system of N particles, a complete set of values for its 
D-parameters consists of 6N real numbers. Customarily, 
physicists are interested in the representation of the 
changes of states in the phase space. Therefore, it is the 
rate at which states change, in various directions in this 
space, which is of primary concern to them. Since this rate 
of change is different in different directions, to each point 
a vector can be assigned whose direction —indicates the 
direction of the greatest change from that point, and whose 
magnitude shows the 'size' of that change. Larger vectors 
would thus represent a more rapid change in a certain 
direction, and smaller ones a slower one in certain others.
As was noted earlier, this project for the description of the 
behaviour of physical systems, was frustrated by the 
discovery of Q-systems. This meant that the representation of 
the states of a system as points in an appropriate phase 
space lacks generality, and is untenable if the domain of 
physical systems is to be truly universal. There are, 
however, new adequacy requirements which any theory 
purporting to describe the behaviour of physical systems must 
satisfy. One is that it must entail, with appropriate initial 
conditions, the statistical regularities observed for the 
corresponding values of each parameter. The other is the 
Uncertainty relations between the values of the appropriate 
pairs of parameters.
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9. Schrodinger's Scheme for the Description of States
One scheme for the description of the states of a system is 
Schrttdinger1 s. It starts out by selecting either one of the 
parameters that make up the phase space, and introduces a new 
parameter over all its values, such that the values of the 
latter everywhere depend on the values of the former. This 
means that the values of the new parameter are assigned by 
means of a function whose domain ranges over the values of 
the parameter selected from the phase space. Either of the 
selected parameters specify a space 'half the size1 of the 
original phase space. So, for a system consisting of N 
particles, the space defined by its configurations, as well 
as that by the momenta of its constituent particles, is 3N 
dimensional. The first is appropriately called the 
'configuration space' of the system, and the second, its 
'Momentum space'.
Let us take the configuration space of a system and see how 
the new parameter is defined over it. Each point u* in this 
space, as we have seen, corresponds to a particular 
arrangement of N particles in the physical space. To it, a 
complex number is assigned such that its absolute square, 
i.e. the product of the number with its complex conjugate 
(which always comes out a real number) represents, with 
proper adjustments in some cases, the probability of finding 
the system in the close vicinity of u*.
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This one-one pairing of a real number u£ with a complex 
number, finds its geometrical representation in the 
correspondence between uf and a unique point on the so-called 
'Argand plane'. Roughly, this plane is set up by introducing 
two additional (linearly independent) dimensions to the space 
of the chosen parameter. The plane defined by these new 
dimensions at uA serves as the complex axis associated with 
that point. Each point in this Argand plane;- specifies one 
value for the new parameter at u*, and is called an 
'amplitude' for the particular configuration of the N 
particles which is represented by u£.
At any one time t, the assignment of amplitudes to the points 
in the space of a selected parameter must be complete, in the 
sense that every point in this space should have a unique 
amplitude corresponding to it at t (in regions where, for 
example, the spatial arrangement of the particles is never 
found, the corresponding amplitudes assume zero for their 
values). The function which for every t determines a 
particular distribution of the amplitudes over the space of 
a selected parameter, is obtained by solving a first order 
differential equation. This equation was first discovered by 
Erwin Schrbdinger in 1926 and is known as the time-dependent 
SchrOdinger equation.
We briefly note here another peculiar feature of QM in 
comparison to CM. When this picture is applied to determine 
possible values for the position of an electron in a Hydrogen 
atom, which is itself in a state of fixed energy, positions
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are allowed (with a non-vanishing probability) that according 
to CM are impossible for the electron ever to be found at. 
Needless to say that the experimental confirmation of this- 
consequence of the procedure described was another major 
triumph for QM.
Now it can be seen how the Uncertainty Principle is brought 
to bear on determining the function which assigns amplitudes 
to the values of one parameter in the phase space, once a 
function for the other has been found. Suppose we have a 
function that determines the distribution of the amplitudes 
over the configuration space of a system. At every time, the 
spread of the values of this parameter, i.e. the spread over 
which the amplitudes are distributed, represents the 
uncertainty in the configuration of the system. The function 
that is to assign amplitudes over the corresponding momentum 
space, must, at each time, determine a spread of momentum 
values which is related to that of the configurations at that 
time, through the Uncertainty Principle. Mathematically a 
device called 'Fourier transformation' is available, by the 
application of which on a function with the mentioned 
characteristics over one half of the phase space, one with 
precisely the right sort of features over the other half may 
be produced.
10. The Conception of State in Quantum Mechanics
In what must be acknowledged as a radical break with the 
Classical tradition, it is now proposed that a complete set
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of values for the amplitudes over the space of a selected 
parameter of a physical system at any one time, picks out a 
unique state of the system at that time. The function that 
assigns values to the amplitudes at each point in the space 
of a selected parameter of a system in a particular physical 
situation, is, as a result, called, appropriately, its 'state 
function1.
This view of the state of physical systems differs sharply 
from its counterpart in CM in two respects: (i) the set of 
numbers that singles out a state in QM, are values of a 
parameter that simply does not exist in CM, and (ii) the 
minimal set of parameters whose values determine states in 
CM, are no longer D-parameters in QM.
In general, any set of numbers may specify a vector, provided 
a suitable structure exists into which it can be embedded. 
Usually, a set of objects which includes zero, is closed 
under addition and scalar multiplication, and whose members 
satisfy few additional requirements, provides such a 
structure and is, what we have already met, a vector space.
It so happens that there exists a special vector space, 
called a ' Hilbert space', in which a complete set of values 
for the amplitudes of any one parameter at any one time can 
be embedded. Each number, therefore, in this set would 
specify one component, for a unique vector, along one 
principal direction in the corresponding Hilbert space. 
Hilbert spaces, in general, have an infinite number of such
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directions. Each can be marked off at the origin of the 
space, much in the same manner as in the case of the three 
dimensional Cartesian space, by a vector of unit length* 
which is called a 'basis’. The set of all the bases of a 
Hilbert space is linearly independent, which roughly means 
that none can be reconstructed by linearly combining the 
others, and, every vector in the space which is not a basis, 
can be expressed as a sum of all the bases, each multiplied 
by a suitable factor (called a 'coefficient').
We now have a picture of the components of a vector in a 
Hilbert space which, in many ways, is similar to the familiar 
components of a vector in the three dimensional Cartesian 
space. Each component is a unit vector multiplied by a 
[complex] number, and together they add up to define a unique 
vector in the appropriate Hilbert space. It must be kept in 
mind that such a component represents a single amplitude 
associated with a particular value of a selected parameter at 
a given time, and thus determines the probability, for the 
system involved, of actually having that value for the 
parameter in question at that time.
Each vector in the Hilbert space appropriate for a selected 
parameter of a given physical system, would now represent a 
unique state of that system, and is fittingly called its 
'state vector'. The scheme for the vectorial representation 
of Quantum Mechanical states of physical systems was 
developed by Von Neumann and Dirac. It is more general than 
SchrGdinger's, in the sense that it can accommodate, in a
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straightforward manner, handling of those dynamical 
parameters that have no Classical counterparts (such as a 
particle's spin, it's parity, etc.).
In both these schemes, one and the same set of amplitudes for 
all the values that a selected parameter of a system can 
possibly have in a given situation at any one time, 
corresponds to a unique state of the system.— Amplitudes are 
not themselves observable quantities, but the probabilities 
they determine, are. An examination of how these 
probabilities are to be measured would shed some further 
light on what the Quantum Mechanical states look like.
11. Credible Measurement Results
In order to observe a particular value for a system's 
parameter, calibrated instruments must be used which 
correlate a particular feature in the system's behaviour with 
a number on the scale built into the instrument. The simplest 
examples of such instruments are measuring rods, clocks or 
weighing scales.
C-systems behave very conveniently when various instruments 
are used, in laboratory conditions, to measure their 
parameters. This convenience stems entirely from the fact 
that CM is perfectly adequate for the description of their 
states, and single measurement results on just two parameters 
of the system suffice to determine each state according to 
this theory. This, of course, is not to say that any
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measurement result is just as good as others. The possibility 
of sloppy readings, instrument malfunction, as well as 
breakdowns in what ought to be tightly controlled conditions 
in the laboratory, always exist and must, therefore, be 
vigilantly guarded against. The point is, once due care is 
exercised and errors eliminated, a single credible result 
from the measurement of two parameters counts as adequate 
data for the CM to determine states of an observed C-system.
We have seen that Q-systems do not generally lend themselves 
to a similar convenience. Not that these systems are so 
fragile that the slightest contact with a measuring 
instrument destroys any chances of obtaining a credible 
reading for the value of their parameters. The suggestion, 
often cited in writings on Quantum theory, that it is 
impossible to measure values for ’canonically conjugate1 
variables (i.e., roughly, variables that in CM would either 
be themselves the D-parameters of a system, or else would be 
a pair of their components) simultaneously, is a red herring. 
If, indeed, it were impossible to obtain credible measurement 
results that somehow tie up with the values of a parameter, 
the testability of the theories whose equations range over 
their mathematical surrogates would be seriously impaired. On 
the other hand, such results invariably come in the shape of 
particular readings from a certain scale.
As we have mentioned, a single measurement result on the 
members of what in CM amounts to a set of D-parameters for a 
Q-system, does not constitute adequate data for deciding the
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state of that system. Suppose we carry out a controlled 
measurement on the position of a Q-particle at time t, and 
manage to obtain a credible reading. Since this result is a 
particular number, there is no dispersion in the values of 
this parameter, and hence, if we let q represent the latter, 
A  q is zero.
Substituting this in the Uncertainty relation, we get a 
corresponding dispersion for the values of the particle’s 
momentum which is indeterminately large. There is no 
obligation to take this to mean, as some writers suggest, 
that the particle has no particular momentum at time t. 
Stretching the meaning of a particle's 'momentum' - this far, 
risks its comprehension. Rather, it indicates that, any 
particular value for the particle1s momentum, is compatible 
with the particular position measurement obtained at t. One 
consequence of this is that, no matter how vigilant we may 
try to be in guarding against errors creeping into our 
momentum measurement at t, we have no way of distinguishing 
a credible result from an error-ridden one, once a credible 
result has been obtained for the particle' s position at t. In 
this sense, we can say that the particle's momentum is, 
indeterminate at the time.
All this should come as no surprise if it is to QM that we 
turn for deciding the states of Q-systems. What we need here 
are probability distributions for possible values of certain 
parameters, and single credible results from particular 
measurements are far from providing them. But never too far.
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For it is from the accumulation of these very results, in the 
repetition of the very same measurements, that such 
distributions emerge. That is why we have been Insisting on 
a stock of a large number of systems of the same kind, each 
of which must be initially prepared in the same manner as all 
the others.
If after carrying out a particular measurement on a parameter 
of a Q-particle, we could regain it intact and bring it back 
to exactly the same state as we started with initially, we 
would not need to start with a large number originally. As it 
happens, Q-particles are generally not easily retrievable 
after they have left a trace on a measuring instrument; they 
are either absorbed by the latter, annihilated after the 
process, scattered in unpredictable directions, or else next 
to impossible to capture and bring back to the starting line­
up.
To repeat the same measurement on a parameter, then, we start 
out with a large number of Q-systems that are all of the same 
type (electrons, for example, or photons, etc.), and prepare 
them to be in identical situations. This means that their 
constant parameters, such as mass, size, charge, and the 
like, must all have exactly the same values. Then, the same 
set of constraints is imposed on all of them initially. That 
is, for example, if they are to start in an electric field, 
the potential difference should be the same for all of them. 
Or, if they are to be in an electromagnetic field, the 
field's intensity should be the same for all of them. Or, if
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they are to get on to some target, they should all start from 
the same ’launching pad*. Finally, one and the same procedure 
must be used in each trial the outcome of which is to be a 
single measurement on a selected parameter.
12. Dispersion of Measured Values and the State of Q-systems
As was noted before, in contrast to the case of C-systems in 
a given state, where repetitions of the same measurement 
establishes a single value for a selected parameter, from the 
repetition of the same measurement on a large number of 
identically prepared Q-systems of a given type, a dispersion 
emerges over which values occur with varying frequencies. 
This dispersion is further cleansed of experimental errors 
when a considerably large series of repetitions of the same 
measurement are carried out. The size of a thus established 
dispersion remains unchanged, as long as the trials involve 
systems initially prepared under the same conditions. It 
begins to vary accordingly, as variations are introduced in 
the initial preparation of the systems of an identical type.
The frequency to which a particular value for a selected 
parameter converges over an indefinitely large number of 
identical trials is, customarily in physics, taken to be the 
probability of the event that the parameter in question 
assumes that value. Since a unique distribution of 
probabilities for the values of a selected parameter is 
always obtained from credible measurements on numerically 
different, but identically prepared, systems of the same
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type, it may be taken as the 'identity sign1 for a particular 
state. Whenever such a distribution is obtained from error- 
cleansed measurements, it can be used to test the accuracy of 
a prediction from QM about that state. So in the end, even 
though the luxury of D-parameters is denied the Q-systems, an 
economy of a sort is introduced in deciding their states, in 
so far as only one parameter is required for the job.
Suppose the parameter selected for deciding the state of a 
stock of identically prepared Q-particles of the same type is 
their location in the physical space, designated by 'q'. For 
ease in picturing the situation, let us restrict q to one 
dimension only. A particular distribution Pj of probabilities 
obtained for a range of q's values, singles out a unique 
state of the system. Let this state be designated by ' Zj/. We 
have, therefore, a one-one correspondence between Z1 and P1# 
The latter, moreover, rises to, and falls from, a peak over 
an interval of length A qx. This interval indicates the range 
of values for q which are observed to occur with significant 
frequencies. This is schematically represented in Figure 7.
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Probability P(q)
Figure 7
Suppose now, another stock of the same type of Q-systems is 
taken and are all prepared under exactly the same conditions 
as those under which Aqt was measured. It would be natural 
to say that all the members of this sample are also in the 
state Zj. This time, however, let measurements be made, with 
an appropriate and invariant measuring procedure, on the 
momentum of the systems which we designate by 1 p' . A 
dispersion of length A  Pi would be obtained for the 
frequencies of observed values of p. The fact that all the 
systems involved in these trials are supposed to be in state 
Zlf establishes a relation between A q x and A  Pi* This 
relation is specified by the Uncertainty Principle to be A q x
. A  p, > h /fi.
As it happens, q and p are only one pair of parameters which 
in CM define a set of D-parameters for a system. The 
Uncertainty Principle actually extends the same relation to
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any other pair of parameters which in CM may define a set of 
D-parameters. Each parameter in such a pair is called the 
’canonical conjugate* of the other. The Uncertainty Principle 
entails that from the size of the dispersion in the values of 
one parameter of a system in a particular state, the lower 
bound for that in the values of it’s canonical conjugate is 
determined. For Q-systems in a certain state, this is as 
close as we can come to the Classical case of having complete 
sets of values for canonically conjugate parameters. Because 
the values of these parameters always display dispersions 
when Q-systems are in a certain state, the parameters may be 
said to be 'non-compatible' . We may have to be content with 
probabilities and dispersions, in place of single sharp 
values, but with only one measuring procedure we can do what 
would otherwise require at least two if we were to operate 
with CM.
13. Instantaneous State of a Single Q-Particle
There is a twist in the tale we have told, that can be the 
cause of bewilderment as well as perhaps some confusion. We 
have seen that the observation of a Quantum Mechanical state, 
which is done by measuring a probability distribution for a 
selected parameter, requires a certain collection of Q- 
systems. A question can obviously be asked about the state of 
a single member of such a collection at any one time. If we 
refer back to the experiment, the outcome of which was 
depicted in Figure 6, we can see that the question of the 
state of each particle involved may be decided only after the
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result of the measurement for all of them has come through. 
If, at the very early stages when the positions of only a 
handful of particles have been detected on the photographic 
film, we ask ’what state are these particles in?', the answer 
must be ’any one which is compatible with the distribution 
pattern that has emerged up to that stage'. And clearly there 
are many such states.
This calls for introducing a distinction. In the case of the 
C-systems, their state can, in principle, be decided at any 
given time, by the results of single credible measurements on 
relevant parameters at that time. In the case of a Q-system, 
although it is in a particular state at any given time, this 
state cannot always be decided at that time. One must go on 
repeating the measurements ah ovo, to use SchrOdinger's 
phrase (Schrddinger, [1935] ), until a particular distribution 
pattern emerges and is stabilized. So, in general, being in 
a certain state at a particular time does not entail that it 
can be decided at that time. Conversely, that the state of a 
system cannot be decided at a given time, does not entail 
either that it has no state at all at that time, or that its 
state is somehow inconceivable.
Still, however, a nagging question hangs over the state of a 
particle, for a parameter of which a particular value has 
been credibly measured, say, at time t. Even if we manage, 
somehow, to obtain a particular value, at t, for the 
parameter which is the canonical conjugate of the first, we 
saw that its state at this time, remains undecided. But in
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that case,, what is it exactly that we are lacking at t for 
deciding the state of the particle? Have we not got at hand 
all that is required for fixing a state of the particle?
The answer ought to be obvious. What we need, but have not 
yet managed to obtain, are amplitudes. Remember, it is the 
set of all the amplitudes over the possible values of a 
parameter that singles out a state. A single value for the 
parameter in question is just one, among perhaps as much as 
infinitely many others, of its possible values. It is not 
even a measure of a single amplitude, let alone all the 
others that are required. To measure the amplitude associated 
with this particular value alone, we need to find the 
frequency with which this value recurs over a sufficiently 
large number of trials. The numbers we need in order to 
decide a state of the particle at t, can only be dug up from 
an enormous amount of readings from the instruments used for 
the measurement in question.
The element of unease that was felt in connection with this 
particular question, therefore, appears to be traceable to 
mixing two radically different conceptions. On the one hand, 
the Quantum Mechanical conception of a state requires 
amplitudes and these cannot be decided by single credible 
measurement results. On the other hand, the Classical 
conception of a state is complete with just such results and 
requires no further information. The two conceptions are 
inconsistent, thus one must be adopted with the total 
exclusion of the other. We cannot chose to pursue the
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procedure prescribed by one conception for deciding a state, 
only to stop in the middle of it, ask questions that presume 
a switch to the rival conception, and expect to get away 
without any problems.
14. Evolution of Quantum Mechanical States
Quantum Mechanical states, very much like their Classical 
counterparts, are determined by a set of numbers. The major 
difference, however, between the two conceptions of states is 
that in the latter these numbers represent values that the 
dynamical parameters of a system must have at a certain time, 
to the exclusion of all the others in the spaces of those 
parameters. Whereas in the former, they represent something, 
as yet we know not what, which somehow fixes the 
probabilities for an array of possible alternatives in the 
space of the dynamical parameters of the system. To highlight 
this difference, we may call, for lack of better words, the 
Classical state of a system a ’definitive* collection, and 
that of its Quantum Mechanical counterpart a * statistical * 
one over the spaces of the canonically conjugate parameters.
The progression of successive states in time, from the point 
of view of CM is a sequence of definitive collections, and 
from that of QM, a sequence of statistical ones. Both 
progressions are governed by strict laws, provided the system 
involved is isolated and its states not subject to any 
interferences from outside the constraints already specified. 
That is to say, the state of a system at any one time,
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together with the laws, uniquely determine its state at any 
other time, only if the system remains undisturbed. In CM 
this law is expressed by the Hamilton-Jacobi equations which 
apply to points in the phase space. In QM it is expressed by 
Schrddinger's equation which applies to state functions in 
the space of a single parameter ( 'half the size* of the phase 
space).
The progression of the state function in time, as described 
by the Schrddinger equation, displays a periodic character, 
and defines a plane wave propagating over the space of a 
selected parameter. The frequency of this wave (and hence its 
wave-length) determines the total energy of the system 
involved up to a factor which is simply Planck's constant. 
This wave behaves in ways which in some respects is typical 
of Classical waves: it spreads continuously over the space in 
which it is travelling, and in cases where there is more than 
one disturbance propagating so that their paths overlap, they 
interfere constructively or destructively in the appropriate 
regions of that space. For this reason the state function is 
also referred to as a wave function.
Now we seem to have the wave we need in order to explain the 
diffraction pattern observed on the photographic film in the 
double-slit experiment. From the source, plane waves are set 
in motion, along with the particles and in the direction of 
their travel, falling on the surface of the barrier as the 
latter arrive there. On the barrier, everywhere except at the 
openings, the incident wave is partly absorbed and partly
173
reflected in accordance with Classical laws. Through each of 
the openings, the incident wave passes, emerging on the other 
side as two waves which propagate simultaneously towards the 
screen with the photographic film. These waves, in turn, 
interfere as soon as they meet each other. The result, again 
in accordance with the Classical picture, is that they add up 
everywhere to reinforce one another if they are both rising 
together, or to cancel if one is rising while the other is 
subsiding.
15. The Reality of the State Function
Waves that produce visible diffraction patterns must be 
physically real. Yet the state function whose evolution in 
time happens to share some characteristics with ordinary 
waves, describes a mysterious phenomenon whose values cannot 
be directly measured at any time. The nearest this function 
comes to being observable, is by somehow determining 
probability distributions for the possible values of a given 
parameter. Are we to believe, then, that there is a 
physically efficacious phenomenon whose propagation in the 
real space fixes probabilities for where a particle may be 
located?
Many people regard this a very unpalatable suggestion. In the 
early days of the development of Quantum theory, de Broglie 
proposed the idea of 'pilot-waves' which was something along 
this line. According to this idea, a particle travels at the 
centre of a wave whose intensity at every point in space is
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proportional to the probability of the particle's presence 
there. Based on this imagery, he produced a relation between 
the wave-length of this 'pilot-wave' and the momentum of the 
associated particle that remains a permanent fixture in QM. 
That this imagery was indeed a guiding principle in his early 
work, is attested in de Broglie [1956]^ (p. 89): 'At the time 
when I conceived the first ideas of Wave Mechanics, I was 
convinced that it was imperative to accomplish a fusion of 
the physical notions of waves and particles... So I sought to 
represent the wave-particle dualism to myself by a picture in 
which the particle would be the centre of an extended 
phenomenon. This idea is found again and again in my early 
works'
Most other founding fathers of the theory neither found this 
idea acceptable (although some held similar views for a 
while), nor were necessarily led to their contributions by a 
particular imagery. Their major concern lay in finding a 
mathematical algorithm from which the observed statistical 
regularities in the behaviour of Q-systems could be produced. 
Indeed, some of them were not at all prepared to attribute 
the emergence of the statistical collections to any reason 
other than irremovable uncertainties in our knowledge of the 
initial conditions. Very much influenced by Bohr's ideas on 
the subject, Heisenberg wrote in 1927 : '...in the strong
fomulation of the causal law "if we know exactly the 
present, we can predict the future", it is not the conclusion 
but rather the premise which is false. We cannot know as a
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matter of principle, the present in all its details. ' (Quoted 
from Jammer [1966], p. 330).
As a result, a view emerged and soon became dominant, 
according to which the significance of the state function 
must be restricted only to measurement results obtained in 
making observations on Q-systems. The numbers that make up 
the value of a state function at a given time, are, according 
to this view, to be construed, not as values that a 
physically significant parameter may have in reality, but as 
a catalogue of possible results to be expected if some 
measurements were to be carried out on the system. When 
Schrddinger, in his celebrated [1935], described the state 
function as 1 the means for predicting probability of 
measurement results', and called it an 1 expectation-catalog' 
(In Wheeler and Zurek [1983], p. 158), he was very much 
expressing this sentiment.
This view, which at one period enjoyed the status of an 
orthodoxy, confers (as we shall see later in more detail) on 
observation, and thus the observer, an unprecedented 
commanding position in the determination of the states of 
physical systems. So far, we have not seen anything in the 
physics of the Q-systems that would compel submission to this 
position apart from a conceptual difficulty in connection 
with the existence of 'probability waves'. This difficulty, 
which is really about how physical reality ought to be 
viewed, must, however, be balanced against the fundamental
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problems which are raised by the orthodox view about how the 
reality of states in physics is to be conceived.
In more recent times the recommendation that the conception 
of the reality of states in physics should be fundamentally 
revised has come to be increasingly questioned. However, not 
all the alternative proposals appear to converge on a single 
picture. The main reason for this seems to be that none has 
actually managed to avoid one startling consequence or 
another, and there is a lack of consensus on which of these 
is more tolerable than the others.
One such move away from tinkering with the very conception of 
the reality of the states of physical systems, and towards 
offering a picture for it, has been advanced in Penrose 
[1989], which it will prove illuminating to examine. 
Considering a single Q-particle he writes: 'Quantum-
mechanically, every single position that the particle might 
have is an Malternative" available to it. We have seen that 
all alternatives must somehow be combined together, with 
complex-number weightings. This collection of complex 
weightings describes the quantum state of the particle. It is 
standard practice... to use the Greek letter *¥* for this 
collection of weightings, regarded as a complex function of 
position - called the wavefunction of the particle... I am 
taking the view that the physical reality of the particle's 
location is, indeed, its quantum stateY-' (Penrose [1989], 
p. 314).
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Now, the phrase ’physical reality of the particle's 
location1, as ordinarily understood, conjures up the image of 
a tiny spot in physical space which the particle does occupy 
at a given time. On the other hand, the value of the wave 
function that at any given time signals the particle’s state, 
determines, in general, a statistical collection over its 
possible locations. From this collection a mean can be 
calculated which represents the average of all the locations 
that are possible, with varying probabilities, for the 
particle to occupy when it is in that state. This is called 
the 'expectation value' of the particle's location.
The expectation value of the particle's location in a certain 
state does, needless to say, represent a tiny spot in 
physical space that the particle may occupy at a certain 
time. But it certainly need not be identical to the physical 
reality of the location which the particle in that state 
would occupy at a given time. Conflating these notions is 
analogous to the case of the 1.5m tall man who did not know 
how to swim, but when told that the average depth of a river 
was only lm, stepped confidently into it and drowned!
16. Beam-Splitting Experiments
That the wave function, on the other hand, should not be 
conflated with the physical reality of the particle's 
location, comes out clearly when we consider the particle's 
behaviour in the so-called 'beam-splitting' experiments. 
These are a variation on the theme of the double-slit
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experiments, with the advantage that they can actually be 
performed more or less along the lines that we will describe.
Ideally, when a beam of light falls on a fully silvered 
mirror, all of it would be reflected. We can split such a 
beam into a half that is reflected and a half that is 
transmitted through, if instead, we use a half-silvered 
mirror. If the intensity of the incident beam is cut down so 
that only a single photon falls on the dividing line in a 
half-silvered mirror, then it would either pass through or 
get reflected with an equal probability of %.
Suppose we shoot a photon onto a half-silvered mirror that is 
tilted at a 45 angle to the path of incidence. There is a 
probability of h that the photon would be reflected off the 
mirror at 90* to its original path, and a probability of h 
that it would go through along that path. If now two fully- 
silvered mirrors are placed at points I and II along either 
routes, each tilted at 45* to the path of incidence, the 
photon should arrive at the point F, provided the distances 
travelled (which could, in principle, be made as long as one 
wishes) are equal. This is shown in Figure 8.
The photon II
Figure 8
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Suppose, further, that a half-silvered mirror , again tilted 
at 45* to the paths of incidence along both routes, is placed 
at F and photon-detectors set up at A and B to measure the 
probability of the photon's arrival at either point. 
Empirically, these probabilities are measured to be 1 at A 
and 0 at B, indicating that interference has taken place at 
F. 'What does this tell us1, Penrose writes, 'about the 
reality of the photon's state of existence between its first 
and last encounter with a half-reflecting mirror? It seems 
inescapable that the photon must, in some sense, have 
actually travelled both routes at once!' (Penrose [1989], p. 
330).
Whatever additional reasons there may be that add to the 
strangeness of the observed outcome (and there are some which 
we will consider), this manner of speaking appears nothing 
short of being inconsistent. For since we can make the 
distance 01 shorter than Oil, if the same photon is 
travelling along 'both routes at once', by the time it 
reaches mirror I, it would also be travelling unimpeded along 
the other route. It can then be said of the same particle 
that it has been simultaneously obstructed and unobstructed 
in its travel, which is surely absurd given our understanding 
of 'particles' and their properties.
It may be thought that perhaps the photon had split as a 
result of encountering the first half-silvered mirror. After 
all, a photon is just a bundle of energy and it is 
conceivable that it could spread just as it could appear
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localized. This way out, however, is blocked on empirical 
grounds. Whenever photon detectors are placed along both 
paths, only one of them is activated, and' in a manner 
indicative of the passage of a whole photon.
17. Delayed-Choice Experiment
This way of speaking has a further embarrassing consequence. 
Wheeler [1981], introduces a variation in the experiment just 
described (In Wheeler and Zurek [1983], p. 184). Let us 
repeat the experiment only this time remove the final half- 
silvered mirror at F just before the photon is about to reach 
it. Now the photon will be detected at either A or B with 
equal probabilities. This indicates that no interference has 
taken place and the photon has travelled only one route: if 
it has gone along OIF, it will arrive at A, and if it has 
gone along OIIF, it will arrive at B.
In the light of the idea that the photon would have to travel 
both routes in the original version of the experiment, we 
would now face the bizarre consequence that a delayed-choice 
about the positioning of a half-silvered mirror at F has 
actually determined the events prior to when the choice was 
made. If we leave the mirror in place, the photon would 
allegedly travel both routes to get to F. But if we lead the 
photon to 'believe' that everything is set up so that it 
should travel both routes, only to 'pull the rug from under 
its feet', as it were, at a fraction of the millionth of a 
second before it is about to reach its destination by
181
i
removing the half-silvered mirror at F, it would have to 
miraculously wipe out having travelled along one of the 
routes from its past altogether.
It should be noted, as Wheeler (In Wheeler and Zurek [1983], 
p. 192), and Bell [1987], p. 112 point out, that the orthodox 
view would get around this problem, by forbidding us to think 
about it. According to this view, the new physics does not 
allow any questions to be raised about what happens to the 
photon in-between its source and detection at either A or B. 
The cause of the absurdity encountered is hence diagnosed as 
departing from the path of physics, and embarking on that of 
[realist] metaphysics which pushes us in the direction of 
seeking realities where none is to be found. Physical 
reality, we are told, should be confined to measurement 
results alone, even if this entails that minds are ultimately 
essential for determining this reality. Measurement results 
are observable traces on measuring instruments, and 
observations are complete only when recorded by the mind of 
an observer. Since each such result, however, is entirely 
consistent on its own, and different results arise from 
different physical situations, the absurdity encountered 
above would not ensue.
18. The Amplitude Field
In physics, any quantity whose values everywhere depend on 
locations in the physical space is considered a field. The 
state function over the space of a particle’s location,
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therefore, describes a field. The alternative which remains 
before us and which we are going to adopt, is to consider 
this field, which we shall call the 'amplitude field', as a 
real entity. This by no means is an option free of problems. 
Nevertheless, it has several considerable advantages over its 
rivals. First of all, it provides a natural explanation of 
all the phenomena we have encountered, without running into 
the absurdities just considered. Secondly, it avoids revision 
of the traditional conception of the reality of states, which 
would either suppress the freedom to be curious, or else 
bestow attributes on the unobserved states of physical 
systems, as well as on the role of minds in determining the 
observed ones, which appear to defy comprehension.
The main obstacle in the way of considering the amplitude 
field as a real entity is that it remains hidden. And that, 
not only in the sense of being itself directly unobservable 
-for there are many unobservable entities in physics whose 
reality is not doubted by anyone-, but also in the sense of 
lacking any understood physical attributes. For instance, it 
turns out that in order for it to be efficacious in producing 
some observed results in physical space, disturbances in it 
must be able to travel faster than the speed of light (Bell 
[1987], pp. 171; 106, 115, d'Espagnat [1979]). Yet, unlike 
other familiar fields known in physics, the amplitude field 
appears to lack any energy of its own (Rae [1986], p. 27).
These, however, are problems that when more sharply defined 
should find their solutions from within physics itself. And
that is how it should be. Here, we appear to have a 
consistent interpretation of QM that refers all the 
outstanding problems which remain on the way to its adoption 
back to the domain of physics. This fact alone should suffice 
to commend it against the rivals which can do no better (as 
we shall see) than reverting to metaphysics or speculative 
psychology for offering solutions to their own. There is also 
an added advantage, for our purposes, that the physical 
picture provided by this interpretation, highlights clearly 
the features of the limiting case where the laws of CM meet 
with empirical success.
According to this interpretation, the particle, with its own 
position and momentum at any given time, is to be sharply 
distinguished from the wave function which determines its 
state at that time. The particle behaves in the age old 
Classical fashion, as all particles should, in so far as it 
is always localized in one and only one position, and travels 
with one and only one velocity at any one time. It can only 
pass through a single slit at a time, and travel along a 
single route to any target. It fails, however, to fit into 
the Classical picture in so far as its state at any one time 
is not determined by its location and velocity at that time. 
That is to say, its instantaneous state is compatible with a 
range of values for location and velocity in physical space, 
subject to the restriction laid down by the Uncertainty 
Principle.
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The range of locations in physical space which a particle in 
a given state is allowed to occupy at any time, is determined 
by the size of the disturbance in the amplitude field at that 
time. This size , in turn, is determined by Schrddinger1 s 
equation and the initial conditions. Disturbances in the 
amplitude field at any one time are to be thought of as open 
passage-ways within physical space. Any point in this space 
is free for the particle to occupy to an extent proportional 
to the intensity of the field at that point. The greater this 
intensity at a given point, the more open it would be for the 
particle to occupy. All the points at which this field 
intensity is zero, are consequently closed for the particle 
to occupy.
Physical space according to this picture, therefore, is no 
longer the void that it was painted to be in CM. Everywhere 
within that void a particle couXd freely move about as long 
as there were no obstacles on its way. In the new picture, 
however, even in the absence of any obstacles whatsoever, 
only those locations where the intensity of the amplitude 
field is non-zero are accessible. The periodic features of 
the amplitude field are, moreover, preserved when the 
location space of a single particle is enlarged to the 
configuration space of a system of particles. They then get 
transformed into the corresponding momentum space in such a 
way that the uncertainty relation between the two parameters 
is always maintained.
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Historically, it appears that de Broglie was not the only 
prominent contributor to the Quantum theory who was led, by 
the idea that the wave function represents an awkward field, 
to the discovery of an important feature of Quantum 
phenomena. Dugas [1955], p. 586, discussing the second paper 
that Max Born published in 1926 ( 'Quantenmechanik der
Stossvorg&ngef, in Zeitschrift fur Physik, 38), writes: 'For 
his part, Born suggests a new interpretation which arises out 
of a remark of Einstein on the relation between photons and 
wave fields. Einstein said that waves only served to indicate 
the path to the particle and, in this connection, spoke of a 
virtual or "phantom" field (Gespensterfeld). This field 
determines the probability that a photon, carrying energy and 
momentum, should take a certain path; but it does not, 
itself, have energy or momentum. To Born the part played by 
the waves of quantum mechanics would, in an analogous way, be 
that of a pilot (Fuhrungsfeld).'
Jammer [1974], (pp. 40-4l); confirms this by citing an 
interview with Born in October 18, 1962 which appears in 
Archive for the History of Quantum Physics. In addition, he 
also cites a lecture which Born delivered in 1955, three days 
before Einstein's death, and which appears under the title 
'Albert Einstein und das Lichtquantum' in Die 
Naturwissenschaften 11, 1955. In this lecture, 'Born declared 
explicitly that it was fundamentally Einstein' s idea which he 
(Born) applied in 1926 to the interpretation of Schrddinger's 
wave function.' (Ibid, p. 41).
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Max Born's crucial contribution to the Quantum theory was the 
discovery that the intensity of the wave function at any 
point over the space of a selected parameter determines the 
probability that the system's parameter has that value. It is 
in fact through this very discovery that the wave function 
can be, albeit indirectly, observed at all. We seem, 
therefore, to have yet another instance in which the idea of 
amplitude field has played a powerful heuristic role in a 
major discovery. That this idea is not, from the point of 
view of physics, untenable, has been forcefully argued 
against all its prominent critics by David Bohm and John S. 
Bell in more recent times, in particular in Bohm [1952], and 
Bell [1987].
19. Back to the Beam-splitting Experiments
Let us set up the experiment described in 17 so that the 
photon will be restricted, for simplicity, to move only on 
the plane of this paper. We mark the directions in which the 
photon will be travelling by the customary x and y 
coordinates. The photon starts from its source S and travels 
along the x-axis to the first half-silvered mirror at 0.
There is a probability of % that it will go through, as well 
as get reflected, at the first half-silvered mirror. If it 
goes through, it would continue travelling along the x-axis 
until it encounters the full mirror II. It would then be 
reflected at a 90° angle and hence travel towards F along the 
y-axis. If, however, it is reflected from the first mirror,
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it would be deflected by 90° at O and hence proceed along the 
y-axis until it encounters the full mirror I. Reflection from 
this mirror would finally send it travelling along the x-axis 
towards F.
Meanwhile, firing the photon at S starts a disturbance in the 
amplitude field. The geometrical shape of this disturbance 
is, as has been noted, determined by the initial as well as 
the boundary conditions, and will be described by an 
appropriate wave function y  . It turns out (Penrose [1989], 
pp. 314-319), that if the initial conditions are so prepared 
that in all the repetitions of the experiment the photon 
starts out with the same momentum, Y  would describe a unique 
helix winding around the x-axis from S. This wave propagates 
towards 0 in such a manner that the sum of the absolute 
square of its amplitude over a small interval around each and 
every point between S and 0 can be normalized to 1.
Encountering the half-silvered mirror at 0, the wave splits 
into two equal disturbances and each with an
intensity which is everywhere half that of the original. That
conjugates of and TZ respectively. One passes through 
winding around the x-axis in phase with the original, while 
the other is reflected winding around the y-axis 90° out of 
phase with the original. This is illustrated in Figure 9, 
with arrows indicating the direction in which each helix is 
winding in a 0° to 360° dial.
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Assuming that nothing other than a mere change of phase 
happens to either waves as a result of reflection from the 
full mirrors, and would each undergo a 90° phase
shift again, by encountering mirrors I and II respectively. 
They would, therefore, be approaching the half-silvered 
mirror at F, 90° out of phase with one another. At F each 
wave would split into two equal waves: M' into^ /jf which goes 
through the half-silvered mirror, and V'/z which is reflected 
from it; and ^  into V^ \ and^likewise (see Figure 9). In the 
same manner as the splitting of ^  a-t the first half­
silvered mirror at 0, the intensities of and
everywhere must now be such that each is half that of 
That is, in rough n o t a t i o n , ^ = Vm The same should 
hold for %  and
Each reflected wave would be 90° out of phase with the 
corresponding incident wave approaching F, while the 
transmitted ones would remain in phase with the latter. As
a consequence ,j would be propagating in phase with
fi 'ji
thus
producing a constructive interference at A, while would be 
180° out of phase with thus producing a destructive
interference with it at B.
Now, the probability that the photon is present in the 
vicinity of any point along its possible routes, is given by
the intensity of the amplitude field around that point. We
2.
designate this quantity by | <lf/{ x ) | for the value of the wave 
function ^  around the point x, which is another way of 
writing ^(x) ^  (x). If we designate the phase differences 
between ^  and on the one hand, and V',, and on the other, 
by Bt and ^ respectively, we calculate the probabilities P(A) 
and P(B) of the photon arriving at A or B respectively, as 
follows: n
VCA) ^  I %  (A ) + %  (A ’ f  =  1V*  ^  1^  (ft) ^  A1 1 * Coi &l ‘
Q. = 0° =$ - i TY/i) = •+ ^
P(/U = -t- Vr2 = 1 •
= + Cos B-a .
#* = \$0° Gs ^  = l/M , cr
PCfO = •& - v* «  o  ■
By conceiving the particle and the amplitude field as 
separate entities, we have accounted for the observed 
probabilities in a straightforward manner (i.e. requiring no 
renormalizations), without either resorting to the absurdity 
of a single photon travelling both routes at once, or ad-hoc 
metaphysical revisions, as well as epistemological
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restrictions. All other empirical results obtained from 
introducing variations to this experiment can likewise be 
accounted for:
1. If either of the routes after the first half-silvered 
mirror is blocked by a photon-detecting device, for example, 
the device would be activated with a probability of h in a 
manner indicative of the passage of a whole photon. The 
amplitude wave along the open route would propagate unimpeded 
towards F, splitting into two equal waves as a result of 
encountering the half-silvered mirror at F. Then the pho'ton 
should be detected at either A or B with equal probabilities, 
as observed.
2. If there is no mirror at F and both routes from 0 remain 
open, the amplitude waves from I and II would proceed intact 
to A and B without interfering. The photon should then be 
detected at either points with equal probabilities, as 
observed.
3. The delayed-choice about placing a half-silvered mirror at 
F does not give rise to any problem. Two amplitude waves 
would be approaching F with or without a mirror there, and 
the outcomes at A or B would be decided by whether or not 
they split at F. This, in turn, is decided by the fact that 
there is, or is not, a half-silvered mirror in place there.
20. Averages and Expectation Values
Although the amplitude field and the Q-system that is , 
associated with it are separate entities, the fact that (a) 
the intensity of the field at each and every point in the
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space of a selected parameter of the system determines the 
probability distribution of the latter*s values, and (b) this 
distribution is unique for all the systems that are prepared 
in exactly the same way, enables us to 'read off' the state 
of the system at a given time from what its associated field 
is doing at that time. Because of this association, the state 
of the field at a particular time can be thought of as the 
signature for the state of its associated system at that 
time. If we keep this point in mind, most of the conceptual 
problems arising from the current interpretations of QM will 
disappear, as we shall see.
To begin with, we remind ourselves that in CM the state of a 
C-system at a given time is uniquely determined by single 
values of its D-parameters at that time. Because the 
probability distribution of the values of a selected 
parameter is unique for identically prepared Q-systems, we 
can produce the (statistical) analogue of the Classical 
situation in QM by taking the average of all the values that 
occur in this distribution. This single number, then, would 
represent a unique state of a Q-system.
Let us take a large enough stock of Q-particles of the same 
type which are all prepared to start an experiment in the 
same way. We ask what the average value of their position is 
in a completely isolated volume of the physical space, after 
the lapse of a certain time from when they are released, one ; 
by one, into this volume. To measure this value, we would 
have to take the number of times each particular position in
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this volume is occupied by a particle after the time in 
question, multiply the two numbers, add up the results for 
all such locations, and finally divide by the total number of 
trials. This is just what we mean by ’taking the average* of 
all the locations that are possible for the particle to 
occupy, after the lapse of time in question.
If, however, we happen to have the wave function that is the 
signature of the state of the particles at the designated 
time, we can calculate this value through the following 
reasoning. Let us designate each obtained value of the 
particle’s position q by qt, the number of times it occurs by 
N*, and the total number of trials by N. The average value 
qava of the particle's positions can be calculated from qave = 
£ Niqi/N = £ (N^NJq*. The quantity N£/N converges towards the
e rl
probability that the parameter q has the value q*, as N is 
increased towards infinity. This means that for sufficiently 
large number of trials we can write qave = ,£ If the
e' i
wave function associated with the particle has the value 
at q£ for the designated time, we can write 
pi = I "V(«ii) 12 = V'(qi)^fqi)-
Once we approach the limit of an infinite number of trials 
over a region of space, all locations within that region must 
be included in our calculation. This means that when we turn 
to probabilities in order to calculate our average, we must 
replace the sum with integral over the entire region of space 
we are looking at. In general, if we represent the amplitude 
field that determines the probabilities for all the locations
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of a Q-particle in the physical space at all times, by a wave
volume dx.dy.dz of physical space. Because of the fact that 
this average is indicative of a particular state for the 
particle, it is also called the ’expectation value1 of its 
location in that state.
We note that in the expression for calculating the 
expectation value of the particle's location, q appears as a 
variable that takes on all the latter's relevant values. This 
can be generalized to hold for all the parameters whose 
values can be measured. We could either switch to the space 
of the selected parameter, in which case we retain the simple 
variable over the values of that parameter, but should take 
care to convert the wave function that describes the 
amplitude field to its counterpart in that space. Or, 
alternatively, we could chose to work with the amplitude 
field itself, in which case we should take care to convert 
the variable that takes on the values of the selected 
parameter to its appropriate form in the physical (or more 
generally, the configuration) space.
21. Operators, Their Eigenvalues and Eigenfunctions
function ^ (q,t), the average of the particle's locations
at any state can be calculated from qave
where dq is the abbreviation for the incremental
The form that the conversion of the variable over a selected, 
parameter, other than the one over which the amplitudes are 
described, takes, depends on the scheme that is used. In the
Schrddinger representation the converted variable becomes an 
algebraic operation (such as differentiation combined with 
multiplication) to be performed on the wave function over the 
physical (or the configuration) space. In the Hilbert space 
representation, it becomes a linear operation to be carried 
out on a state vector according to the rules of linear 
algebra.
In the simplest case of calculating the expectation value of 
a selected parameter, we are dealing with the multiplication 
of each and every relevant value of the parameter by its 
corresponding amplitude. On the other hand, the only 
measurable quantity which we can calculate using the 
machinery of QM, is the expectation value of a selected 
parameter. We can generalize these facts and say that all 
measurable parameters find their representation in the 
formalism of QM as certain operations that are to be 
performed on expressions that describe the behaviour of the 
amplitudes in a given representation. The formal expressions 
that specify the precise operations to be performed, are 
called 'operators1. If A is a measurable parameter, the
A
operator that represents A is usually designated by 1 A' .
Earlier on, we labelled the state of a Q-particle as a 
'statistical collection' over the space of a selected 
parameter. This does not mean that there are no states in 
which certain parameters of the particle retain the sarae^  
value through time. It means, rather, that such states are 
more of an exception than the rule. In general, most
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parameters of a Q-system in a particular state display values 
that fluctuate around a mean. There are, however states in 
which the value of some parameters remains stable at a single 
number. Most notable among such parameters is the total 
energy of the system. The states in which the energy of the 
system retains a single constant value through time are, 
appropriately called the 'stationary states' of the system. 
The stationary states of the hydrogen atom-, for example, 
correspond to the various energy levels that we met when 
discussing Bohr's theory of electrons in atomic orbits.
It follows at once that when a system is in a state in which 
a measurable parameter retains the same value, the 
expectation value of that parameter should be identical with 
that value. Since the expectation value of a parameter is 
characteristic of a particular state, the single constant 
value of a parameter that corresponds to one such special 
state is called the 'characteristic value' or the 
'eigenvalue' of the operator that represents the parameter in 
question, associated with that particular state.
The wave functions over the space of a selected parameter, 
each of which in the Schrodinger representation determines 
one of these special states, are correspondingly called the 
'eigenfunctions' of the operator representing that parameter. 
Because in the Hilbert space representation the equivalent of 
such wave functions are vectors, they constitute the^ 
'eigenvectors' of the operator in question and are called its 
'eigenstates'.
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22. Eigenvalue Equation and the Superposition Principle
If a Q-system is in one of the eigenstates of a selected 
parameter, operating on the wave function that is the 
signature of that state with the operator that represents the 
parameter in question, results in what is called an 
' eigenvalue equation1 . Let the operator in question be one 
of its eigenvalues A*, and the wave function associated with 
A*, . The eigenvalue equation for this particular case
would be ''A W  - A±V^ • This is particularly convenient since 
it says that operating on the function ^  with the operator 
in question is equivalent to performing a simple 
multiplication on "V7 with a real number.
Armed with this equation, we can easily prove the proposition 
that the expectation value of a parameter, when a Q-particle 
is in an eigenstate of its corresponding operator, is just 
the eigenvalue of the operator associated with that 
eigenstate. Let A be the selected parameter, A± one of its 
eigenvalues, and '^ (<3, t) the eigenfunction of
associated with A* which describes the amplitude field. The 
expectation value <A> of A can be calculated from
where dq is to be interpreted as before. From the eigenvalue 
equation we get
Substituting this in the expression for <A>, we get
<A>
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Since A± is a constant / it is unaffected by the 
integration. We can, therefore, write
The integral must be equal to unity since the particle1s 
parameter q must have some value within the space covered by 
the integration. It follows that <A> = A±.
In the Schrddinger representation, the eigenfunctions of a 
selected operator over the space of its parameter describe 
wave motions in that space. Each of these wave motions is 
analogous to a characteristic mode of an undulatory 
phenomenon in Classical wave mechanics. Once all the 
characteristic modes for such a phenomenon are known, 'Any 
motion at all can be analyzed by assuming that it is the sum 
of motions of all the different modes, combined with 
appropriate amplitudes and phases* (Feynman et al [1963], I, 
49-3). This is known as the 'principle of superposition' in 
wave mechanics.
The analogy enables us to carry over the superposition 
principle to QM. In the Schrddinger representation, this 
translates into the statement that any wave function at all 
over the space of a selected parameter can be expressed as 
the superposition of the eigenfunctions of the operator 
representing that parameter, using appropriate coefficients 
and phases. In the Hilbert space representation the 
application of the same principle amounts to the fact that 
once all the eigenstates of a selected operator are 
normalized (which involves choosing such coefficients for
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each that would make their ’length' equal to unity), they 
establish a set of bases upon which a (Hilbert) vector space 
can be set up.
We have already witnessed the principle of superposition at 
work when discussing the double-slit and beam-splitting 
experiments. In both these experiments, we were working with 
the amplitude field whose behaviour at each relevant region 
of the physical space determined the probabilities for the 
particle’s location there. Here, there are two points worth 
making explicit. (1) Whenever there was more than one wave 
motion associated with a single particle, each was 
elementary, in the sense that it was not itself the resultant 
of several simpler waves being combined together. Although at 
every location in their joint or separate travels, the waves 
determined the probability of the particle's presence there, 
the particle was always found localized at a single spot, to 
the exclusion of all other locations. (2) The state of a 
single particle at any time must be viewed as being 
determined by the state of a complex wave motion that 
resulted, wherever applicable, from superimposing all the 
elementary waves associated with it.
If we take the crucial property of eigenfunctions as being 
that every other wave function can be analyzed in terms of 
their superposition, each elementary wave motion associated 
with a single particle would qualify for being described by 
an eigenfunction. To each one of these eigenfunctions there 
corresponds a particular eigenvalue (in non-degenerate cases
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these are distinct), which represents a value of the selected 
parameter to the exclusion of all the others. It follows, 
therefore, that each value of a selected parameter that is 
obtained by carrying out a measurement on the particle in any 
state, is an eigenvalue of that parameter (associated with 
one of its eigenfunctions, barring degeneracies).
23. 'Paradoxes1 of the Orthodox Interpretation
In the interpretation of the formalism of QM favoured by most 
physicists -one which we have already referred to as being 
the orthodox- the distinction we have been at pains to
i
maintain between what the wave function describes, and the 
state of the corresponding Q-system is not recognized. The 
fact that the wave function provides the maximum possible 
information about the system, plus the fact that the proposed 
amplitude field is very much unlike any familiar physical 
entity, have joined to force, in their minds, the only 
available alternative. That is, to regard the wave function 
as nothing but the maximal description of the state of the 
system itself.
What, however, was quite straightforward to envisage in the 
case of the amplitude field, namely, the superposition of 
waves, becomes, under the orthodox interpretation, something 
incomprehensible, namely, the 'superposition of states'. The 
difficulty is perhaps better seen in the light of the 
following standard distinction. A system is said to be in a 
'pure state' if there is a single wave function which
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describes its state. The system is said to be in a 'mixture' 
of states if all that is known about it is that it is in one 
pure state with the probability Pi, another pure state with 
the probability P2, and so on. (See, for example, London and 
Bauer [1939],^4], in Wheeler and Zurek [1983], pp. 233-235).
By superimposing the eigenfunctions of a selected operator, 
we end up with a single wave function. The state of a system 
that is defined by the superposition of the eigenfunctions of 
one of its parameters is, therefore, pure. But what are we to 
make of such a state?
Take the selected parameter to be the total energy of the 
system. If the system is in any of the eigenstates of energy 
(i = l, 2, ...), its total energy would have the value 
E* characteristic of that state. When the system is in a 
superposition of these eigenstates, however, we cannot 
describe its state as having the energy E1 with the 
probability P1# energy E2 with the probability P2, and so on. 
Each of the values Et, (i = 1, 2, being associated
with a single eigenstate of the energy, that would amount to 
describing the state of the system as a mixture. And this 
cannot be because the system is, by definition, in a pure 
state.
The problem gets deeper once we note that even when ideally 
the most accurate measurements are carried out on the energy 
of the system, these probabilities, and only these 
probabilities, are the results observed. It looks as if the
state consisting of the superposition of eigenstates cannot 
be identified by means of the best possible mass of 
observational data. Yet such states are by no means rare for 
Q-systems to find themselves in. Wherever there are 
uncertainties in the value of a parameter, and this is most 
generally the case, superpositions of the eigenstates of that 
parameter are involved.
24. The Problem of Measurement
A sure sign that a conception has outlived its usefulness is
when the solutions it generates in order to overcome the
problems it has run into prove even more enigmatic. This
holds for the orthodox interpretation vis a vis the problem
of the superposition of states. The way out, first
articulated in von Neumann [1932], (chapters V and VI; also in
Wheeler and Zurek [1983], pp. 549-623), and still widely held,
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consists of postulating that Q-systems evolve differently 
when left unobserved from when they are brought under 
observation. The first evolution is governed by a strict law, 
expressed by Schrddinger1s equation, and proceeds from pure 
states to pure states; the second evolution is statistical, 
proceeding from either pure or mixture of states to a mixture 
of states.
Von Neumann writes: ’We... have two fundamentally different 
types of interventions which can occur in a system... First, 
the arbitrary changes by measurements... Second, the 
automatic changes which occur with passage of time...’ (in
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Wheeler and Zurek [1983], p. 553). And, ’[the second] 
transforms states into states... while [the first] can 
transform states into mixtures. In this sense, therefore, the 
development of a state according to [the first] is 
statistical, while according to [the second] it is causal.1 
(Ibid, p. 559)
As a result, von Neumann concludes, 'we must- always divide 
the world into two parts, the one being the observed system, 
the other the observer. In the former, we can follow up all 
physical processes (in principle at least) arbitrarily 
precisely. In the latter, this is meaningless... Now quantum 
mechanics describes the events which occur in the observed 
portions of the world, so long as they do not interact with 
the observing portion, with the aid of the [second] process, 
but as soon as such an interaction occurs, i.e., a
measurement, it requires the application of [the first] 
process.1 (Ibid, p. 622).
This, prima facie, does not appear to amount to much more 
than a paraphrase of the original problem. Indeed, similar 
qualitative proposals were already around, made by people 
like Bohr and Heisenberg. What made von Neumann's 
contribution particularly distinguished, was his genius to 
couch this idea within the same mathematical machinery that 
was used to formalize QM. In other words, he managed to 
produce a theory, using the formalism of QM, which described 
the process of measurement involving Q-systems, and which 
entailed that their state should turn into a mixture as a
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result of interacting with measuring devices on which they 
leave observable traces.
Crucial to this theory is the assumption that the wave 
function (or its equivalent in the Hilbert space 
representation) is the Quantum Mechanical version of the 
description of states for all physical systems. From this 
assumption, von Neumann proceeded along the following line of 
reasoning: 'In measurement we cannot observe the system S by 
itself, but must rather investigate the system S + M, in 
order to obtain (numerically) its interaction with the 
measuring apparatus M. The theory of the measurement is a 
statement concerning S + M, and should describe how the state 
of S is related to certain properties of the state of M 
(namely, the positions of a certain pointer, since the 
observer reads these). Moreover, it is rather arbitrary 
whether or not one includes the observer in M, and replaces 
the relation between the S state and the pointer positions in 
M by the relations of this state and the chemical changes in 
the observer's eye or even in his brain (i.e., to that which 
he has "seen" or "perceived")... In any case, therefore, the 
application of [the second process] is of importance only for 
S + M. Of course, we must show that this gives the same 
result for S as the direct application of [the first process] 
on S. If this is successful, then we have achieved a unified 
way of looking at the physical world on a quantum mechanical 
basis.' (Ibid, p. 554).
204
The success of von Neumann's efforts, which we take for 
granted for our purposes, means, in particular, that the idea 
of the superposition of states can be reconciled (to use 
Putnam's word in Putnam [1983], p. 250) with the fact that 
even ideal observations on Q-systems cannot ever reveal such 
states. The problem, then, of making sense of this idea 
appears to get defused, so far as at least Q-systems are 
concerned, since their time-evolution in isolation must, by 
necessity, be disrupted if any observation of their state is 
to be attempted at all- We don't have to worry about what 
their states look like when they evolve undisturbed, one 
could say, so long as we have a good enough unified theory 
which, in conjunction with appropriate initial conditions, 
entails the observation results actually obtained.
This, however, proves to be a short-lived respite. The 
reason, as we shall see, has to do with the fact that the 
reconciliation between the observed and unobserved states of 
the Q-systems has been achieved by extending the idea of 
superposition of states to all kinds of systems. Devices from 
which results of measurement on a parameter of a Q-system 
must ultimately be read off, would have to include C-systems. 
Von Neumann's theory manages to get the desired mixture for 
the Q-system observed, by viewing the combined Q and C- 
systems as a single system undergoing undisturbed evolution 
in time (according to the time-dependent Schrodinger 
equation).
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So long as all the systems involved, the theory suggests, 
remain coupled in complete isolation, the states of the 
whole, conceived as a single unit, goes through 
superpositions. As soon as an observer intervenes to read off 
the result of the measurement on the C-part of the combined 
system, the coupling breaks down. Consequently, the smooth 
evolution of the unit as a whole comes abruptly to a halt, 
and the states of each de-coupled system on its own, embark 
on a new kind of evolution. Finally, this new evolution 
leaves the subsequent states of the separated systems only 
statistically correlated.
Although this theory ensures that the awkward states of 
superposition remain so well hidden that they need not bother 
us so long as we restrict ourselves to observables -and at 
least according to one school of thought, that is all that 
physics should be concerned about, it has achieved this 
success at the cost of contaminating C-systems with such 
states. The problem is that their state, either in complete 
isolation or in interaction with any other system, is 
successfully envisaged as a definitive collection, which 
although compatible with being a mixture at any one time, 
cannot be reconciled with being a superposition at any time. 
There may be uncertainties as to what the state of a C-system 
is at a particular time, but to ascribe superpositions to 
these uncertainties ’seems simply wrong1, to use 
Schrddinger1s description in Schrddinger [1935] (also in 
Wheeler and Zurek [1983], p. 156).
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25. Schrodinger1 s Cat: and Wigner’s Friend
To highlight: "the gravity of the problem, SchrOdinger [1935] 
proposed a gruesome experiment. 'A cat is penned up in a 
steel chamber, along with the following diabolical device 
(which must be secured against direct interference by the 
cat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive 
substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of one hour 
one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, 
perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and
through a relay releases a hammer which shatters a small
flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system 
to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives
if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The first atomic decay
would have poisoned it. The ^function of the entire system 
would express this by having in it the living and the dead 
cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal 
parts.1 (In Wheeler and Zurek [1983], p. 157)
Now, the * smeared out' state of being alive and dead at the 
same time, is quite inconceivable for a single cat to be in, 
with or without being coupled to an atom. However, to those 
who find inconceivability suspect as sufficient grounds for 
questioning the merits of an idea, the follow up must surely 
encourage a good step in that very direction. For the cat 
that is both alive and dead ’ in equal parts' while hidden 
from anybody’s view, is instantaneously converted into a cat 
that is either very much alive, or else very much dead, as a 
result of an observer merely casting an eye on it I This, in
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■the case of the cat and other as yet unseen animals, may 
amount to bestowing divine-like powers over life and death on 
mere mortal. observers, but its implications go much further 
than this.
Let us take the view, very much uncontroversial, that 
observers emerged during a period in the time-evolution of 
the universe. Since there were no observers intervening with 
its evolution prior to this period, the states of the whole 
universe, viewed as a single complex physical system, must, 
according to von Neumann's theory, have been evolving 
undisturbed. This process of evolution must, therefore, have 
been of the second type, unfolding strictly according to the 
law laid down by the SchrOdinger equation, from superposition 
to superposition of states.
'Events' as we understand the term, would have no place in 
this universe, since nothing is ever fixed one way or the 
other in the course of its evolution. We would, at best, have 
to describe the world up to this time, using Jammer's words 
(from a different but related context), as being 'a universe 
of evolving potentialities.. .but not of real events.' Jammer 
[1974], p. 474.
The emergence of observers, however, has, as its consequence, 
the gratuitous introduction of the first type of evolution 
into the world. Without any effort being required on their 
part, as observers merely multiply and turn their attentions 
around, definite events begin to take shape and proliferate.
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When Putnam [1983], p.. 251, wrote, 'On von Neumann's view 
there is a dependence of the truth upon one's perspective; 
there is no master truth', he was giving us only a part of 
the picture. One, by mere virtue of observing, would, 
according to this point of view, have to be engaged in world- 
making !
To complete the picture, the final master stroke is provided 
by Wigner [1961], in the shape of yet another ingenious 
experiment. The set-up includes an atom, similar to that in 
Schrttdinger' s experiment, only now its decay is made to 
produce an innocuous, but visible flash of light from a 
device that is secured to detect it.
' It is natural to inquire about the situation if one does not 
make the observation oneself but lets someone else carry it 
out. What is the wave function if my friend looked at the 
place where the flash might show at time t? The answer is 
that the information available about the object cannot be 
described by a wave function. One could attribute a wave 
function to the joint system: friend plus object, and this 
joint system would have a wave function also after the 
interaction, that is, after my friend has looked. I can then 
enter into interaction with this joint system by asking my 
friend whether he saw a flash.' (In Wheeler and Zurek [1983], 
p. 173)
Wigner deploys a reductio regarding the states of the joint 
system. Let us assume, to begin with, that the states of the
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joint system can be accounted for by QM a la von Neumann. 
Then, so long as the joint system remains completely isolated 
from the rest of the world, its states should evolve as the 
superposition of the following eigenstates: the device
flashing and the friend seeing a flash, and the device not 
flashing and the friend seeing no flash (we assume there is 
no other alternative). Only when the isolation of the joint 
system is broken by an outside observer who enters into 
communication with the friend, asking him whether or not he 
saw a flash, is the superposition supposed to give way to 
either one of the definite states of the friend seeing a 
flash or not.
’However, if after having completed the whole experiment I 
ask my friend, "What did you feel about the flash before I 
asked you?" he will answer, "I told you already, I did [did 
not] see a flash", as the case may be. In other words, the 
question whether he did or did not see the flash was already 
decided in his mind, before I asked him.’ (Ibid, p. 176)
This outcome is in contradiction with what the theory says 
should be the case. Since von Neumann’s theory is quite 
successful in all the cases where the system involved does 
not include observers, Wigner concludes that it must stop 
short in cases 'where consciousness plays a role' (Ibid, p. 
178). In other words, von Neumann's formulation of QM manages 
to unify the laws of motion governing the evolution of Q- 
systems' states with the measurement processes that must be 
employed to test them, at the cost of introducing to physics
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entities whose behaviour must remain outside the latter’s 
applicability altogether.
26. Back to the Wave Function
We started off with an interpretation of the wave function 
which was based on the assumption that it is the Quantum 
Mechanical equivalent of the description of physical systems 
in CM. Since, as such, it ought to apply to all physical 
systems, including those that are combinations of Q and C- 
systems, we find that this can be secured only by dividing 
physical processes into two fundamentally different types.
The first (to change the order imposed by von Neumann), is 
allowed to enjoy the time-honoured characteristic of 
unfolding smoothly according to a strict law, but must pay 
the price of escaping comprehension by any stretch of the 
imagination. The reason for this is that the notion of 
superposition, which is perfectly understandable in the area 
where it originated, is forced to apply to something which 
appears totally alien to it. In the case of Q-systems, the 
sting of incomprehensibility may feel less biting at first, 
because of the fact that they are next to impossible to 
observe on their own. But the advice that it can be cured by 
barring curiosity from domains to which direct observations 
cannot be extended, proves ineffective. Superposition of 
states as applied to Q-systems, is soon found, by the 
implications of the theory which postulated it, to
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contaminate the states of C-systems as well, and here the 
application appears to verge on a category mistake.
The second type of process conforms admirably, to the 
statistical regularities that are the best we can obtain when 
we make measurements on selected parameters of Q-systems. 
This, however, must pay the price of being introduced into 
the physics of the strange world that — is supposedly 
determined by the first, as a result of perceptions that are 
spontaneously formed in the minds of observers. Exactly how 
these perceptions are formed, or through what procedures they 
come to transform what goes on in accordance with the first 
type of process into observed events, must remain a mystery 
that is, eventually, pushed well outside the reach of 
physics, and perhaps science as a whole, altogether.
What we end up with, therefore, as a result of taking on 
board the orthodox interpretation of the wave function, is a 
host of problems far more numerous, and more serious, than 
those for the solution of which it was conceived in the first 
place. It by-passes an entity with properties that do not 
appear to tally with our current conceptions in physics, only 
to run into a quagmire of entities, attributes and processes 
all of which seem to be grossly out of line with anything we 
know. At least with the former we stand a chance of improving 
our position since it remains a physical phenomenon, and no 
door has been shut on the possibilities of carrying out 
further research on it. With the latter, on the other hand, 
the theory ensures that no further probe into their mysteries
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can be made apart from speculations that cannot be 
independently tested.
All this adds up to indicate that the choice of this 
interpretation is unduly costly. One is also tempted to say 
that it is methodologically questionable as well. The only 
reason for hesitation would be the fact that untestable 
speculative hypotheses abound in physics. It -is, we are told 
by methodologists, whether a theory, as a package of 
hypotheses which may or may not be individually testable, is 
itself testable, that matters. But it must be noted that the 
legitimacy of the place of untestable hypotheses in testable 
packages depends entirely on whether or not they have a 
constructive role to play, either in the articulation of a 
formalism or else in facilitating the comprehension of one.
None of these purposes are fulfilled by the untestable 
hypotheses which the orthodox interpretation of the wave 
function entail. An articulated formalism for QM was already 
in place before they appeared, and far from facilitating the 
former's comprehension, they have managed to shroud much of 
how it works in an impenetrable obscurity. They appear, 
therefore, as purely idle excess baggage which must be tacked 
on to physics solely as a result of sustaining the orthodox 
interpretation against serious difficulties. They are even 
barred from having any bearing at all on any area of science, 
and often end up more expedient as propaganda material for 
esoteric schools of thought.
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In contrast, the alternative interpretation of the wave 
function that we have opted for does not appear to suffer 
from problems in the same scale. According to this 
interpretation, the wave function is identified neither with 
Q-systems themselves, nor with their state description. It 
is, rather, supposed to describe a separate entity, a field, 
whose intensities everywhere in the physical space determine 
distributions for the values of the dynamical- parameters of 
the associated Q-system. Because this distribution is unique 
for each preparation procedure that Q-systems" of a certain 
kind may be subjected to, the values of a wave function can 
be taken to single out particular states for them. This is in 
line with the tradition of identifying the state of a 
physical system by the values of its dynamical parameters, 
and is the reason why we have chosen to describe the wave 
function as the signature of a particular state.
The problem associated with the conception of this field, as 
has been noted, is that it lacks characteristics other known 
fields possess, and it can do things which in the light of 
what it lacks appear inconceivable. Even though it does not 
store energy itself, its ripples can move in space with 
phenomenal speeds. Their frequency, in turn, appears to be 
related to the energy of the associated particle in an 
unprecedented way. Even though the latter clearly lacks 
enough Classical energy to possibly reach certain regions in 
physical space, the very fact that this field extends over 
those regions enables the particle reach them (a phenomenon 
known as the 'tunnelling effect').
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’Inconceivable* attributes such as these, however, are no 
strangers to physics. The very ideas that empty space stores 
energy and that ripples of energy can propagate as waves 
without requiring any material medium, exemplify two that 
were once thought to be inconceivable. Likewise, entities 
such as particles that have no ’mass' and travel with the 
same speed in all frames of reference were, in one day, 
considered just as inconceivable. The reason why they manage 
to force their way into physics, despite the fact that nobody 
liked them, is that with their help notable successes are 
achieved, one way or the other, by this science.
The same can be said about our 'inconceivable' field. We have 
seen that at least in the cases of two major contributions to 
the development of QM, de Broglie's and Born's, it had a 
considerable heuristic role to play. We have also seen that 
in the cases of the double-slit and the beam-splitting 
experiments (with or without delayed-choice), the conception 
of this field facilitates comprehension in all the areas 
where its rival runs either into absurdity or obscurity. 
Moreover, puzzles such as those of Schrodinger's cat and 
Wigner's friend simply do not arise, because the idea of 
superposition of states plays no part in this conception. In 
all, this conception is methodologically fertile while its 
rival is sterile, and it is illuminating while its rival is 
obscurantist.
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27. Amplitude Field and Measurement
Once we have overcome the problem of conceiving the amplitude 
field, we can account for the process of measurement in a 
straightforward manner. Let us concentrate on position 
measurements only. This does not detract from generality 
since all Quantum Mechanical measurements ultimately depend 
on tracking traces which Q-systems leave at various locations 
on measuring instruments. Even a spin measurement, as in the 
Stern-Gerlach experiment, 'despite all the talk about 'spin1, 
is finally about position observations' (Bell [1987], p. 
162). The measuring instrument, or at any rate the device on 
which we finally observe traces of a Q-system, is, in turn, 
always a C-system.
The places where the latter comes into contact with the 
former, are generally determined by the behaviour of the 
amplitude field in the region. If the circumstances 
surrounding a measurement are such that from the initial to 
the final stages of the experiment the intensity of the 
amplitude field associated with a Q-system remains everywhere 
confined to a compact region of space, the Q-system would be 
in an eigenstate of its location. The progression of this 
intensity in time would, in turn, be determined by a wave 
function which, strange as it may look, is the sole solution 
to the Schrodinger equation appropriate for this case. This 
function describes a passage way opening up in physical space 
which looks like a narrow tube, and inside which the motion 
of the system is confined. Only at places where this tube is
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cut or obstructed with a suitable device, would a trace of 
the system be observed.
If, on the other hand, the circumstances are such that there 
is more than one solution to the Schrbdinger equation which 
is appropriate for the case, the intensity of the associated 
field everywhere would be determined by the superposition of 
several waves. The Q-system in motion- under these 
circumstances would, therefore, face the passage ways that 
open up in the physical space, as a result of this- 
superposition. There might be only one, as in the case of the 
beam-splitting experiment with the final half-silvered mirror 
in place. Or, there might be many with varying degrees of 
permeability, as in the case of the double-slit experiment. 
The degree of permeability of each passage way, in turn, is 
determined by the strength of the field which results from 
the interference of all the waves that are set into motion in 
a given circumstance.
If the instantaneous intensity of the amplitude field 
everywhere could be measured independently for a given 
situation, the state of its associated Q-system could be 
decided at once from this measurement. This possibility, 
however, must be ruled out since, so far as we know, the 
amplitude field cannot exchange energy with other systems, 
something that would be necessary if we were to obtain a 
measurement result on its intensity. Instead, the state of 
the Q-systems must be decided indirectly, by measuring the 
probabilities that the intensities of this field everywhere
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determine for its possible locations. This entails, as was 
pointed out in 13, that the state of each Q-system, a trace 
for which has been observed at a particular location, is a 
mixture. This mixture would, in turn, be resolved only when 
the results from the same location measurement on an 
indefinitely large number of the same type of systems, all 
identically prepared, are obtained. It is only then that we 
would be in a position to have a picture of the intensity of 
the amplitude field at hand which is pertinent to the 
circumstances of a particular measurement situation on a Q- 
system.
We sum up: States do not superimpose, but amplitude waves, 
like all waves, do. In each particular circumstance, set up 
to obtain some traces of a Q-system, the behaviour of these 
waves is strictly determined by the Schr6dinger equation that 
is written for that circumstance. Superpositions which must 
be allowed because of the linearity of this equation, are, 
therefore, quite naturally (thanks to Born) reconciled with 
the results obtained from measurements on Q-systems, without 
any need to invoke supra-physical interventions. Finally, the 
strange properties that must be accepted for the amplitude 
field itself, pose a problem which can find its resolution 
only from further advances in physics. Either it would turn 
out to be analogous to numerous other similar conceptions 
where conceptual adjustments have had to be made by working 
physicists, or else deeper principles would be discovered 
that can explain these properties and their effects on other 
things.
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28. The Limiting Case Problem
Now we consider the vexed question of whether this account of 
QM complies with the demands of the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle. According to the atomic conception, 
Q-systems are the very building blocks with which C-systems 
are ultimately put together. C-systems, on the other hand, 
find an adequate account of their behaviour in CM. QM is a 
theory which has to date accounted spectacularly successfully 
for the behaviour of Q-systems. If it turns out that this- 
theory is unable to meet the demand of the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle, then we will be faced with the 
following dilemma: Either QM is a transitory theory in the 
history of physics and will be replaced with a comprehensive 
theory that does meet this demand. Or else "the demand made on 
all theories in physics by the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle is unwarranted. For QM is not only methodologically 
sound but empirically successful in the domain where CM is 
known to have failed, and the Generalized Correspondence 
Principle requires that any replacement of CM must have it as 
its limiting case.
Bohm and Hiley [1993], (p. 160), claim that Bohm’s
ontological interpretation of Quantum formalism is able to 
meet this demand quite naturally (they present this 
capability as yet another advantage of this interpretation 
over its rivals). In this interpretation, what we have called 
the amplitude field is regarded as somewhat analogous to a 
potential with non-Classical characteristics which is called
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the 'quantum potential'. With the aid of this potential and 
using a method known as WKB approximation, they rewrite 
Schrbdinger's equation in a form which yields the Classical 
Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the motion of a particle when 
the quantum potential is negligible compared to the kinetic 
energy of the particle (ibid, p. 161). They rule out at the 
outset the viability of the idea that the Classical limit 
will be obtained when the Planck's constant in the 
Schrddinger equation is equated with zero (ibid, p. 161).
The general claim in Bohm and Hiley [1993] is that in the 
domains where CM is empirically adequate, the effects of this 
potential are not at all pronounced. They manifest themselves 
in the domain of the sub-atomic entities, and this is where 
QM can deal with them adequately. This indeed provides a 
suitable framework within which there is hope for finding an 
acceptable solution to the limiting case problem in QM. What 
remains to be done is to find the conditions under which the 
quantum potential can be justifiably neglected. The simplest 
and most natural expectation that suggests itself in this 
regard is that as the size of a collection of sub-atomic 
particles in a fixed region of physical space grows and hence 
tends to become a macro-system dealt with adequately by CM, 
the quantum potential would assume values tending to become 
so small as to be negligible. Interestingly, however, it is 
shown in Bohm and Hiley [1993], (p. 167), that this is not at 
all the case; the quantum potential is simply not a function 
of the number of particles that comprise a macro-entity. Bohm
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and Hiley are consequently forced to find the conditions 
under which the quantum potential may become reasonably 
negligible by resorting to some other devices*
They find this limiting condition, through a rather 
sophisticated argument, in the interaction between a macro­
entity and the electromagnetic radiation to which, they 
contend, every entity in the physical world is actually 
subjected (they make a similar case for the interaction 
between a macro-entity and a stream of sub-atomic particles 
(ibid, pp. 172 & 173)). To get the desired result in this 
way, however, they need two essential ingredients each of 
which is open to challenge. First, is an assumption about the 
form of the wave function for the sub-atomic particles at the 
moment of the creation of the universe. They chose two forms 
for this wave function (ibid, p. 166f) and base their entire 
case upon them, thus exposing themselves to an obvious charge 
of ad hocness. Second, is an assumption about the way the 
supposed interaction must take place in order to render the 
value of the resulting quantum potential negligible. For this 
purpose, it is essential to their case that the source of the 
radiation falling on a macro-entity be so placed in relation 
to the latter that a distinct ' shadow ’ is formed beyond the 
object in the direction of the radiation's propagation (ibid, 
pp. 168-170, also pp. 267-269). Only under such conditions 
are they able to argue that (1) the probability of the 
destruction of interference between the wave functions of the 
particles comprising the macro-entity and those of the quanta
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of radiation present inside the shadow increases as the 
number of such particles increases, thus (2) diminishing the 
value of the quantum potential accordingly. But obviously in 
real life there is no guarantee that the relation between the 
macro-entities and the sources of electomagnetic radiation in 
the universe remains so fixed that in each case the right 
shadow is thereby produced. Any macro-entity may be exposed 
to many different sources of radiation, each placed at 
different and varying locations in relation to it so that 
indeed no shadow is produced in any direction. On this 
account, such an entity would cease being a ’macro-entity'.
Let us go back to my account of the amplitude field and try 
to explore the simple expectation, alluded to above, that as 
the number of sub-atomic particles increases to form larger 
and larger congregation in a region of space, the probability 
that the resulting system would tend to behave as a C-system 
increases. A striking feature in QM has been the fact that 
probabilities do not add up in the simple way in which they 
add in CM in any situations where probabilities arise, and CM 
is perfectly adequate to account for the behaviour of C- 
systems. A characteristic feature of the equations of motion 
in CM is that they are non-linear. That is to say, if there 
is more than one solution to these equations at any one time, 
their linear combination is not a solution. The Schrddinger 
equation (which is the Quantum Mechanical equivalent of the 
equations of motion in CM), on the other hand, is linear. We
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are, therefore, led to the following problem: how can the 
non-linear behaviour of the C-systems be reconciled with the 
linear behaviour of their ultimate constituents? This, like 
the case involving the problem of measurement, is the crux of 
the limiting case problem for QM.
According to our interpretation, the linear behaviour of Q- 
systems is entirely due to the fine-structure of the physical 
space in which they move. We have identified this fine- 
structure with variations in the intensities of the amplitude 
field associated with each Q-system in motion. Roughly, as 
the number of Q-systems that join together to form a larger 
system in a small region of the physical space increases, two 
events start happening: (1) the number of amplitude waves
propagating in the direction of motion of the joint system 
increases, and (2) the volume that is occupied by the 
combined Q-systems in this region also increases.
From the point of view of the mathematics, the first increase 
translates into an increase in the number of 1 interference 
terms' in regions relevant to the motion of the enlarged 
system in a given circumstance. We recall that the intensity 
of a wave function, which results at a given point from the 
combination of the intensities of two other such functions, 
is not a simple sum of those intensities. The term that must 
be added on to yield the correct result, includes the cosine
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of the phase difference between the two functions at that 
point. If Ia is the intensity of the first wave at a given 
point, I2 that of the second, and 9 the phase difference 
between the waves, the combined intensities I12 at that point 
is, I12 = Ix + I2 + 2(/l1I2) cos0.
As 6 varies between 0° and 180°, cosG varies between 1 and 
-1 accordingly, being 0 at 9 = 90°. So, the -average of cosB 
over one period is zero. We note that the, significant part in 
each interference term is the contribution made by the cosine 
of the phase difference between the waves. If, therefore, as 
the number of waves increases, the phase differences involved 
get nearer and nearer to covering all the values between 0° 
and 180° randomly, the sum of all the interference terms 
should tend towards zero. This would be the case only if an 
ever greater number of Q-particles that come together to form 
an enlarged system, are in an ever greater variety of 
different states. We have seen that if they are-all prepared 
to be in the same state, the interference terms are very much 
visible in the outcome.
Generally, it is not true that all Q-particles found in 
nature would have to be in different states if they come 
together to occupy a region of the physical space. However, 
a generic type known as Fermi particles, have precisely this 
property. They obey what is known as Fermi’s 'exclusion 
principle' according to which it is impossible for Fermi 
particles in the same state to cohabit in the close vicinity
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of one another. They can share a small region of space only 
by being in different states. As it happens, all Q-particles 
that serve as building blocks in the structure of C-systems 
such as billiard balls, for example, i.e. electrons, protons 
and neutrons, are Fermi particles. It is, in fact, by virtue 
of being Fermi particles that they are able to form stable 
bonds which are necessary to hold them together into 
structures with an ever increasing size. The net result of 
billions of Fermi particles congregating in a small region of 
physical space to form a single joint system is, therefore, 
that the interference terms in the combination of the 
intensities of their associated amplitude waves vanish.
Disappearance of the interference terms explains why the 
behaviour of C-systems, which are themselves made up of an 
enormous number of Fermi particles, can be accounted for 
adequately by the non-linear equations of motion in CM. In 
turn, as the dimensions of the system formed by the 
congregation of Fermi particles increase, the relative 
significance of Planck's constant tends to decrease. In the 
limit, this number becomes entirely negligible, allowing us 
to treat the location and momentum of the enlarged system as 
commuting parameters. As a result, these parameters appear to 
admit dispersion free values simultaneously, thus allowing us 
to regard them as D-parameters for the enlarged system.
All this ties up nicely with at least one account of how 
Schrodinger was able to arrive at his famous equation. 
According to Wigner [1983], 'Schrodinger derived the wave
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equation named after him by viewing the classical Hamilton- 
Jacobi equation as giving an incomplete and approximate 
description of this wave: incomplete, in the sense that it 
deals only with the phase... of this wave,^Y/(x, y, z, t); 
approximate, in the sense that the equation for the Hamilton- 
Jacobi function... is non-linear, whereas by demanding 
linearity SchrGdinger got the right equation for • ’ (In 
Wheeler and Zurek [1983], p. 290)
Electromagnetic phenomena, however, do not, in general, 
appear to fit the account given above. Here, systems of an 
enormous number of photons appear to behave as linearly as a 
single photon. In fact until the discovery of photons, large 
scale electromagnetic phenomena were adequately accounted for 
by Maxwell’s equations which are linear. Feynman et al 
[1963], vol. Ill, p. 21-6, explains this difference as 
follows: 'The wave function (r) for an electron in an
atom does not, then, describe a smeared-out electron with a 
smooth charge density. The electron is either here, or there, 
or somewhere else, but wherever it is, it is a point charge. 
On the other hand, think of a situation in which there are an 
enormous number of particles in exactly the same state, a 
very large number of them with exactly the same wave 
function. Then what? One of them is here and one of them is 
there, and the probability of finding any one of them at a 
given place is proportional t o ^ ^ .  But since there are so 
many particles, if I look in any volume dx dy dz I will 
generally find a number close to V" dx dy dz. So in a 
situation in which is the wave function for each of an
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enormous number of particles which are all in the same state, 
can be interpreted as the density of the particles...
' Something similar can happen with neutral particles. When we 
have the wave function for a single photon, it is the 
amplitude to find a photon somewhere... [T]here is an 
equation for the photon wave function analogous to the 
Schrddinger equation for the electron. The phot-on equation is 
just the same as Maxwell's equation for the electromagnetic 
field, and the wave function is the same as the vector 
potential A. The wave function turns out to be just the 
vector potential. The quantum physics is the same thing as 
the classical physics because photons are non-interacting 
Bose particles and many of them can be in the same state - as 
you know, they like to be in the same state. The moment that 
you have billions in the same state (that is, in the same 
electromagnetic wave), you can measure the wave function, 
which is the vector potential, directly. Of course, it worked 
historically the other way...’
We must note, however, that there are some states for photons 
such that when photons, either singly or en masse, are found 
in these states they behave in ways that cannot be accounted 
for by classical electromagnetic theories. But there are also 
photon-states in which the photons behave in a classically 
linear manner (i.e. beams of photons in such states are 
capable of producing such diffraction patterns as, for 
example, in Young's interference experiment). These states
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are called 'coherent' states and are distinguished by
particular phase properties for the photons. All
electromagnetic phenomena that are adequately accounted for 
by Maxwell's theory in particular, involve photons in 
coherent states.
Feynman's description above applies to photons in coherent 
states. Bose particles, which photons are a kind of, have the 
opposite property to their Fermi counterparts. 'It is a 
property of Bose particles that if there is already one
particle in a condition of some kind, the probability of
getting a second one in the same condition is twice as great 
as it would be if the first one were not already there. This 
fact is often stated in the following way: If there is
already one Bose particle in a given state, the amplitude for 
putting an identical one on top of it is /2 greater than if 
it weren't there.' (Feynman et al [1963], vol. Ill, p. 4-6). 
Once there is a photon in a region of space which is in a 
coherent state, the probability that others in the same 
region would be in the same state increases considerably. A 
large scale congregation of photons all of which are in the 
same coherent state is, therefore, highly probable once there 
are some already in that state in the region. The behaviour 
of such a congregation, unlike a similar one of Fermi 
particles, would thus be linear.
As mentioned before, Quantum Mechanics as yet has been unable 
to account for physical phenomena involving gravitation. This 
fact has prompted some physicists (Penrose, for example) to
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regard it as essentially an incomplete theory and to call for 
its replacement with a new kind of theory which would have 
this capability. Whether or not this will happen is a point 
I do not wish to speculate on. I have argued against some 
positions which claim, on the basis of the existence of a 
conceptual gap between Quantum and Classical Mechanics, that 
the Correspondence Principle cannot hold between them. I have 
proposed a conjecture according to which QM, -in its present 
state, appears to entail that the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation 
of CM, as well as Maxwell*s electromagnetic theory, are good 
approximations over the domain of phenomena in which they 
both proved empirically adequate.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion I present a summary of the main points 
conjectured and discussed in the preceding chapters:
1. The Correspondence Principle as envisaged and deployed by 
Bohr in his classic paper [1913], is Generalized and states 
that any theory 1^,(1 = 1,2,...), which is to supersede an 
outstanding, but falsified, theory TL, must, among other 
things, entail that TA is a good approximation over a domain 
in which it was established as empirically adequate.
2. The conception of the Correspondence Principle which 
appears to be promising as a Generalized intertheory 
constraint is the approximational conception.
3. Apart from its heuristic efficacy in the development of a 
new theory, the Generalized Correspondence Principle is 
necessary for a consistent assessment of outstanding theories 
in physics in accordance with the outlook of the two-tier 
realism. This outlook requires the choice of outstanding 
theories in physics to be based on the progress they have 
made in the direction of capturing the underlying physical 
constitution of the world.
4. The constraint imposed by the Correspondence Principle on 
outstanding theories, defines the Correspondence Relation 
among successive theories in one or more branches of physics. 
If the theory rA is a member of the sequence ordered by this 
relation which immediately precedes the theory T1^1, then TL 
is a limiting case of
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5. The Correspondence Relation is transitive. Assuming that 
the sequence of theories ordered by this relation converges 
to a theory T which mirrors the underlying physical 
constitution of the world, each member of this sequence that 
precedes T would be its limiting case. T can be taken to 
represent the entire truth which is of interest to physics. 
Therefore, the position a theory occupies in this sequence 
provides an indication of its relative proximity to the 
truth. The greater the number of limiting cases that a theory 
has in this sequence, the closer it is to the truth relative 
to all its other members.
6. The property of being a limiting case of any future theory 
that may supersede a new theory TL is decidable in a finite 
period of time. At a time t if TL is the only theory for 
which this property has been decided, and TL entails that the 
last falsified member of the sequence ordered by the 
Correspondence Relation is a good approximation, it is 
decided that TL is the closest available theory to the truth 
at t.
The imposition of the constraint demanded by the Generalized 
Correspondence Principle in physics on theories that are 
methodologically sound, as well as empirically adequate, 
forms the truth-likeness sequence. This sequence, in turn, 
can serve to provide two-tier realism with an illusive and 
much needed criterion of theory choice. The satisfaction of 
a curiosity about what the world is like, is the predominant 
motivation for a realist of this type in turning to science.
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It is, therefore, imperative that his choice of a theory 
should be grounded in relative advances towards the discovery 
of the truth.
Attempts to seek indications of truth-likeness in mere 
successes a theory has managed to achieve, have met with 
failure because they proved unable to find a link between 
them and the truth. Adding the requirement demanded by the 
Generalized Correspondence Principle to the demand for these 
successes, coupled with the assumption that the ultimate 
theory T exists, provides us with this very link. Each 
successive theory in the truth-likeness sequence constitutes 
one additional step in closing the gap to T, and therefore to 
the truth. It thus represents a further advance towards the 
discovery of the truth compared to all those that come before 
it.
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